Duckett, Tyler Marie

English

University of Baltimore School of Law

University of Baltimore Law Forum Volume 48 Number 2 Article 11 3-1-2018 Recent Developments: Porter v. State Tyler Marie Duckett Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf  Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons Recommended Citation Duckett, Tyler Marie (2018) "Recent Developments: Porter v. State," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 48 : No. 2 , Article 11. Available at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol48/iss2/11 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact hmorrell@ubalt.edu. RECENT DEVELOPMENTPORTER V. STATE: A SPOUSE SUFFERING FROMBATTERED SPOUSE SYNDROME DOES NOT HAVE TOEXPERIENCE ABUSE WITHIN MINUTES OF HIS OR HERDEFENSIVE ACTION TO BE ENTITLED TO AN IMPERFECTSELF-DEFENSE JURY INSTRUCTION; A CLAIM OFIMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE IS NOT FORFEITED WHENTHE SPOUSE CONTRACTS A THIRD PARTY TO TAKEDEFENSIVE ACTION.By: Tyler Marie DuckettThe Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, pursuant to Maryland'sbattered spouse syndrome statute, a defendant who kills in a non-confrontational setting is entitled to a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense. Porter v. State, 455 Md. 220, 247-49, 166 A.3d 1044, 1060-61(2017). This instruction does not require a spouse suffering from batteredspouse syndrome to have experienced abuse within minutes or hours of hisor her defensive action. Id. at 249, 166 A.3d at 1061. The court further heldthat a battered spouse who contracts a third party does not forfeit a claim toan imperfect self-defense instruction. Id. at 251, 166 A.3d at 1061-62.In early 2010 in Baltimore County, Karla Louise Porter ("Porter")contracted with Walter Bishop ("Bishop") to kill her husband Ray Porter("Ray") in exchange for $400. Ray was shot and killed by Bishop afterPorter sent him to fix the alarm at their gas station. A week later Porter wascharged with first degree murder, three counts of solicitation to commit firstdegree murder, and other related crimes.During the trial, Porter testified to several instances of verbal and physicalabuse over the course of their relationship, including being beaten withvarious objects. Additionally, Porter stated that in the year preceding Ray'sdeath, she was terrified on a daily basis. Porter also presented witnessescorroborating her claims of abuse and called two experts to establish that shesuffered from battered spouse syndrome. At the conclusion of the trial, thecourt read the State's proposed jury instruction on imperfect self-defense.Those instructions required that Porter had used no more force thanreasonably necessary to defend herself, that retreat from Ray had beenunsafe, and that she had not been the aggressor. The jury subsequently foundPorter guilty on all counts.Porter filed a motion for a new trial alleging that the jury wasinadequately instructed on how to evaluate evidence of battered spousesyndrome in the context of imperfect self-defense. The motion was denied,and Porter appealed. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed,holding that Porter had not presented sufficient evidence to be entitled to an131University of Baltimore Law Forumimperfect self-defense jury instruction. Therefore, any error in delivering theinstruction was harmless.The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari. Porter, 455 Md. at233, 166 A.3d at 1052. The court was asked to analyze the relationshipbetween the elements of imperfect self-defense and the battered spousesyndrome statute. Id. at 234, 166 A.3d at 1052. Specifically, the courtfocused on whether Porter was entitled to a jury instruction on imperfectself-defense and if the trial court's erroneous jury instruction was harmless.Id. at 239-40, 166 A.3d at 1055-56.The court began by assessing the legal structure of self-defense inMaryland. Porter, 455 Md. at 234-35, 166 A.3d at 1053. While perfect self-defense requires the defendant to have had a reasonable belief that they werein imminent danger, imperfect self-defense only requires an actual,subjective belief that they were in danger. Id. at 235, 166 A.3d at 1053. Thedefendant must produce some evidence on the issue of mitigation or self-defense. Id. at 240, 166 A.3d at 1056 (citing Wilson v. State, 422 Md. 533,541, 30 A.3d 955 (2011)). Once the evidence has been presented, adefendant is entitled to a jury instruction explaining the elements of perfector imperfect self-defense. Porter, 455 Md. at 240, 166 A.3d at 1056.In order to determine whether Porter was entitled to an instruction onimperfect self-defense under the doctrine, the court analyzed the meaning ofimminent or immediate. Porter, 455 Md. at 240, 166 A.3d at 1056.Specifically, the court reviewed the rationale for