Paper presented at the Wits History Workshop:  The TRC; Commissioning the Past, 11-14 June, 199

Saul, John

Wits Institutional Repository on DSPACE

'The dog that didn't bark in the night:' Namibia's missingIRC and the South African modelJohn S. Saul,Southern Africa Report (Toronto)These notes must serve as a kind of prolegomenon to a longer paperto be prepared in the wake of the History Workshop. Even moreimportantly, that paper will be prepared in the wake of a period offurther research on the issues anticipated in these pages that I will becarrying out in Namibia immediately prior to the workshop itself. Inthis research/writing project I seek to place in comparative perspectiveSouth Africa's option for the TRC process and the prior decision inNamibia not to develop any such mechanism to deal with the past. Boththe conditions and calculations that broadly framed these choices andthe different potential implications of such choices, short- and long-term, will eventually be discussed. But the main focus will be on thereluctance of SWAPO, Namibia's chief liberation movement and now party-in-power, to encourage in Namibia any process remotely comparable tothat exemplified by the TRC in South Africa. The longer paper willexplore the possible importance of differences of opinion between SWAPOand the ANC regarding the most effective means of "reconciliation" tothe making of such a choice. More importantly, however, I willunderscore the centrality to Swapo's decision in this regard of itscontinuing refusal — different from the position taken by the ANC — toopen up its own human-rights' record in exile to public scrutiny. Thisproject thus builds on an earlier study, by myself and Colin Leys, ofSwapo's own often dismal human rights record in exile {Namibia'sLiberation Struggle: The Two Edged Sword [1994], especially chapter 3,attached) and its reluctance to speak openly about it. But it seeks toupdate that account by examining the way in which the crucial issuesidentified in that chapter have surfaced in post-liberation Namibia,despite SWAPO's best efforts to ignore them. It will also suggest theimportance to the keeping alive of such issues in Namibia of anawareness of the nature and promise of the TRC process unfolding inSouth Africa.Lauren Dobell, in writing on related themes, has noted theexistence of apparent differences of opinion between SWAPO and the ANCregarding the best means of dealing with questions of nationalreconciliation in the wake of successful liberation struggles (albeitstruggles whose outcomes were defined, in their particulars, by thecontinued salience of contending forces sufficiently stalemated on bothsides to make negotiations the necessary modality of resolution). As sheobserves,SWAPO's policy of national reconciliation, the essential contoursof which were determined before independence, differssignificantly from the ANC's. In confronting similar legacies ofsuffering, of communities and families torn apart in the waragainst apartheid, the Mamibian and South African governments cameto opposite conclusions regarding the best way to put the pastbehind them.1Succinctly summarizing the TRC model, she then notes that, "as Namibia'sruling party, SWAPO adopted a more cautious approach to reconciliation.In the government's considered opinion, resurrecting the past wouldserve no constructive purpose. A successful transition, it was argued,required cooperation among former enemies. Delving into past injusticeswould only incite a desire for vengeance and distract a still fragilenation from the paramount tasks of reconstruction and development."Leave aside the question of whether merely bracketing off the pastin this manner was an option available to the ANC in any case, except tonote that perhaps it was not, given the nature of the negotiationsthemselves and the centrality of the white community to sustaining thekind of overall economic strategy that the ANC was choosing for itself.After all, the alternative that many would have preferred to the projectof reconciliation through the pursuit of truth rather than justice wasnot the kind of studied silence chosen in Namibia but rather one ofdealing with the grim record of the apartheid state as the work of war-criminals, the latter to be dealt with accordingly.2 Perhaps it was3easier for SWAPO leaders to take the line it did given the fact that theregime overthrown had been, to some significant extent, a regime ofillegal occupation, now departed. Moreover, for all that the ANC won the1994 election