Following the 'bread riots' of October 1988, the Islamist movement was the biggest benefactor of the introduction of democracy in Algeria, quickly amassing huge political support and winning landslide victories in local and legislative elections. But instead of using its newly acquired power to install democratic principles throughout Algeria, the Islamist movement fell victim to its own aspirations. Today, as Algeria observes the tenth anniversary of the October riots, certain conclusions are self-evident. Overall, Algeria's Islamist leadership has proven ill equipped to handle its success or its own agenda

Salhi, H.

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Algeria's Islamist Movement. Victims of Success

Leiden University Scholary Publications

Regional IssuesI S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  1 / 9 8 11A l g e r i aH A M O U D S AL H IFollowing the ‘bread riots’ of October 1988, the Islamistmovement was the biggest benefactor of the introduc-tion of democracy in Algeria, quickly amassing hugepolitical support and winning landslide victories in localand legislative elections. But instead of using its newlyacquired power to install democratic principlesthroughout Algeria, the Islamist movement fell victimto its own aspirations. Today, as Algeria observes thetenth anniversary of the October riots, certain conclu-sions are self-evident. Overall, Algeria’s Islamist leader-ship has proven ill equipped to handle its success or itsown agenda.Algeria’s IslamistM o v e m e n tVictims of SuccessThe RiotsThe typical Algerian who demonstrated inthe country’s major cities, now a decade ago,was compelled more by immediate economicconcerns than long-term political goals likedemocracy. For years, Algerians suffered theconsequences of failed economic policies andhad finally grown frustrated with chronicunemployment, inadequate wages, inflationand substandard housing. Those who took tothe streets in October 1988 protested for basicnecessities, hoping to get the government’sattention if not economic reform.Political pluralism was not on their agenda:the FLN’s (National Liberation Front) one-partysystem of government maintained such firmcontrol of opposition activities inside the coun-try that it became too difficult to engage inpolitical activism against the State. As such,opposition leaders like Ait Ahmed of the Social-ist Front Forces (FFS) and former PresidentAhmed Ben Bella concentrated their activitieswithin Europe, trying to mobilize Algerians liv-ing abroad, not locally, against the FLN’s politi-cal monopoly. Furthermore, Algerians were dis-inclined to pursue pluralism as the oppositiongroups were widely perceived as weak and ‘outof touch’ with the population.In this way, the religious Islamist oppositionwas somewhat an exception. Though active,the Islamist movement was too divided toeffectively challenge the state authorities whenthe bread riots occurred. The Islamists, howev-er, were succeeding in relating to Algeria’s dis-heartened society and capitalizing upon thefailure of the FLN’s secular approach to devel-opment. More importantly, they channelledthe population’s mounting anger against thegovernment to their own advantage: collectinghuge sums of money from donors, they pro-moted themselves by constructing privately-run mosques and responded to social needs byproviding houses for newly-weds and Islamicdresses for young girls.Effects of the RiotsFollowing the October riots, the political liber-alization initiated by President Benjedid waswelcomed by Algerians of every ideologicalstripe: in less than six months, more than 50 par-ties were formed. Unlike any other time, Algerianleaders were now seen debating, criticizing eachother and government policies. Behind thescenes, however, the FLN retained its colossalpowers and continued to privatize the economy,relaxing laws on importation and price controls.For the vast majority of Algerians, the quickcombination of democratization and privatiza-tion was proving disastrous. Government poli-cies were benefiting a privileged few whocould seize new opportunities in the markets.In contrast, the Algerian state struggled withinternational debts due to a sharp decline in oilrevenues, forcing the FLN to relinquish some ofits social welfare responsibilities, particularly inhealth care, education and housing.The government’s failure to address the socio-economic problems of the masses had a tremen-dous impact on the Islamist movement, nowlegalized and represented by more than 15political institutions. Specifically, it legitimizedthe Islamists’ struggle for a better state and evenrallied enough militant support to make violentchange an option. With social disparities evenmore glaring, the Islamists had become