Review of: Tamsin Jones, A Genealogy of Marion’s Philosophy of Religion: Apparent Darkness, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 201

George Vamesul

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BOOK REVIEWS 535   META: RESEARCH IN HERMENEUTICS, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY VOL. III, NO. 2 / DECEMBER 2011: 535-541, ISSN 2067-3655, www.metajournal.org    Jean-Luc Marion’s Philosophy of Religion:  Between Methodological Rigorousness and Hermeneutics  George Vamesul Al.I. Cuza University of Iasi   Tamsin Jones, A Genealogy of Marion’s Philosophy of Religion: Apparent  Darkness,  Bloomington,  Indiana  University  Press, 2011   Keywords: Jean-Luc Marion, philosophy of religion, phenomenology, Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius the Areopagite, hermeneutics   Jean-Luc  Marion’s  writings  range  from  revolutionary approaches  on  Descartes  oeuvres,  to  apologetic  debates  in theology  and  groundbreaking  inquiries  into  the  realm  of phenomenology. When dealing with such a vast amount of topics the  reader  finds  himself  rather  puzzled  concerning  the cohesiveness of Marion’s entire corpus, and the question of how one  should  engage  such  a  variety  of  subjects.  While  the originality of his work on Descartes seems to be a common place among  scholars,  the  problem  rests  with  the  relation  between phenomenology and theology. Here, the readings waver from a theological or hermeneutical or “non-egological” understanding, to claims that he is not theological or hermeneutical enough, or that the ego still plays an important role in his work1. Despite all these conflicting narratives, there are scholars2 that have a more holistic understanding of Marion’s enterprise. In his recent book A Genealogy of Marion’s Philosophy of Religion: apparent Darkness, Tamsin Jones takes up the holistic view claiming that a remote narrative tends to overlook a more META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 536  basic  tension,  namely  that  between  the  demands  of methodological rigor and  the anti-idolatrous claim (4). Drawing on  two  Greek  patristic  sources  in  Marion  –  Dionysius  the Areopagite  and  Gregory  of  Nyssa  –  he  unravels  the  entire schema of this tension and, in the end, points a way to balance it. The first task of the book (chapter I) is to reveal the place, the reason and the purpose of the many citings of Dionysius and Gregory throughout Marion’s work. This whole itinerary leads Jones from analyses of Marion’s first articles, through some of the most famous books (The Idol and Distance and God Without Being) ending with his last publication Au lieu de soi: L’approche de Saint Augustin. Besides providing arguments in favor of the holistic  view  –  since  givenness  or  the  conceptual  dyad  visible-invisible are major themes that can be trace back to Marion’s fist writings  (pp.15-17)  –  the  analyses  also  reveal  two  important aspects of the way the citings of the Gregory and Dionysius work. First of all, the quotations function as a source of authority in contemporary  apologetic  debates  –  and  also  in  more philosophical  accounts  –  especially  because  of  the  manner  in which  the  Fathers  appropriate  certain  theological  problems: instead of starting from a rational point of view and advancing different hypotheses, they wait to “receive properly what is to be received  from  God”  (18).  Secondly,  Marion  recovers  these  two authors in a univocal manner that frequently takes the form of employing Gregory’s ideas as proofs for Dionysius. This pattern of citings is exposed exemplarily by Jones’ analyses of Marion’s In the Name: How to avoid speaking of it. Here Marion engages himself  in  a  debate  with  Derrida  who  claims  that  negative (apophatic) theology cannot avoid metaphysics and consequently, is  subjected  to  deconstruction  (32).  Marion  responds  to  this critique with the idea of a third way of speaking in Dionysius. He draws  on  his  translation  of  the  term  αỉτία  as  the  Requisite instead of cause, claiming that for Dionysius this term has no intention  of  naming  God,  that  is,  has  no  connection  with  the Aristotelian  predicative  language.  Instead,  αỉτία  denominates, pointing  to  a  somewhat  non-predicative  language:  therefore language praises God as αỉτία in the act of praying. Here, Marion faces in a very precise way the Derridean critique, since prayer praises God as something and therefore by naming. To avoid it, BOOK REVIEWS 537   he  brings  in  Gregory’s  theory  of  language  from  Contra Eunomium,  which  claims  that  language  does  not  name  the essence  of  things  but  only  fulfills  the  pragmatic  function  of indication,  without  manifesting  something  (36).  This  shows precisely how Marion mixes up the two authors in a univocal retrieval that governs explicitly or implicitly his entire work. The only problem with this pattern is raised by Jones’ analyses of Marion’s last published book Au lieu de soi: L’approche de Saint Augustin.  It  is  obvious  that  this  last  publication  is  a  turning point for Marion, shifting from the Greek Fathers to a peculiar Latin one, from apophasis to confession and from invisibility to beatific vision (42). Nevertheless it continues a movement which began  with  The  Erotic  Phenomenon  and  analyzes  the  moral implications  of  the  passive  self  in  relation  with  unlimited givenness.  