Ph. D. ThesisThis thesis considers the extent to which phonology (that is, the phonological processor) can
be considered a module of the mind. It is divided into two parts. In the first, an approach of
'modest' modularity owing to Fodor (1983) is explored. In the second, the 'massive'
modularity model, due to evolutionary psychologists in general, but Caruthers (2006a) in
particular, is examined. Whilst for Fodor (1983, 2000) the mind is only modular around its
periphery (i.e. only its input and output systems are modules), for massive modularists the
mind is modular through and through, up to and including its central capacities. The two
authors, therefore, by extension differ in their definitions of modularity: Fodor (1983, 2000)
sees 'informational encapsulation' as being essential to modularity, whereas for Carruthers
(2006) domain specificity is much more important. The thesis concludes that whether
phonology is a module or not then depends on the definition of modularity, for although a
substance-free phonology which has no phonetic grounding could count as strong evidence
for the informational encapsulation (and therefore the modularity) of phonology by Fodor's
(1983) standards, some aphasiology data has shown that semantic treatments can remediate
phonological word finding difficulties in aphasia, which would be indicative that phonology
is not domain-specific, and therefore amodular in the terms of massive modularists like
Carruthers (2006a).1 In order to answer whether phonology is modular, then, we must first
define, once and for all, what modularity (and indeed phonology) means. Until then, the
debate remains, and so does my resolve to settle it.Arts and Humanities Research Council, Northern Bridge Doctoral Training
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