thevoice of the impoverished. As democraticchange slowly became a part of Algerian life, theIslamist movement was growing rapidly andevolving into the most potent political force inthe country.Rise of the Islamist MovementUndoubtedly, the Islamists’ greatest successwas in connecting with Algeria’s abandonedyouth – those who failed in school and in thelabour market and who were portrayed as soci-ety’s losers. To them, the mosques became aplace of refuge where respect and understand-ing could be found, where the state’s policiesand the government’s shortcomings were toblame for their personal failures. Armed with anew attitude and seen as being in touch withGod, the abandoned youth quickly regainedrespectability in society, something it clearlyowed to the Islamist movement and no one else.Although the budding Islamist movement wasgaining momentum, internal strife hindered itsdevelopment as a viable political entity. Thoughbonded by common religious symbols, setswithin the movement were increasingly dividedover political strategies and ideological issuesand appeared to be moving in two distinct direc-tions: one towards greater unification and theother towards fragmentation. Before 1988,many religious and political disagreements wereleft to be sorted out in the mosques. This contin-ued during the democratization process; allIslamists seemed united in their antagonismtowards the secular state, but sharp differencesremained over how Islam was to solve Algeria’sproblems. Ultimately, the mosques themselvesbecame host to disputes, contributing to frag-mentation within the movement.Ideological DivisionsDivisions within the Islamist movement haveexisted since the 1970s between the Liberal-Algerianites, Djeza’ara, who advocated anindigenous form of Islamic activism and theShoyoukh, ‘elder persons’, who believed inlinking Algeria’s Islamist movement with theMashreq’s, particularly the Muslim Brother-hood of Egypt. The differences between Djeza-’ara and Shoyoukh have centred on how theyperceived the role of Islam in modern societyand in governmental policies. The Djeza’ara have followed Malek Bennabi,an Algerian scholar and philosopher. Educatedin France in the 1950s, Bennabi later lived inEgypt and returned to Algeria when it becameindependent. Bennabi’s thoughts encompasselements of Western modernity and Islamictraditions and intend to reconcile these twocontradictory facets of Algerian life. ToBennabi, Western civilization can be beneficialto the Muslim world, especially in the areas ofscience and administration. But Bennabi hasalso criticized Western civilization for its moraldecay and has urged Muslims to be cautious inwhat they take from it. Bennabi has been influ-ential among university students and otherswho believe that openness to Western cultureis necessary for Algeria’s development and,more recently, parties such as the AlgerianIslamic Assembly.In contrast, the Shoyoukh have long con-tended that the Algerian religious establish-ment lacked the intellectual background toform a religious doctrine without the Mashreq’shelp. Many of this group were former studentsof Sheik Abdel Hamid Bin Badis, the founder ofthe Ulama Association, a reformist movementformed in 1930 to combat France’s coloniza-tion and prepare Algerian society for indepen-dence. During the 1970s and 1980s, manyleaders sought to establish ties with the Egypt-ian Brotherhood in an attempt to link theAlgerian struggle for an Islamist state with oth-ers in the Mashreq. Now, the reformist ideas ofthe Shoyoukh are represented by many mod-erate Islamist parties, like Hamas, even thoughan alliance with the Mashreq is no longers o u g h t .Despite their differences, the Djeza’ara andthe Shoyoukh have shared a common disdainfor the FLN’s overall treatment of religion,especially its moves to impose state controlover mosques. Additionally, the two Islamistcamps have both supported incremental socialchange and working to change Algeria’s politi-cal structure from within society.Since the mid-1980s, however, this moderateapproach has been shunned by the youngerIslamist recruits who reject peaceful changeand adhere to a strict interpretation of Islamictexts. Known as Salaf, in reference to the fol-lowers of the Prophet Mohammed and his wayof life, this camp espouses the ideas of manymilitant thinkers, including Egyptian SeyyedQotb and Pakistani Abou Alla al Mawdudi.These recruits have come to see Islam throughthe eyes of Iranian revolutionaries, Afghanrebels and older militant Islamists who haveprovided literature and tapes about radicalIslam. It has been this younger set that has somarkedly radicalized the Islamist movement inthe 1990s, as many of them have become mem-bers of groups preaching violence as a meansof change. Consistent