limiting self-defense tothreats of imminent or immediate danger. Id. at 248, 166 A.3d at 1061.Self-defense is often limited to only these threats because a non-imminentthreat may never come to fruition and because there are other ways toaddress a non-imminent threat besides responding with defensive force. Id. at248, 166 A.3d at 1061 (citing Kit Kinports, The Myth of Battered WomanSyndrome, 24 Temp. Pol. & C.R. L. Rev. 313, 315 (2015)). However,experts testified that in a cyclical, abusive relationship, the threatenedviolence will eventually come to fruition, but the syndrome prevents thebattered spouse from pursuing other options. Porter, 455 Md. at 247, 166A.3d at 1060. Therefore, the court found these rationales were notundermined by a claim of self-defense when a battered spouse kills in a non-confrontational situation. Id. at 248, 166 A.3d at 1061.The court next addressed the distinction between imminent andimmediate. Porter, 455 Md. at 241, 166 A.3d at 1056. Porter argued that theimminent or immediate requirement was satisfied because she presentedevidence that the threat of violence was always present. Id. The court foundthat the elements of imperfect self-defense required Porter to show that sheactually feared either imminent danger or immediate danger and that it wasunnecessary to prove both. Id. at 245, 166 A.3d at 1059. Further, the courtnoted that an imminent threat is not dependent on its proximity to thedefensive act. Id. Rather, an imminent threat is one that places thedefendant in immediate fear for their life. Id. This distinction aligns withthe General Assembly's intent behind the battered spouse syndrome statute,132 [Vol. 48.2Porter v. Statewhich allows testimony explaining how a spouse might fear imminentdanger during a break between violent episodes. Id. at 245-46, 166 A.3d at1059. Therefore, since Porter feared imminent danger, she was entitled to aninstruction on imperfect self-defense. Id. at 249, 166 A.3d at 1061.Next, the court addressed whether a person who contracts a third party tokill their abuser forfeits their right to an imperfect self-defense instruction.Porter, 455 Md. at 250, 166 A.3d at 1061-62. The court noted that imperfectself-defense negates the element of malice, but not premeditation. Id. Aspouse claiming imperfect self-defense must show that he or she fearedimminent or immediate danger; they do not have to prove that they actedspontaneously. Id. at 250, 166 A.3d at 1061-62. Thus, the means by which aspouse takes defensive action against an abuser does not impact whether heor she actually believed that they were in imminent danger at the time of thekilling. Id. Therefore, Porter contracting a third party did not forfeit animperfect self-defense instruction. Id.Ultimately, the court held that Porter had met her burden of establishingthat she was entitled to an imperfect self-defense instruction. Porter, 455Md. at 252-53, 166 A.3d at 1063. Further, Porter demonstrated that the juryhad considered the self-defense claim since it requested more informationrelating to battered spouse syndrome during deliberation. Id. Therefore, theerroneous instruction was not harmless. Id. at 253, 166 A.3d at 1063-64.The court thus vacated all of Porter's convictions and remanded the case. Id.at 255, 166 A.3d at 1065.The dissenting opinion alleged that the majority's definition of imminentor immediate was too broad. Porter, 455 Md. at 259, 166 A.3d at 1067. Thedissenting judges argued that the majority's holding allows evidenceregarding battered spouse syndrome to be used unlimitedly. Id. They wereconcerned with how broadly this interpretation can be applied. Id. Further,they opposed the majority's holding on contract killings, alleging that understare decisis it erroneously contradicts jurisprudence, which typically barsself-defense jury instructions in such cases. Id. at 263, 166 A.3d at 1069.The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that a battered spouse isentitled to an imperfect self-defense jury instruction, if he or she presentssome evidence that they feared imminent or immediate harm at the time ofthe killing. Additionally, the court held that a battered spouse does not forfeitthis right if they contract a third party. This holding signals a progressiveshift in domestic violence jurisprudence, by allowing a jury to considerevidence explaining a battered spouse's thoughts and decisions in takingaction against his or her abuser. This will ensure that battered spouses areafforded fair trials by allowing juries to be presented with relevant evidencewhen considering the elements of self-defense in this context.1332018]1

Recent Developments: Porter v. State

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Recent Developments: Porter v. State

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