handily, it had to establish its credentials on a far morecomplex terrain of political diversity and existing cross-pressures thandid SWAPO, given its apparently unshakable base in the northern part ofNamibia and its consequent very substantial political hegemony in whatis, in any case, a very small country.Further study of the reasons why different in-coming regimes, notleast those in South Africa and Namibia, chose their diverse routestowards (in Dobell's phrase) "knitting shattered societies together inthe wake of dismantled authoritarian regimes" are required before anyvery confident judgments can be made regarding the wisdom and/orappropriateness of choices made. But there is one dimension of suchchoices, relevant perhaps to both cases, that cannot be ignored, adimension significant enough to cast doubt on the importance to thechoice made in Namibia of Dobell's suggestion that "in the government'sconsidered opinion, resurrecting the past would serve no constructivepurpose." "Considered opinion"? "No constructive purpose"? Dobellherself is too astute an observer to leave that interpretation (albeitone that it is presented, at least momentarily, as her own) without anadditional gloss. As she then writes,An unspoken but critical sub-text for what detractors derided as apolicy of national amnesia [in Namibia] was the SWAPO leadership'suncomfortable awareness of the skeletons in its own closet....Incontrast to the ANC, whose Skweyiya Inquiry and MotsuenyaneCommission acknowledged violations of human rights in the ANCcamps, SWAPO never officially admitted to any wrongdoing.Indeed, it is difficult not to feel, in the SWAPO case, that thisconsideration is a primary one, trumping many of the broader questionsthat might, in principle, be posed about the roots and merits of thedifferent strategies of national reconciliation chosen. For the factremains that the SWAPO leadership simply has too much to hide to putitself on equal footing, at least for purposes of open TRC-styleproceedings, with the torturers, murderers and informants on the other4side. This is not straightforward terrain, of course. No-one would arguesome simple-minded equivalence between, on the one hand, the apartheidstate and its functionaries (whether operating in South Africa or inNamibia) and, and on the other, those who struggled, against enormousodds and often under the most desperate of conditions, to challenge it.It was on the grounds that just such an error had been committed in thewriting of the TRC report itself that the ANC launched its own (ill-advised?) challenge to the report at the eleventh hour late last year.Nonetheless the fact remains that the ANC did, up to a point, putitself in the dock, a key factor perhaps in allowing the TRC to make asmuch progress on a broad range of other fronts as it did. And this was,as Dobell mentions, not something new. For the ANC, there had alreadybeen the Skweyiya Commission and, when that was not deemed adequate, themore independent Motsuenyane Commission, both (in the early 1990s)reporting publicly — and before that' there had been the StuartCommission Report of 1984, now in the public domain, inquiring "intorecent developments in the People's Republic of Angola." Others canjudge the adequacy of those prior reports and of the ANC's own responseto them: in terms of disciplining perceived perpetrators of injustice,making just compensation to victims of any excesses, and/or self-critically examining the political premises (beyond the countervailingfact of the very real imperatives of war) that could have produced suchproblems. We know of at least one aggrieved critic of both theprocedures of the TRC (which is criticized for deciding "not to call theANC leadership to account publicly for atrocities committed in its campsoutside the country") and of the approach of the ANC to elaborating uponits own record in its external camps.3 Thus, Joe Seremane writes — inhis eloquent statement entitled "Where Lies My Brother?" — of hisfruitless pursuit of the "truth" as to the fate of his brother, Timothy"Chief" Seremane, apparently executed in exile by the ANC:I cannot help feeling that our TRC has betrayed a partisaninclination, accommodating so-called or adherent to the "popularparty," relegating relative unknowns to the periphery of TRCexperiences and services.How can the TRC believe that I will be satisfied by the editedreport with blotted-out names purporting to the ANC response to myplea? This account merely propagates the vilification of the dead,those who can no longer tell their side of the story.Why did the TRC not subpoena my informants, the Quatro Campsurvivors, to tell the other side of the story so that peoplecould judge for themselves.At the same time, both the ANC's initial report of the TRC("African National Congress Statement to the Truth and ReconciliationCommission," of August 1996, especially section 6, "Did the ANCperpetrate any gross violations of human rights?") and its second, moredetailed one ("Further Submissions and Responses by the ANC to Questionsraised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. 