Harbro, Gent Grinvalds

Holst, Lars Abjørn

Schultz-Lorentzen, Johannes

Sørensen, David

Welander, Tobias Kjer

In 1993, Professor Christopher Hill defined a gap between the expectations to the Euro-pean Union’s security policy and its actual capabilities, the so-called capability-expectation gap. This project investigates whether the European Union still suffers from a capability-expectation gap, following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, and if the con-temporary expectations towards the Union, as a foreign security actor, are justified. The project has its starting point in Hill’s theoretical framework, which consist of the three different components defining the capability-expectation gap; EU’s operational ca-pacity, its resources and its ability to agree. These three points, together with the internal and external expectations post-Lisbon, are analysed based upon the outlined changes in the institutional framework of the CFSP, following the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. To fully grasp this development, the theory of New Institutionalism is used. The analysis uncovers two contemporary gaps; the Member States ability to agree and the High Representative’s ability to make them agree, and their actual capabilities of doing so. These gaps serve as the base when analysing the case of the Mali crisis. The Mali crisis, with its security implications for the EU, is used to further explore the existence of the gaps. It also provides an understanding of which expectations the Member States have to EU as a military actor. These expectations, together with the theory of Normative Power, give an understanding of whether the contemporary expectations are justified. The project concludes that the EU suffers from a capability-expectation gap, and that the contemporary expectations are unjustified. The increased expectations were a conse-quence of a time, where Germany, France and the UK had a rare consensus on the Unions future military capabilities, which manifested itself in a greater operational capacity of the CFSP. In an intergovernmental system, where a decision reflects the consensus of the Member States, the expectations became unjustifiably high, when the political willingness changed and the expectations, to the ability to act united, remained.In 1993, Professor Christopher Hill defined a gap between the expectations to the Euro-pean Union’s security policy and its actual capabilities, the so-called capability-expectation gap. This project investigates whether the European Union still suffers from a capability-expectation gap, following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, and if the con-temporary expectations towards the Union, as a foreign security actor, are justified. The project has its starting point in Hill’s theoretical framework, which consist of the three different components defining the capability-expectation gap; EU’s operational ca-pacity, its resources and its ability to agree. These three points, together with the internal and external expectations post-Lisbon, are analysed based upon the outlined changes in the institutional framework of the CFSP, following the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. To fully grasp this development, the theory of New Institutionalism is used. The analysis uncovers two contemporary gaps; the Member States ability to agree and the High Representative’s ability to make them agree, and their actual capabilities of doing so. These gaps serve as the base when analysing the case of the Mali crisis. The Mali crisis, with its security implications for the EU, is used to further explore the existence of the gaps. It also provides an understanding of which expectations the Member States have to EU as a military actor. These expectations, together with the theory of Normative Power, give an understanding of whether the contemporary expectations are justified. The project concludes that the EU suffers from a capability-expectation gap, and that the contemporary expectations are unjustified. The increased expectations were a conse-quence of a time, where Germany, France and the UK had a rare consensus on the Unions future military capabilities, which manifested itself in a greater operational capacity of the CFSP. In an intergovernmental system, where a decision reflects the consensus of the Member States, the expectations became unjustifiably high, when the political willingness changed and the expectations, to the ability to act united, remained

EU as a Global Security Actor - Hopes and Expectations

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Roskilde Universitet