Hernandez-Leal, P. (Pablo)

Kaisers, M. (Michael)

English

This article considers multiagent algorithms that aim to find the best response in strategic interactions by learning about

the game and their opponents from observations. In contrast to many state-of-the-art algorithms that assume repeated

interaction with a fixed set of opponents (or even self-play), a learner in the real world is more likely to encounter the

same strategic situation with changing counter-parties. First, we present a formal model of such sequential interactions, in

which subsets from the player population are drawn sequentially to play a repeated stochastic game with an unknown

(small) number of repetitions. In this setting the agents observe their joint actions but not the opponent identity. Second,

we propose a learning algorithm to act in these sequential interactions. Our algorithm explicitly models the different

opponents and their switching frequency to obtain an acting policy. It combines the multiagent algorithm PEPPER

for repeated stochastic games with Bayesian inference to compute a belief over the hypothesized opponent behaviors,

which is updated during interaction. This enables the agent to select the appropriate opponent model and to compute

an adequate response. Our results show an efficient detection of the opponent based on its behavior, obtaining higher

average rewards than a baseline (not modelling the opponents) in repeated stochastic games

Learning against sequential opponents in repeated stochastic games

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