Silverstein, Harry S., Jr.

English

University of Denver

Denver Law Review Volume 12 Issue 2 Article 3 July 2021 Suicide, Sane or Insane, an Accident? Harry S. Silverstein Jr. Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr Recommended Citation Harry S. Silverstein, Jr., Suicide, Sane or Insane, an Accident, 12 Dicta 32 (1934-1935). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. SUICIDE, SANE OR INSANE, AN ACCIDENT?NSURANCE companies of their own volition have neverundertaken to insure the risk of suicide. At first it washeld by the courts of this country that if an insured com-mitted suicide his beneficiary could not recover, whether thepolicy mentioned suicide or not. The courts declared thatsuicide while sane was a fraud on the company. Ritter vs.Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U. S. 139, 42 L. Ed. 693. Laterthe courts began to change their views where the beneficiaryhad a vested interest on the ground that this interest could notbe defeated by the act of a third party. To overcome thisview or rule of law the insurance companies began to ex-pressly except this risk from their policies and have continuedto do so to the present day.Beneficiaries contended that this clause was inoperativeand invalid, but it was early held, in Bigelow vs. BerkshireIns. Co., 93 U. S. 284, 23 L. Ed. 918, that such a clause wasvalid and enforceable. For, said the court, in an opinion byDavis., J.: "If they (insurance companies) are at liberty tostipulate against hazardous occupations or unhealthy climates* * . surely it is competent for them to stipulate against anintentional act of self-destruction, whether it be the volun-tary act of a moral agent or not." The policy in this caseexcepted the risk of suicide while sane or insane.Such has continued to be the law in most states down tothe present time. However, a few states-Missouri, Utahand Colorado in particular-believing such a clause to be con-trary to public policy, have passed statutes calculated to nul-lify its effect.The statutes in the three states are the same in effect, theold Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals declaring in ContinentalCasualty Co. vs. Agee, 3 F. (2) 978, 983, that the interpre-tation given by the Supreme Court of the United States to theMissouri statute, "looking at the object of the statute andgiving effect to the words according to their ordinary, natu-ral meaning," was binding on the Circuit Court of Appealsin interpreting the Utah statute. This Utah statute is identi-cal with the Colorado statute. The Supreme Court case re-ferred to was Whitfield vs. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U. S.489, 51 L. Ed. 895.The Missouri statute is as follows:32DICTA"In all suits upon policies of insurance on life issued by any com-pany doing business in this state, to a citizen of this state, it shall be nodefense that the insured committed suicide, unless it be shown to thesatisfaction of the court or jury trying the cause, that the insured con-templated suicide at the time he made his application for the policy, andany stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void." R. S.1919, #6150.The Colorado statute reads:"From and after the passage of this act, the suicide of a policy-holder after the first policy year of any Life Insurance Company doingbusiness in this state shall not be a defense against the payment of a lifeinsurance policy, whether said suicide was voluntary or involuntary, andwhether said policyholder was sane or insane." Colorado CompiledLaws of 1921, j2532.Utah's statute is identical with the Colorado statute ex-cept that in the Utah statute the word "chapter" is substitutedfor the word "act" in the first phrase of the law. CompiledLaws of Utah of 1917, # 1171.The insurance companies naturally contended that suchstatutes were unconstitutional, but the courts have uniformlyheld contra. The Colorado Supreme Court in Woodmen ofthe World vs. Sloss, 49 Colo. 177, referring to the Coloradostatute, said its "enactment was a legitimate exercise of powerby the state legislature" and that it was not contrary to theprovisions of either the state or federal constitutions. "Bythis statute," stated the court, "the state has declared it to beagainst public policy to permit insurance companies to con-tract against the payment of their policies, in the event of loss,because the insured came to his death by suicide." This viewhas been upheld by the Colorado Supreme Court in its laterdecisions and by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, mostrecently in Aetna Life Ins. Co. vs. Braukman, 70 F. (2) 647.Having settled the constitutionality of these statutes, itbecame necessary to interpret them, not only as to the typeof companies and policies controlled, but also as to the situa-tions which they governed. Clearly life policies issued by lifeinsurance companies fell within the scope of the statutes, butit was contended that the acts were not so limited in theireffect. Beneficiaries claimed that accident insurance policieswerecontrolled when such policies contained a provision forpayment in case of an accidental death or death by accidentalDICTAmeans. The courts upheld this contention from the first, thelatest Colorado decision to that effect being Mass. ProtectiveAssociation