The conflicts arising from the differences of interest between the company and its directors have been the object of study in the organizational context. One of the problems related to these conflicts is the moral hazard, which is characterized by an opportunistic behavior of the manager after the contract is signed. In order to reduce this problem, the company’s owner may use incentives, which have the important function of aligning the manager’sinterests to its own, reducing the moral hazard and establishing the company in a position of competitive advantage. The objective of this paper is to analyze the influence of the type of incentive (monetary, non monetary or mixed) in the manager’s moral hazard intention. The method used was a quasi-experiment, which was applied in pairs and in a three round game, considering the three different types of incentives. The results showed that the type of incentive didn’t influence significantly the respondents’ answers. Yet an interactive effect, that comes from the inexistence of a previous knowledge of the partner, was identified in the relationship between the type of incentive and the moral hazard intention, which provoked a significantly increase when the money was used as incentive