From  this  perspective,  the  pattern  that  Jones unravels is confirmed again. Having  that  figured  out,  Jones  proceeds  further  in  the analyses  of  the  legitimacy  of  such  a  univocal  retrieval  of  the Christian authors in Marion’s corpus. Although Marion employs the  Fathers  in  constructing  his  anti-idolatrous  (apophatic) strategy – that is, a discourse proper to God – he ignores that their  approaches  on  the  topic  comes  with  a  bigger  frame  of reference,  one  that  involves  also  cosmological,  theological  and anthropological  presuppositions  due  to  which,  instead  of  one apophatic strategy, Marion ends up with two different projects.  First,  for  Gregory,  language  has  its  place  in  a  world determined by two components: diastema and kinesis (57). While the former describes the absolute gap between God and creation, the later constitute all beings in an ongoing movement toward an infinite  creator.  Hence,  despite  the  fact  that  language  is conventional,  thus  reflecting  the  human  speaker,  it  is  in  the same  manner  reliable  and  humble  due  to  the  fact  that  it constitutes  a  response  to  God’s  revelation,  regardless  of  the imperfections that comes with this response.  Second, from Dionysius’ perspective, language is a system of symbols that points toward a divine creator. Since creation is understood as a hierarchical givenness out of divine love (58-72), this  pointing  is  twofold:  on  the  one  hand,  it  sets  up  in  a “projection” that opens the possibility for an ontological and an META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 538  epistemological connection between creation and creator; one the other  hand,  it  always needs  to  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  sign never  reaches  its  ground  since  the  latter  is  beyond  every signification.  Thus,  Jones  concludes  that  in  the  Dionysian understanding  of  language  there  is  a  perpetual  play  between disclosure and concealment that materializes on the one hand in an infinite number of names, on the other hand in an ascent into silence that opens up a hymnic worship.  Consequently, since Dionysius’ apophaticism is concerned with  assigning  human  beings  their  right  place  according  with God,  while  Gregorys’  deals  with  a  never  ending  movement toward  the  divine,  Jones  finds  their  univocal  retrieval inadmissible. Since he stated in the beginning that this pattern of citing implicitly influences Marion’s philosophical works, the next two chapters represent an extensive analysis to disentangle which of the two anti-idolatrous strategies fits better with his phenomenology of givenness.  In analyzing Marion’s phenomenology, Jones finds that it is  driven  by  two  central  motivations:  the  claim  to  free phenomena from all conditions and idolatrous restrains, and the urge to show the possibility of all phenomena (79). This means paradoxically,  that  his  method  requires  a  universal  (certain, indubitable and unquestionable) determination without deciding a  priori  any  specific  epistemological  corollary  (metaphysical specificity). The reduction to givenness seems to fulfill these two exigencies since, on the one hand it secures the indubitability of apparition of things without the certainty of objects, and on the other hand it renders itself as a counter-method (without giving up  its  hegemony  toward  other  sciences)  inasmuch  as  it intervenes  after  the  fact,  that  is,  after  the  manifestation  of appearing.  The  method  remains  phenomenological  since  it confines to the necessity of the describability of phenomena, and it approaches revelation only as a pure possibility (94). According to  Jones,  this  search  for  universality,  despite  Janicaud’s observation,  places  Marion  in  the  same  line  with  Husserl. Nevertheless, since the method intervenes only “after the fact”, I wonder how could one describe a pure possibility without any link to the actual happening, and thus, how could the neutrality of phenomenology remain untouched? BOOK REVIEWS 539   Furthermore,  Jones  argues  that  the  framework  of givenness  leads  back  to  Marion’s  recovery  of  Dionysius.  Thus, while  providing  him  with  an  apophatic  strategy  which  entails the  notion  of  givenness  Marion’s  recovery  of  Dionysius  also accomplishes  a  hierarchical  understanding  of  the  world  which means an ontological and epistemological leveling of things. This leads Jones to a double conclusion: first, Marion’s motivations – especially  the  claim  for  a  universal  method  –  leads  him  to refashion some of Dionysius’ ideas and concepts – like the term αỉτία (100) – to fit his intention, and second, when criticized3 for the  strange  imports  that  come  along  with  this  apophatic strategy, he resumes to Gregory without a specific note.  Since Dionysius’ apophasis does not provide a way out given  the  claim  for  a  universal  methodology,  Jones  turns  to Marions’ relation to Gregory, emphasizing the second pole of the tension: anti-idolatry. This second pole requires to loosen up the methodological  component  in  order  to  allow  a  place  for  more hermeneutical inquiry, especially when it comes to the saturated phenomena. The problem can be put like this: if pure givenness and saturation require a more passive subject which lacks any transcendental  function,  how  can  one  reinstate  hermeneutics without betraying the givenness or the saturation of phenomena? This breaks down into two additional challenges: a) the problem of the description of the excess and b) the difficulty of religious exclusivity  when  encountering  revelation  (111-119).  