Arendt, William J.

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UIC Law Review Volume 18 Issue 3 Article 12 Spring 1985 Televised Trials in Illinois: Should It Be Viewed as a Privacy Question, 18 J. Marshall L. Rev. 793 (1985) William J. Arendt Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview  Part of the Privacy Law Commons Recommended Citation William J. Arendt, Televised Trials in Illinois: Should It Be Viewed as a Privacy Question, 18 J. Marshall L. Rev. 793 (1985) https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss3/12 This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu. TELEVISED TRIALS IN ILLINOIS: SHOULD IT BEVIEWED AS A PRIVACY QUESTION?The debate over televised coverage of courtroom proceedings inIllinois continues. For most states, the question of the propriety ofmedia coverage involved a weighing of the constitutional guaran-tees of freedom of the press, the right to a public trial, and the rightto a fair trial. Although some courts have recognized the right ofprivacy in this context, the trial participant's privacy interest hasbeen regarded as "a weak reed to rely upon to prevent a telecast ofa trial."' Given the broad scope of disclosure inherent in broadcast-ing, however, it is necessary to reevaluate the trial participant'sright of privacy.The Illinois Supreme Court should examine the right of pri-vacy along with the right of free press, the right to a public trial,and the right to a fair trial when it makes its decisions concerningthe appropriateness of televised trial proceedings. Recently, in Inre Photographing, Broadcasting, and Televising Proceedings in Illi-nois Courts,2 the court, in aligning with a majority of states, liftedits ban on courtroom photography and authorized experimentalbroadcast coverage of appellate level proceedings for one year. Thesharply divided court did not, however, extend broadcast coverageto the trial level.3 Now that the experimental period has expired,the court is expected to reconsider the issue of whether to author-ized televised trials.Prior to the court's latest pronouncement in this area, it hadheld that cameras should not be permitted in the courtroom be-cause their presence was "not in keeping with the dignity a courtshould maintain."'4 Following the United States Supreme Court'ssanctioning of cameras in the courtroom in Chandler v. Florida,5however, the trend among states has been to allow cameras in thecourtroom at the trial level.6 Indeed, even the Illinois SupremeCourt has noted that, with the advent of substantial technologicaladvancements in the communications industry, some of its previous1. Yesawich, Televising and Broadcasting Trials, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 701, 712(1952).2. 11 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2634 (1983).3. Id.4. People v. Munday, 280 Ill. 32, 67, 117 N.E. 286, 300 (1917).5. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).6. See Graves, Cameras in the Courts: The Situation Today, 63 JUDICATURE24 (1979).The John Marshall Law Reviewconcerns had been limited or reduced substantially. 7It has long been recognized that the use of the news camera,which is able to capture one's image and transmit it for the benefitof a mass audience, poses an especially oppressive threat to the indi-vidual's 'privacy interests. Nonetheless, most courts have refused torecognize the individual's right of privacy during a trial because theinformation published is considered to be public information.8 Theunderlying rationale is that, because the published information ispart of the trial record, which is open to the public, it was neverprivate. This reasoning, however, fails to take into account thatmuch of what goes on during a trial receives little attention in stan-dard news coverage and is not expressed in the trial record.Moreover, courts have analogized camera coverage to newspa-per coverage in ruling that the individual does not have a right ofprivacy during a trial.9 The qualitative differences between televi-sion coverage and newspaper coverage, however, make televisioncoverage sui generis. The auditory impact and the visual deliveryof television clearly exceed that of newsprint because they allowthe viewer to receive a constant and thorough inspection of the trialparticipants. Thus, there exists the "potential for intimate close-ups and widespread exposure of not only the name of the [partici-pants], but of their faces and features, emotions, and possibly eventheir private thoughts."' 0Not only must the participant be subjected to a serious assaultupon his privacy interest during the trial, he may also be subjectedto the unavoidable notoriety that accompanies the media's promo-tional messages. It is this type of extensive and unwarranted disclo-sure that the right of privacy was intended to protect.'" Hence, theuniqueness of television coverage of trials and its attendant mediahype, require a reevaluation of the trial participant's right ofprivacy.This reconsideration is especially appropriate in light of thefact that the participants in a trial attend for various reasons and invarious circumstances. Some appear willingly; others appear undercompulsion of a court order. For some, such as judges and courtpersonnel, the trial may represent a test of their detachment andobjectivity. For others, the trial may represent intense, private7. In re Photographing, 2634, at 12 (Simon, J., concurring).8. Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Berg v. Minne-apolis Star and Tribune, 79 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D. Minn. 1948).9. Comment, Televised Trials: Constitutional Constraints, Practical Im-plications, and State Experimentation, 9 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 910, 914 (1978).10. Boone, TV in the Courtroom: Is Something Being Stolen From US?, 9HUM. RS. 24, 27 (1981).11. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 204(1890).[Vol. 18:793Televised Trialsgrief, shame or fear. Regardless of one's personal stake in the out-come, the presence of the television camera only serves to augmentthe existing high level of intense emotion. In addition, a witness' orjuror's reticence, whether originating from reclusiveness or fromfear of reprisals, may be severe and possibly debilitating to the trial.This behavior can only undermine the goals of efficient and fair ju-dicial administration.Because the courts have the responsibility to supervise all as-pects of the trial, they must ensure that camera exposure does notsubject trial participants to privacy invasions beyond what is inher-ent in a traditional public trial. Admittedly, private individualsthrust into the public domain must relinquish some expectation ofprivacy in favor of the public's right to be informed of newsworthyevents. This does not mean, however, that the individual's privacyrights must be cast aside to make room for television cameras. Infact, most courts have recognized that, in situations involving sexcrime victims, children, informants, and undercover police officers,the trial judge may, in his discretion, exclude spectators from thecourtroom if necessary to prevent embarassment or emotional dis-turbance of a trial participant.12Although the public's right of access is not absolute, the indi-vidual's right of privacy is likewise subject to restraints. Privacyinterests, especially in what has traditionally been considered apublic forum, must yield to other compelling constitutional consid-erations such as the right of free press, the right to a public trial,and the right to a fair trial. Therefore, it is necessary to balancethese considerations in conjunction with the indispensible right ofprivacy in determining the permissible extent of invasion of one'sprivacy interests during a televised trial. On balance, however, thescale tips in favor of permitting televised trials.The implementation of televised trials need not force jurors,witnesses, litigants, or other participants to endure a serious assaultupon their privacy interests in order to accommodate other compet-ing constitutional considerations. Because cameras in the court-room present a unique threat to a trial participant's right of privacy,the Illinois Supreme Court, if it decides to implement camera cover-age at the trial level, should adopt a limited access plan that willpreserve the individual's privacy interests during a televised trial.No other result can protect and preserve the trial participant'shuman dignity.William J. Arendt12. 75 AM. JUR. 2d Trial § 146 (1974); R. HUNTER, FEDERAL TRIAL HAND-BOOK § 7.9, at 72 (1st ed. 1974).19851

Televised Trials in Illinois: Should It Be Viewed as a Privacy Question, 18 J. Marshall L. Rev. 793 (1985)

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Televised Trials in Illinois: Should It Be Viewed as a Privacy Question, 18 J. Marshall L. Rev. 793 (1985)

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