12 May 1997), dodeal with questions of abuses of power by the movement in exile insomething more than a purely defensive manner. And the final reportitself has some strong sections on such matters (Final Report, volume 2,chapter 4). This is, in any case, so much more than has beenaccomplished in Namibia along similar lines that it is small wonderaggrieved Namibians have looked to the TRC, warts and all, as a possiblemodel for their own country-Of course, the fact is that, whatever the negative aspects of itsrecord at, most notably, the Morris Seabelo Rehabilitation Centre inAngola, the ANC has very much less to hide than does SWAPO as regards"gross violations of human rights in exile." Elsewhere, Colin Leys and Ihave documented in some detail the authoritarian political culture thatdeveloped within SWAPO from the very earliest days of its exiledexistence in Tanzania, deepened dramatically in Zambia in the 1970s, andculminated in the horrors of the "spy scare" of the 1980s that filledLubango Camp with many apparently quite innocent victims of the SWAPOtorturers and executioners there.4 Despite the best efforts of formerdetainees, relatives of the victims, and human-rights activists inNamibia to get the full .story of those Angolan days on the table, notmuch happened during the early years of independence. To be sure, thestory had obtained some hearing during the transition to SWAPO'selectoral victory in 1990, aired thanks in part to the "disinformation"efforts of the apartheid state still present in Namibia during that6period. And yet, ironically, much of this "disinformation" was actuallytrue, whatever the malignant purposes to which its more wide-spreaddistribution was sometimes put. Nonetheless, SWAPO has had some success,then as now, in wrapping itself in the mantle of patriotism and thehonour of liberation to cover its tracks on the issue — despite thebest efforts of various parents' and detainees' groups to keep it alivein the public realm.Words are weapons, however. Once again, Dobell has helpedvigilantly to record the impact that the volume by Siegfreid Groth, aGerman cleric heretofore closely linked to the Lutheran church inNamibia and to support for SWAPO's liberation struggle, had in Namibiawhen it was first published there in 1995/6.5 Dobell notes that Groth'saccount of events in Angola and of the questionable silence ofchurchpersons, then and since, regarding them, revealed little that hadnot been written before. But, coming from a source so close to home andhitting, in any case, so uncomfortably close to target, it evoked somedramatic responses: embarrassment on the part of some churchpersons andanger from the SWAPO hierarchy, including President Nujoma who denouncedthe author on television in fiery terms. Importantly, too, itreactivated the network of those who still wished to force SWAPO tofinally come clean on such issues. As Dobell writes, "A Breaking theWall of Silence (BWS) Committee was formed, comprising former detaineesand their supporters, together with a number of CCN (Council of Churchesof Namibia) employees, to launch the book under its own auspices, andundertook to translate from English into the more widely spokenAfrikaans and Oshivambo, the latter directly addressing SWAPO'straditional support base."6The precise long-term impact of such disclosures remains to beseen. Certainly it has been the BWOS that has evoked most vigorously theTRC model as a possible bench-mark and model for future Namibianpractice. Its 1997 Annual Report is full of such references to the TRCand it bears noting that it BWOS actually invited a member of the TRC.Dr. Mapule Ramashala, to address its annual General Meeting on "therelevance of the TRC exercise to the Southern African Region." She quitespecifically argued that "the ANC's painstaking work of careful7investigating and documenting the dead and those who have disappearedshould inspire Namibians to find a way to do