Following the thread of the first difficulty along Marion’s work, Jones finds that saturation necessitates rather than forbids interpretation, but the latter is somewhat a more subsequent act. Jones turns here  to  a  distinction  made  by  Shane  Mackinlay  between  the ontological  and  derivative  sense  of  hermeneutics:  while  the former is ruled out by the absoluteness of the given, the later still remains an open possibility. As far as the second difficulty, it is obvious that Marion favors the Christian examples when it comes to describing revelation, but he claims that the later is safeguarded  against  exclusivity  through  the  multitude  of hermeneutical  possibilities  that  are  requested  by  its  excess. Nevertheless  the  problem  stands  since  in  both  cases  Marion never  elaborates  the  relation  between  the  purity  of  givenness and the multiplicity of hermeneutical possibilities.  META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 540  Jones returns now to Gregory in an attempt to see if his apophatic  strategy  could  point  a  way  to  resolve  Marion’s problematic. Gregory states that the relation between scriptural interpretation  and  divine  incomprehensibility  results  in  a necessary  interpretative  pluralism  (129).  Since  language  has only  a  pragmatic  function,  it      is  due  to  God’s  kenosis  that humans have access to revelation, but this happens by filling and overwhelming our finite capacity to understand and interpret it. In this act of interpretation the subject is not only disrupted, but also  transformed  to  be  able  to  receive  more,  and  more,  in  an infinite  movement  towards  God.  Jones  claims  that  this  could serve  as  better  example  in  pointing  out  a  way  for  Marion’s aporia.  In  his  last  chapter,  Jones  proceeds  to  an  appraisal  of Marion’s  apophatic  phenomenology.  In  his  genealogical movement to uncover the tension between methodology and the anti-idolatrous pretence he has linked the former with Marion’s use  of Dionysius,  and  the  latter  with  analyses  on  Gregory.  In order to obtain coherence, Jones claims that the methodological pole is the least sustainable out of the two, since the reduction excludes  any  productive  or  volitional  role  of  the  subject  (132). Not even through the recourse to love does Marion’s reduction become any more clear: while insisting on the universality of love its appearance can only be personal and thus “subjective”. Jones thinks that the abandonment of the claim for universality would yield to a softer understanding of the method, along the lines of Pierre Hadot’s spiritual exercises. This would allow Marion to maintain  the  purity  of  givenness  along  with  the  plurality  of interpretation (135). However, I believe that this might lead to the revoking of the reduction’s phenomenological status. It is my content that a more accurate elaboration of the reduction, so that a  clear  distinction  can  be  drawn  between  lack  and  excess  of intuition, might lead to a clarification of the role of hermeneutics. I believe that this conceptual indistinctness (lack/excess) posits so much weight on hermeneutics leading the entire problem to an unsolvable aporia.  Turning on the second pole of the tension, Jones claims that in the development of the relation between pure givenness and  the  role  of  hermeneutics  a  more  obvious  and  careful BOOK REVIEWS 541   consideration of Gregory could prove useful for Marion’s entire project.  With  his  understanding  of  language  as  a  pragmatic discourse and the assigning of the limits of knowledge, Gregory outruns Dionysius whose recovery tends to unbalance the entire tension from Marion’s thought.  Although  I  wonder  whether  such  a  specific  import  of Gregory  would  resolve  the  tension  from  Marion’s  work,  Jones’ book remains one of the most challenging exegeses. The clarity and force of the arguments, as well as the novelty of the analyses opens new and interesting ways to approach Marion’s work.   NOTES   1 For example see Janicaud, Dominique. 2000. “The Theological Turn of French Phenomenology”.  In  Phenomenology  and  the  “Theological  Turn”.  The  French Debate.  New  York:    Fordham  University  Press;  Caputo,  John  D.  2007.  “The Hyperbolization  of  Phenomenology:  Two  Possibilities  for  Religion  in  Recent Continental  Philosophy”.  In  Counter-Experiences:  Reading  Jean-Luc  Marion, edited  by  Kevin  Hart.  Notre  Dame:  Notre  Dame  University  Press;  Kearney, Richard. 2011. The God Who May Be: A Hermeneutics of Religion. Bloomington: Indiana  University  Press;  Mackinlay,  Shane.  2005.    “Phenomenality  in  the Middle: Marion, Romano and the Hermeneutics of the Event”. In Givenness and God: Questions of Jean-Luc Marion, edited by Ian Leask and Eoin Cassidy.  New York:  Forham University Press; Leask, Ian. 2005.  “The Dative Subject (and the ‘Principle of Principles’)”. In Givenness and God: Questions of Jean-Luc Marion, edited by Ian Leask and Eoin Cassidy. New York: Forham University Press. 2 One of them is Christina M. Gschwandtner. Reading Jean-Luc Marion Exceeding Metaphysics, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2007. 3 Derrida criticizes Marion with this precise intention in “How to avoid speaking: Denials” in Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay, Suny Press, Albany, 1992.   Address: George VAMEŞUL Al.I. Cuza University of Iasi Department of Philosophy Bd. Carol I, 11 700506 Iasi, Romania E-mail: vamesugeorge@yahoo.com  

Jean-Luc Marion’s Philosophy of Religion: Between Methodological Rigorousness and Hermeneutics

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