The Kantian concept of a priori manifests a twofold meaning: first, that there is a kind of knowledge that is independent of experience; second, that such knowledge is independent of experience through a kind of relatedness to that experience. In short, a priori means both ‘being prior’ and ‘being prior to’. Kant’s a priori encompasses the whole man and is not limited to his intellective faculty. Above all it is an anthropological category, whereas epistemology is but one of its specifications. The term a priori designates a structural dimensions of the being of man which pre-exists al that can ever be given to man and whose application is a necessary subjective condition for anything to be giveable to man at all. Hildebrand claims that each a priori proposition as such possesses three universal features: (1) strict necessity, (2) incomparable intelligibility, and (3) absolute certainty. But what does it mean to call something necessary, intelligible, certain, and• a priori? Von Hildebrand leaves this question unanswered. His a priori in no way supplements, what he calls, propositional necessity, intelligibility and certainty and hence seems to be redundant. Hildebrand uses a priori in yet another sense, namely, in the sense of ‘independent of blunt observation’, but, he does not take the pain of explaining the meaning of the latter phrase. Objective a priori for Scheler means the ontic antecedence of the ideal to the real. As soon as the essences are apprehended by some mind there arises a case of subjective a priori. When somebody apprehends an essence he is affected by that essence and his mind builds up a functional-categorial apparatus whereby it conceptualizes the world. As a result, a thing though or liked becomes a manner of thinking or liking. Scheler names this process 'the functionalization of essences', whole outcome is the subjective a priori structure of the mind. The Schelerian treatment of a priori seems to be the most balanced of the three considered. It takes in Kant's subjective a priori as 'a mental function' and complements it with an objective a priori represented by some ideal essence.Straipsnyje nagrinėjamos aprioriškumo sampratos I. Kanto, D. Hildebrando ir M. Schelerio veikaluose. Anot I. Kanto, pirminė aprioriškumo esmė yra žmogaus sąmonės ir subjektyvumo sąranga ir pobūdis, aprioriškumas žymi pavidalą arba būdą, kuriuo kas nors pagaunama. D. Hildebrandas skiria tris apriorinio pažinimo bruožus: griežtas būtinumas; neprilygstamas suprantamumas ir visiškas tikrumas. Jam aprioriškumo problema dvejopa: tai klausimas apie tikras ir iš esmės būtinas dalykines sanklodas; antra, tai klausimas apie visiškai tikro tokių faktų ir dalykinių sanklodų pažinimo esamumą. M. Scheleris pripažįsta subjektinį ir objektinį aprioriškumą. Jis nukreiptas į patį objektyvių esmių tapatumą ir turinį, todėl apibūdinamas kaip materialus aprioriškumas. Bandymas išskleisti aprioriškumo sąvoką eina dviem linkmėmis: pirmoji – tai objektinio aprioriškumo srities tyrinėjimai, kurie sutampa su esmių sritimi ir yra beveik neriboti. Antroji – subjektinis aprioriškumas, kurio fenomenologinis pagrindas kyla iš fakto, kad esmingasis žmogaus pažinimas sąlygoja tai, kokios esmės ir kas jose prieinama žmogaus pažinimui tam tikru metu. M. Schelerio aprioriškumo samprata laikoma labiausiai pagrįsta iš trijų nagrinėtųjų
