The law of vertical territorial and price restraints in the EU and in the USA: a critical analysis of vertical territorial and price restraints - an argument against legalisation
This PhD thesis critically surveys vertical territorial and price restraints in the EU and the USA not just from a legal angle, but also from comparative, economic, theoretical and historical perspectives. Different aspects of such comprehensive research assist with tackling the different issues that have occurred in the law of vertical territorial and price restraints while determining its correct approach.
This thesis argues against some existing competition policies and principles, such as the objective of the law of vertical territorial and price restraints. It shows that law of vertical territorial and price restraints should protect effective and free competition. Nevertheless, it follows that the object of effective competition is efficiency which is difficult to determine in situations when RPM or VTR is used. Furthermore, the complexity of vertical competition and vertical chains, including relationships, power and market structures, is surveyed. This thesis advocates the existence of vertical competition and further explains that it is bargaining power which should be assessed in RPM and VTR cases and not horizontal market power, which serves the purpose of horizontal rather than vertical competition.
The development of the laws of vertical territorial and price restraints including the analysis of relevant and significant cases both in the EU and the USA within a broader historical framework and relevant theories unveil some inconsistencies and uncertainties. This thesis criticises the formalistic approach within traditional anti-competitive theories and the demagogical approach within the majority of pro-competitive theories offering new suggestions and points of view.
Although vertical restraints have been part of US antitrust law and EU competition law almost since the beginning of their existence, this thesis reveals that their approaches have been unsettled and continue to develop with contradictory arguments on this issue across the legal, economical, empirical and theoretical scholarly works, which show lack of understanding of vertical competition. Unfortunately, vertical competition has not been acknowledged as the basic framework for vertical restraints in both the EU and US policies and their legislations. Therefore, this thesis concludes with legislative suggestions which better reflect the nature of vertical restraints