vs. Daugherty, 87 Colo. 469.Missouri, Utah and Colorado all have agreed that thestatutes apply to an accident insurance policy where the in-sured commits suicide while insane, but there is a decided splitof authority as to the applicability of these enactments incases of suicide while the insured is sane.This particular point has never come before the courtsin Colorado. In this connection the case of Business Men'sAssurance Co. vs. Scott, 17 F. (2) 4, which came before theEighth Circuit Court of Appeals on appeal from the DistrictCourt for the District of Colorado and necessitated the inter-pretation of the Colorado statute, since the policyholder hadshot and killed himself while insane, the court stated (p. 6),"The question of whether the beneficiary in such a policy asthis would have been entitled to recover if the insured hadcommitted suicide while sane was not considered in any ofthese (Colorado) cases, and the Supreme Court of Coloradohas thus far held only that suicide while insane is death byaccidental means, and covered by an accident policy providingfor death benefits." The court refused to go further thanthis in interpreting the statute, but did state by way of dictumthat there was no reason why suicide while sane should becovered by an accident policy, since suicide while sane is in nosense of the word an accident.The Missouri courts, in interpreting their statute, followthe reasoning set forth in this dictum. It was held in Bruns-wick vs. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 278 Mo. 154, 213 S.W. 45, that the statute did not apply where the insured com-mitted suicide while sane. This court stated that such a deathwas not an accident. The burden of proof was still on thebeneficiary to show an accidental death and if the proofshowed suicide while sane then the beneficiary had failed tobear the burden. The defense of suicide need not be pleaded;merely a denial of the accidental death, which the plaintiffhad still to pr9ve, sufficed.The United States Supreme Court had previously inter-preted this Missouri statute in a different manner in the Whit-field case, supra. However, the Brunswick case has since beenDICTAfollowed by the old Eighth Circuit in the case of Von Cromevs. Traveller's Ins. Co., 11 F. (2) 350, which held suicidewhile sane to be a defense under the Missouri statute in theabove circumstance. The court rightfully based its decisionon the right of the state courts to determine the meaning andapplicability of its own state statutes and the binding effectof such interpretation on the federal courts.The Utah statute has been interpreted in exactly the op-posite way and in the following manner. The Agee case,supra, came before the old Eighth Circuit on appeal from theDistrict Court for the District of Utah. Here the insuredmet his death by drowning. The insurance company at-tempted to rebut a prima facie case of accidental death byintroducing evidence of suicide while sane. The trial courtrefused to admit this evidence. The Circuit Court approvedthis ruling, stating that the defense would have been good inthe absence of the statute, but that it had been abolished bythe act. It also stated that any attempt on the part of theinsurance company to contract so as to limit its liability inthe instance of suicide was a nullity and the insurance com-pany would be liable notwithstanding the suicide.A writ of certiorari was granted by the United StatesSupreme Court but was later revoked by it due to the receiptby that court of a certified copy of the opinion of the Su-preme Court of Utah in the case of Carter vs. Standard Ins.Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259, 41 A. L. R. 1495, decidedwhile the Agee case was still before the United States SupremeCourt.In the Carter case, which came before the Utah courts, thecontroversy was as to whether the insured's death, possiblycaused by an overdose of laudanum, was accidental or whetherhe had deliberately and intentionally committed suicide. TheUtah Supreme Court upheld the beneficiary by a somewhatpeculiar holding to the effect that although suicide while sanewould be a good defense, nevertheless "after the plaintiff hasmade a prima facie case of accidental death, to then permit thedefendant to prove the death was suicidal in order to rebutthe proof of accidental death would be to 'fly in the veryteeth of the statute,' and render it useless for the very pur-pose for which it was evidently intended." This interpreta-DICTAtion of the Utah statute by the Utah Supreme Court, beingin accord with the holding in the Circuit Court of Appealsin the Agee case, the United States Supreme Court found itunnecessary to review that decision and therefore revoked thewrit of certiorari as above mentioned.The Agee case is remarkable, for while stating that theMissouri and Utah statutes are the same in effect and thatthe interpretation of the former is controlling on the court inits interpretation of the latter, the court yet chose to disregardthe Missouri court's interpretation of its statute and followedthe old Whitheld case. The Agee case, as well as the Cartercase, goes a long way in interpreting the statute. It writesthe contract for the parties, making the company pay on apolicy covering death by accidental means, where the deathwas not an accident