It is clear that harmful agents are targets of severe condemnation, but it is much less clear how perceivers
conceptualize the agency of harmful agents. The current studies tested two competing predictions made
by moral typecasting theory and the dehumanization literature. Across six studies, harmful agents were
perceived to possess less agency than neutral (non-offending) and benevolent agents, consistent with a
dehumanization perspective but inconsistent with the assumptions of moral typecasting theory. This
was observed for human targets (Studies 1–2b and 4–5) and corporations (Study 3), and across various
gradations of harmfulness (Studies 3 and 4). Importantly, denial of agency to harmful agents occurred
even when controlling for perceptions of the agent’s likeability (Studies 2a and 2b) and while using
two different operationalizations of agency (Study 2a). Study 5 showed that harmful agents are denied
agency primarily through an inferential process, and less through motivations to see the agent punished.
Across all six studies, harmful agents were deemed less worthy of moral standing as a consequence of
their harmful conduct and this reduction in moral standing was mediated through reductions in agency.
Our findings clarify a current tension in the moral cognition literature, which have direct implications for
the moral typecasting framework
