Against Metin Kaplan, self-proclaimed head of the Caliphate State, proceedings were taken up by the Oberlandesgericht Dsseldorf in February 2000. The 'emir of the believers and caliph of Muslims' had been charged with incitement for the murder of his opponent Halil Ibrahim Sofu in Berlin in 1997, and with running a criminal organization. The process may very well mark the end of most radical Islamic group which has developed in the German diaspora of Turkish migrants

Schiffauer, W.

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The End of the Caliphate State? The Metin Kaplan Case

Leiden University Scholary Publications

Regional IssuesI S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  5 / 0 0 27Fieldwork was conducted among the Kaplancommunity in Germany between 1985 and 1993w i t h funding provided by the DeutscheF o r s c h u n g s g e m e i n s c h a f t .Professor Werner Schiffauer holds the chair ofComparative Social and Cultural Anthropology atthe European University Viadrina in Frankfurt/Oder,Germany. He is the author of the recently publishedm o n o g r a p h : Die Gottesmänner. TürkischeIslamisten in Deutschland. Eine Studie in religiöserEvidenz. Frankfrut am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000.E-mail: schiffauer@euv-frankfurt-o.deWe ste rn  Euro p eW E R N E R  S C H I F F A U E RAgainst Metin Kaplan, self-proclaimed head of theCaliphate State, proceedings were taken up by theOberlandesgericht Düsseldorf in February 2000. The‘emir of the believers and caliph of Muslims’ hadbeen charged with incitement for the murder of hisopponent Halil Ibrahim Sofu in Berlin in 1997, andwith running a criminal organization. The processmay very well mark the end of most radical Islamicgroup which has developed in the German diasporaof Turkish migrants.The End oft h e Caliphate State?The MetinK a p l a n C a s eThe community was founded by Metin Ka-plan‘s father, Cemaleddin, in the early 80s asa breakaway from the National View – theEuropean branch of the National SalvationParty in Turkey. In 1983-84, the leadership ofthe former National Salvation Party split onthe issue of whether the party should be re-established after the coup d‘état of 1980. Allparties had been outlawed but now new na-tional elections were scheduled. When Er-bakan and the party establishment optedfor the foundation of a successor party (theRefah (Welfare) Party), a revolutionary wingheaded by Kaplan separated. For them thehistory of the coup d‘état had demonstratedthe limitations of a parliamentary way to anIslamic rule. As soon as an Islamic party be-came strong enough to form the govern-ment and to introduce serious reforms, itwould be suppressed. Kaplan‘s teaching canbe summed up under three headings: (1)Following Sayid Qutb, he proclaimed a revo-lutionary situation: Turkey was in a state ofbarbarity, analogous to the period ofc a h i l i y e t in pre-Muslim Mecca. In this situa-tion, no compromises with the system werepossible. (2) The revolution could beachieved by building up an extra-institu-tional grassroots movement by means oft e b liǧ (preaching with words and practice):On the sole basis of the Koran, the disas-trous frictions between Muslim communi-ties worldwide could be overcome, a massmovement would be established and theunity of the ü m m e t could be restored. (3)Revolutionary pan-Islamism: The reunifica-tion of Islam has to start from below with acoalition/cooperation of all revolutionary Is-lamic groups (including the Islamic Republicof Iran). The final aim would be the re-estab-lishment of the caliphate. The new revolu-tionary community set up by Kaplan calleditself ‘Union of the Islamic Communes andCommunities’ (I.s â m î Cemaatleri ve Cemiyet-leri B i r liǧ i) .The movement had a good start. Manysympathizers of the National View in Europewere weary of the compromises made bythe party establishment. Typical sloganswere those such as: ‘Does Islam exist for theparty or does the party exist for Islam?’ Inmany of the mosques established by the Na-tional View, the Revolutionary wing found amajority and took over the mosque.A religious military orderIt soon became evident, however, that themovement was not able to keep up the mo-mentum it had in the beginning. It re-mained restricted to the Turkish diasporacommunities in Europe. But even there itdid not appeal in a significant way to Mus-lims who were not members of the NationalView (like member of the S ü l e y m a n c ı o rNurcu communities). In 1985, the Kaplanmovement stagnated and in 1986 an ero-sion process began. This process culminat-ed when Ahmed Polat, one of the foundingmembers, left the movement together witha considerable number of followers in 1987.An erosion process is particularly problem-atic for a charismatic movement in whichfascination born out of success is of existen-tial importance. A charismatic movement ei-ther grows or declines at an exponentialrate. The secession of Polat, therefore, couldhave meant the end of the community. Inorder to cope with this crucial situation, Ka-plan re-organized the hitherto rather openmovement into a closed sect.An issue of crucial importance was the re-lation of the movement to the Islamic Re-public of Iran. In the early 80s, the Sunni-Shia split seemed to be a matter of the pastfor many Muslims who were enthusiasticabout the possibilities of Islamic revolu-tions. However, the Iranian revolution re-mained a singular event (and became stuckin the dirty war with Iraq). The hopes forother revolutions waned. Parallel to disillu-sionment, the old resentments against Shi-ites re-surfaced again. After Polat had de-fended his secession with a criticism of Ka-plan‘s pro-Iranian stance, Kaplan saw him-self forced to redefine his position. He nowbegan to insist on the basic dogmatic differ-ences between Sunna and Shia. This dog-matic clarification had practical conse-quences. Kaplan stopped the practices of agroup of enthusiastic believers, who