with their role models,the ultimate goal of these recruits is to estab-lish a Sharia state, the rule of religious authori-t y .When the October events occurred, no oppo-sition group – religious or secular – was in aposition to effectively organize the Algerianmasses with the intent to impose a new politi-cal order. In the absence of a charismatic lead-ership, the Islamist movement grew but theloyalty of its adherents was mostly directed to alocal leader, not a national figure. As a result,while the Islamist movement was expanding, italso became increasingly prone to fragmenta-tion. Generally, people were joining Islamistinstitutions out of religious conviction, not forpolitical reasons. Consequently, many foundthemselves supporting political parties that didnot necessarily represent their views. This wascharacteristic of the membership of the FIS.Rise and Fall of the FISSoon after Algeria’s democratization processbegan, the Islamist movement was dominatedby a single party, the Islamic Salvation Front(FIS). Unlike other Islamic political parties,which had strict recruitment policies, the FISrecruited various types of people, regardless oftheir educational background, gender or race.This open-door policy gave the FIS a truly pop-ulist appeal and helped it to cinch victory inthe electoral polls of the early 1990s.But other FIS policies were partly responsiblefor the fragmentation of the movement. Onseveral occasions, FIS leader Abassi Madanideclined invitations to attend the gatheringsof other political parties, even making a mock-ery of some. Instead of acting as a unifyingforce within the movement, the FIS alienatedthe smaller Islamist groups. In addition, theFIS’s open-door recruitment policy broughtserious divisions within the party’s own politi-cal structure; with so much diversity, it seemedimpossible to maintain the democratic spirit atall times. The FIS’s second-in-command, AliBelhaj, exacerbated the problem with hisrepeated objections to democracy, calling it analien concept and a source of evil. Havingnever visited a democratic state, Belhaj wasmerely reiterating what other militant thinkers,particularly Qotb and Mawdudi, had written.Still, since the FIS included members from theDjeza’ara, Shoyoukh and Salaf camps, Belhaj’sposition fuelled more disagreement amongthe ranks.It was increasingly evident that for Madaniand Belhaj, the struggle in Algeria was not fordemocracy, but rather for the establishment ofa Sharia state. Several instances indicated thatthe FIS leadership was more interested in accu-mulating political power than in actually shar-ing it. The FIS acted as if it were a state withinthe Algerian state, setting up courts in themosques to punish violators and creating itsown military force, the Armed Islamic Salva-tion. Furthermore, the FIS leaders appearedtolerant of political violence; they stood silentwhen militant Islamists from their own ranksformed the menacing Armed Islamic Group.Then, in June 1991, they called for a strike toboycott the country’s electoral laws, a strikethat later turned bloody as over 500 peopledied in clashes with the state police. It is alsonotable that, until recently, the FIS had notcondemned the horrific violence perpetratedby some militants against Algerian civilians.Of all of its shortcomings, the FIS’s biggestmistake was to underestimate the Algerianmilitary. With its overwhelming success in thelocal elections in the early 1990s, the FISbecame overconfident, believing that it couldtopple the military politically. The FIS went sofar as to solicit soldiers to join its ranks in anattempt to rescue the State from its malaise ofcorruption and socio-economic problems. Thiswas a gross miscalculation; the military saw theFIS’s call as a threat to its national supremacy.In response, the military forcefully intervenedbefore the FIS could win an absolute majorityin the 1992 parliamentary elections andrewrite the Algerian constitution to its ownterms. Shortly thereafter, the FIS was officiallybanned. But since the ousting of the FIS fromthe formal political arena, the smaller Islamistparties have also failed to lay claim to theIslamist leadership or to put an end to the ter-rorism carried out by certain extremist groups.Undoubtedly, the Islamist movement was amajor political force in Algeria during the ini-tial stages of its democratization. Ideologicalfragmentation and the spread of militantIslam, however, has since undermined themovement and spun it out of control. In retro-spect, the Islamist movement misused thedemocratic process, but did not escape theconsequences of that abuse. ♦Dr Hamoud Salhi is a journalist for Gulf News.10 years aftert h e O c t o b e r1 9 8 8 r i o t s

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