Carruthers’s thesis is undermined on the one hand by examples of integration of output from domain-specific modules that are independent of language, and on the other hand by examples of linguistically represented thoughts that are unable to integrate different domain-specific knowledge into a coherent whole. I propose a more traditional role for language in thought as providing the basis for the cultural development and transmission of domain-general abstract knowledge and reasoning skills

Hampton, J. A.

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Hampton, J. A. (2002). Language's role in enabling abstract, logical thought. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(6), 688 - 688.City Research OnlineOriginal citation: Hampton, J. A. (2002). Language's role in enabling abstract, logical thought. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(6), 688 - 688.Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/940/ Copyright & reuseCity  University  London has developed City  Research Online  so that  its  users  may access the research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders. Users may download and/ or print one  copy  of  any  article(s)  in  City  Research  Online  to  facilitate  their  private  study  or  for  non-commercial research. Users may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. All material in City Research Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. Versions of researchThe version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.EnquiriesIf you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact  with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.Language’s role in enabling abstract, logical thoughtJames A. HamptonPsychology Department, City University (London), London EC1V OHB, UK.hampton@city.ac.uk http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/hamptonAbstract: Carruthers’s thesis is undermined on the one hand by examplesof integration of output from domain-specific modules that are indepen-dent of language, and on the other hand by examples of linguistically rep-resented thoughts that are unable to integrate different domain-specificknowledge into a coherent whole. I propose a more traditional role for lan-guage in thought as providing the basis for the cultural development andtransmission of domain-general abstract knowledge and reasoning skills.What is the role of language in thought? Carruthers claims thatthought originally developed in prelinguistic hominids and othermammals within domain specific modules such as a folk biology,folk physics, or folk psychology, and that the evolution of languagewas necessary for integrating the outputs of these modules and soenabling humans to be more intelligent and adaptive. I take issuewith the thesis on four grounds.First, it is unclear why language should be considered necessaryfor integrating the outputs from different domain-specific mod-ules. The evidence cited by Carruthers is very limited for such ageneral claim. There are clearly unfamiliar situations in which be-ing able to use verbal coding and inner speech will make infor-mation of different kinds easier to integrate, recall, and use, butthat does not provide evidence that we cannot easily integrate in-formation from different domains without language in many fa-miliar contexts. When attempting to tackle an opponent in rugbyor football, or when selecting a shot to play in tennis, the athleteneeds to be able to integrate psychological reasoning about thelikely action about to be taken by the other player with physical in-formation about the speed and direction in which both playersand/or the ball are travelling. It is an empirical question whetherinner speech might play some role here, but it seems unlikely tobe necessary for integration, given that reaction times are muchtoo quick to allow verbally mediated conscious deliberation.Second, it is important to note (although Carruthers does notclaim to the contrary) that language may often be insufficient toensure integration across domains. Although we have a well-es-tablished vocabulary with which to talk about psychology andphysics, the two domains stubbornly resist attempts to integratetheir outputs in any known form of language, even for experts. Soa psychiatrist may feel warranted to tell her patient that there is“nothing physically wrong with you,” and then proceed to suc-cessfully treat the “purely psychological” symptoms with a drugknown to affect physical systems in the brain. Cartesian dualism isprobably the most widely held commonsense view of the mind-body relation, and the philosophical problems of integrating theoutput from the two forms of discourse are notorious.The failure of language to achieve integration may also be foundbetween folk biology and folk physics, with commonsense beliefsin animism holding for many centuries and still demonstrable inchildren before exposure to science education. There are alsomany domain effects in reasoning. Tasks of logical reasoning suchas Wason’s (in)famous four-card problem are very difficult in theabstract, but can be made trivially easy if placed in a domain wherethe structure of the domain lends meaning to the problem. If lan-guage is successful at facilitating domain-general thinking, then anaccount is needed of why the task (which is presented entirely inlinguistic terms) should become so much harder when abstractedaway from a specific domain.Third, the thesis ignores what may be a much more crucial rolefor language to play in thought, namely, abstraction (see, e.g., theearly research of Bruner et al. 1966). More recently Barsalou(1999) has developed the thesis that (broadly speaking) conceptsare mental simulations. Tokening a thought with a particular con-ceptual content leads to (and may even just be) activation of sen-sory and motor schemas associated with perception and action re-lated to that concept. If his thesis is true, then thinking will oper-ate most successfully within a modality-specific and situated formof mental model. I would argue that a key function of language isthat it provides an escape from this primary level of thought. Itprovides the bridge between the “messy” prototype representa-tion of a concept built around experience and action in the worldand the “clean” representation of a concept as an encapsulatedatom (see, e.g., Fodor 1998). Fodor’s arguments for conceptualatomism involve the compositionality and systematicity of thought.Yet these arguments themselves are simply derived from earlierconsiderations of the compositionality and systematicity of lan-guage. Language allows us to abstract out a notion of a conceptfrom the individual experiences on which it is based. It creates anew mental “entity” as a reified object of thought. As DwightBolinger put it, “The act of naming, with all we have seen it to im-ply in the way of solidifying and objectifying experience, becomesone of our most powerful suasive tools, enabling us to create en-tities practically out of nothing” (Bolinger 1975, p. 251).Finally, I argue that a second crucial cognitive role for languageis as a necessary precursor for the cultural development of sociallyshared logical thinking and hence, for rationality, narrowly de-fined. Natural language is, of course, a very imperfect tool for ex-pressing truths of any kind because of the vagueness to be foundin almost all of its referring expressions and the ambiguity in muchof its syntax. However, once the reference of terms is established(e.g., by indexicals or stipulation), and care is taken in choice ofsyntactic form, the development of logic (and hence mathematicsand science) can proceed, using forms of propositional argumentbased on the sentences of natural language. The formation of acommunity of speakers sharing the same language has thereforebeen essential for the progression of human thought through theformulation and the resolution of conflicting views.In a sense, of course, abstract logical thinking performs thefunction of taking input from domain-specific modules and inte-grating them, just as Carruthers argues. But it is not the availabil-ity of language per se that lies at the basis of this integration. Thereare many examples of domain-specific knowledge that signally failto be integrated in spite of fully developed language structures fortalking about them. It is rather the fact that with language – andthe cultural development and transmission of knowledge that itsupports – comes the hard-won capacity for abstracting the formof an argument away from its content, developing general reason-ing skills and finding the means for testing and challenging thereasoning of others.Relativistic implications of a natural-language-based format for thoughtSteve HenserIndependent Researcher, 174 Pennant Road, Llanelli SA14 8HN, UnitedKingdom. steve.henser@btinternet.comAbstract: I will argue (contra Carruthers) that accepting natural languageas the format of many of our thoughts should entail accepting a version ofWhorfian relativism and that, rather than something to be avoided, evi-dence from bilingual cognition suggests that incorporating this idea intofuture research would yield further insights into the cognitive functions ofnatural language.Peter Carruthers’s work on the cognitive functions of language isan excellent example of the healthy symbiosis of philosophy andpsychology. Carruthers’s work in this area has matured in responseto empirical evidence from scientific psychology (cf. Carruthers1996, where no clear theory of central cognitive modules is pre-sented, with Carruthers 1998 and subsequent work) and, at thesame time, Carruthers has injected a philosopher’s objectivity intothe debate and has pointed out important new areas for research.Commentary/Carruthers: The cognitive functions of language688 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2002) 25:6

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