hadsworn an oath of allegiance to Khomeiniand had also insisted on putting up Khome-ini posters in mosques. Dogmatic clarifica-tion thus implied centralization, i.e. astronger control of the local mosques. Inorder to be able to control the mosqueswhich were spread all over Europe, Kaplanbegan to control personally the appoint-ment of persons in charge (preachers andheads of mosques). The autonomy themosques had enjoyed in the early phase ofthe movement thus came to an end. Thedrastic changes led to conflicts in the com-munity and to the divorce from dissentingmembers. Kaplan interpreted this processas one of purification. He thus implied thatthe loss of numerical strength was morethan compensated by an increase in spiritu-al strength: While the fearsome and weakparted, the strong and courageous re-mained. A further aspect of this process wasan increased drawing of boundaries. The at-tendance of mosque services and prayersalso by members of other communitieswhich had been the practice during the firstyears ceased and only members of the Ka-plan community proper now frequentedthe mosque. A more or less exclusive in-group thus evolved within which increas-ingly non-conformist positions were devel-oped, emphasizing the differences to otherIslamic communities.Ideologically all this was reflected in thetransformation of the movement’s self-per-ception: the Kaplan community no longerconceived itself as a movement open to allbut rather as a closed religious militaryorder. The steps for becoming initiatedwere centered around the institutions:school (m e d r e s e), mystical convent (t e k k e)and barracks (k ışl a k). The sectarian processculminated in Kaplan declaring himselflocum tenens of the caliph in 1992. He alsoproclaimed a government in exile. With thisstep, the differences to the other Islamiccommunities in Europe became irreconcil-a b l e .Kaplan as caliphThe radicalization of the movement wentalong with a dramatic change in the socialcomposition of the community. The first fol-lowers of Kaplan had been autodidacts ofthe first generation, men who had little orno formal education, who had taught them-selves to read and write, and who had dis-covered Islam on their own terms. They hadfound in Kaplan a figure that expressed theirscepticism towards the wider society. Theyassociated Kaplan’s programme with thehope for the restoration of the unity of Islam– an issue of central importance to them.Most of these men left Kaplan when he be-came more sectarian. They realized quiteclearly that any claims to the caliphate wereunacceptable to the other Islamic commu-nities and would therefore deepen the fric-tions rather than help to overcome them.However, younger migrants of the secondgeneration took their place – among them aconsiderable number of academics andhigh school students. These students intro-duced new practices into the community.They set up groups for learning Arabic,studying Islamic law, learning about the lifeof the Prophet, and so on. In short, they de-veloped a rather academic approach toIslam, using the intellectual tools they hadacquired in German institutions of highereducation. They stressed truth more thanunity and therefore had fewer problemswith the increasingly sectarian nature of thecommunity. Kaplan‘s success with regard tothe recruitment of new members stabilizedand reinvigorated the community. Thenumber of members, which had droppedfrom approximately 12,000 in 1985 to 1300in 1992, has remained stable ever since.The years 1992-1994 saw further develop-ments toward an elitist cadre party whichincreasingly viewed itself as the spearheadof the Islamic revolution. In 1994, Kaplan fi-nally declared himself Caliph-proper. Thisrather presumptuous step was justified withthe notion of a historical turning point. Aftercenturies of the decline of Islam, only asmall but powerful elite was left (all otherMuslims being trapped in compromiseswith the world). Under the leadership of thenew Caliph, a r e c o n q u i s t a would commence.Sceptics were reminded of the small num-ber of believers Muhammed commanded inthe battle of Badr. This construction is char-acteristic of the hermetic logic that had de-veloped in the sect during the first half ofthe 90s. Although internally coherent, itcould no longer communicated to membersof other Islamic communities.In 1995, on his deathbed, Cemaleddin Ka-plan appointed his son Metin as successorto the Caliphate. Metin, who did not havethe charisma of his father, faced consider-able problems in the community. In early1996, the movement split and a countercaliphate under Ibrahim Sofu was pro-claimed in Berlin. Both caliphs issued dia-tribes, brandishing each other as d e c c a l. Insummer 1996, Metin issued a fatwa con-demning the counter-caliph to death. InMay 1997 Ibrahim was actually killed by adeath squad in his apartment in Berlin. Al-though – of course – Metin was under suspi-cion, nothing could be proven. There is thesuspicion that the murder was committedby volunteers who had served as mercenar-ies in Kosovo and in Afghanistan and hadlearned to kill in these wars. In October1998, Turkish authorities claimed (in whatlooked very much like a set-up by the Turk-ish Secret Service) that the police had pre-vented an attack on the A n ı t k a b i r (the mau-soleum of Atatürk) during the festivities cel-ebrating the 75t h anniversary of the revolu-t i o n .In 1999, Metin Kaplan was arrested,though the charges against him seem tostand on rather shaky grounds. The state at-torney admitted during the first day of thetrial that a direct link to the murder ofIbrahim Sofu cannot be established. A con-viction seems doubtful. But even if the trialis inconclusive, it is increasingly placing po-litical pressure on the movement and mightvery well mean its end. ♦

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The End of the Caliphate State? The Metin Kaplan Case

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