under any construction of the word what-soever.There is certainly basis for the contention that the Utahcourt, in the Carter case, erred in stating that to allow thedefense of suicide while sane in the instance of an accidentpolicy was to "fly in the very teeth of the statute." Not toallow such a defense gives the insured a greater coverage thaneither he or the insurance company contemplated. The in-sured wanted to be protected in case of accident, and the insur-ance company was willing to so protect him, but neither ofthe parties considered or believed that death in any other waythan by accident was to be covered. Yet such is the resultbrought about by the court virtually making itself a partyand rewriting the instrument for the original contractingparties.Very recently the Colorado statute has been interpretedby the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Braukman case,supra. In this case insured died of a gunshot wound allegedby plaintiff beneficiary to have been accidentally inflicted.The defendants' answers averred that death occurred throughsuicide while insured was sane. Demurrers to these answerswere sustained and an appeal taken. The Circuit Courtaffirmed the decision of Judge Symes in the District Courtfor the District of Colorado, where the action was originallybrought.The opinion, after reviewing and discussing, amongDICTAothers, the above cases, chose to follow the rule of the Ageecase and its interpretation of the Utah statute. It also statedthat in spite of the holding by the Missouri court in theBrunswick case, supra, it believed the reasoning and logic inthe Whitfield case decided by the United States Supreme Courtto be more sound. It further stated that the insurance com-panies had two courses to follow-they could either "ceasewriting policies in Colorado with a suicide exemption clauseor, if necessary, to amend premium schedules to cover theadditional risks."This decision practically settles the question in Colorado,for although it is not binding on the Colorado courts it willundoubtedly be followed by them. The Colorado SupremeCourt has already shown a tendency to go a long way inrequiring the insurance companies to stay well within theletter of the law, and making it practically mandatory thatthe suicide clause either be left out of the policy altogether,as suggested by the Circuit Court, or amended to fit the stat-ute. For in the Daugherty case, supra, the Colorado SupremeCourt held that the clause was not only a nullity but also anexpress and continuing denial of liability which waived therequirements of giving notice of death and furnishing proofof loss.This decision, like those of the Carter and Agee cases,overlooks the fact that such a clause is not a "denial of lia-bility," but, rather, a limitation of liability and an exceptedrisk not intended to be covered by the policy and as com-pletely outside the scope of a personal accident policy as dam-age to the insured's property would be.The result of these decisions is that the insurance com-panies are required by law to cover the risk of suicide althoughto cover it expressly would render the policy void under thedecision of the United States Supreme Court in the Rittercase, supra, which has never been overruled and which statesthat "if a policy expressly provided for the payment of thesum stipulated when or if the assured, in sound mind, tookhis own life, the contract, even if not prohibited by statute,would be held to be against public policy."There would seem to be error in any case which allowsrecovery on an accident policy where the policyholder inten-DICTAtionally and while in the full possession of his faculties takeshis own life: For it is certainly impossible for a beneficiaryunder such circumstances to present a bona fide prima faciecase of accidental death since obviously there was no accident.The remedies suggested by the Circuit Court in theBrauhman case are both impractical and unjust. To force acompany to insure such a risk against its desire bordersclosely on being an infringement of the constitutional rightto contract. Raising the premium rates would be inequitablein that such action would force the policyholders who arehonest to bear the burden of paying for the policies of dis-honest policyholders who, by their suicidal death, commit afraud not only upon the insurance company but also on theother policyholders. The common sense and logical interpre-tation of the statutes, such as that adopted by the Missouricourts, allows the imposition of fair premium rates and doesnot impose an unjust burden on the majority of the policy-holders.HARRY S. SILVERSTEIN, JR., Class of 1936.NOVEMBER DICTA NOTEDWe were pleased recently to receive an inquiry from theeditor of an Eastern Bar Association magazine inquiring thecost of reprinting 1,800 copies of the article in the NovemberDicta by Mr. Frank Swancara entitled "Impolitic Reinstate-ment of Disbarred Lawyers," and we are now advised thatthe printer has received an order for the article to be furnishedas an insert in the Massachusetts Law Quarterly.We extend our congratulations to Mr. Swancara.

Suicide, Sane or Insane, an Accident?

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Suicide, Sane or Insane, an Accident?

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