likewise," concluding byseeking to speak directly to President Nujoma himself (albeit inabsentia):President Nujoma, Sir, may I not be presumptuous, but may Isuggest that there is a way out of this, that you and your peoplecan address this issue. You were a victim also. You need toidentify with the pain and suffering that is going through yourland. You need to provide incentives for full disclosure, not justfor you, for your Cabinet and for all other perpetrators in yourcountry. Listen to BWS. I don't think there is any malice in thisgroup. I believe that they are determined to move their countryforward. This is an appeal to you, Sir, that you opencommunication and find ways with your people to heal not onlythose who have suffered violations, to heal your land, but most ofall to heal yourself.7For note that the matters the BWS seek to advance are not a matterof ancient history by any means. There is, of course, the fact thatsilence keeps alive the unburied memories of relatives of the victimsand the shame that still attaches, often illegitimately, to thoseaccused unjustly in exile of being spies. But silence also leavesunreflected upon the continuing temptations towards authoritariantendencies inherent in any polity, in exile or at home, not leastamongst those who not only, to their credit, won out over the SouthAfricans but also have "gotten away with murder." Unfortunately,however, there has been little sign that President Nujoma has chosen toheed Dr. Ramashala's advice. Indeed, the actions Nujoma and his rulinggroup have taken to amend the constitution in order to enable him tostand for a hitherto unconstitutional third term as president seem verymuch of a piece with the high-handed role he has chosen to play withinthe movement (and now the country?) since its founding.Not that such recent actions have gone uncontested in Namibia. Onewell-known veteran of the liberation struggle (SWAPO soldier, RobbenIsland graduate, pre-independence trade union activist), Mr. Ben Ulenga,actually resigned his post as Namibian High Commissioner late last yearto return to Namibia to contest this development, at first within SWAPOitself, now as head of a new Congress of Democrats.8 The fate of such an8initiative, mounted in the teeth of a still powerful SWAPO, remainsmurky, needless to say, as does the kind of priority this more broad-gauged political initiative might eventually give to the kind of issuesthat have moved the BWS to make its own contribution to the reawakeningof an active and critical civil society in Namibia. It is hard not feel,however, that Namibians have been denied an important opportunity tolearn from their own history, not least the history of their movement inexile, by the failure to facilitate a TRC-type process in their country.Whether other turns of the political wheel will eventually allow thefull story to be told there remains to be seen.1 Lauren Dobell, "Silence in Context: Truth and/or Reconciliation inNamibia", Journal of Southern African Studies. 23, #2 (June 1997).2 We also leave aside here other questions regarding the appropriatenessof the "Truth and Reconciliation" process, both as regards its mandateand its format, for dealing with larger questions of the nature ofsocio-economic system that sustained apartheid and where the lay theresponsibility, not just for the most obvious of crimes but for thefunctioning of that system as a whole. On this subject see theinsightful article3 Wetsho-Otsile "Joe" Seremane, "Where lies my brother," in the issueon "Truth and Reconciliation Commission," of Siyayal Elections 1999,Series No. 3 (1998).4 Colin Leys and John S. Saul (eds.), Namibia's Liberation Struggle:The Two-Edged Sword (London and Cape Town: James Currey and DavidPhillip, 1995), especially ch. 3, "SWAPO in Exile"; also Leys and Saul,"Liberation without Democracy: The SWAPO Crisis of 1976," Journal ofSouthern African Studies. 20, # 1 (March 1994).5 Lauren Dobell, "Namibia's Wall of Silence," Southern Africa Report.11, #4 (July, 1996). Groth's book is Namibia: The Wall of Silence(Wuppertal: Peter Hammer Verlag, 1995).6 Ibid., p. 33.7 From the report of Dr. Ramashala's speech in the Breaking the Wall ofSilence Movement's BWS Annual Report 1997 (Windhoek: BWS, 1997).8 Lauren Dobell, "The Ulenga Moment: SWAPO and Dissent," SouthernAfrica Report. 14, #1 (December, 1998)

'The dog that didn't bark in the night:' Namibia's missing TRC and the South African model

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Wits Institutional Repository on DSPACE