Junior

Xuan Phuc To

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Tropentag 2005 
Stuttgart-Hohenheim, October 11-13, 2005 
Conference on International Agricultural Research for Development 
 
 
 
Accessing to Forest Products: A Commodity Change Analysis on 
Timber in Northern Uplands of Vietnam 
 
To Xuan Phuc 
Junior Research Group on Postsocialist Land Relations. Humboldt University Berlin. 
Center for Development Research. University of Bonn 
 
Introduction 
 
Property relations in the uplands of Vietnam have changed substantially after the government 
implemented the “Open Door” policy in 1986. Regarding forestry sector, the high rate of forest 
loss in the last several decades rang an alarm for government on environmental degradation. In 
the middle of the 1990s, the government enacted the Land Law and accompanying degrees 
promulgating forest land allocation to households. Five use rights have been granted to land 
recipients for long time period: right to exchange, transfer, lease, inherit, and right to use the land 
as collateral to secure loan from the bank. The government expects that by giving people clearly 
defined rights on land, people would have more autonomous on land and they would use the land 
according to their wish to accumulate capital. And simultaneously, forest resources would be 
protected by people. Yet this is not always the case. 
 
This paper applies commodity chain framework developed by Ribot (1998) to study how the 
timber is extracted in the village and brought to the lowland market for sell. It examines who 
actually benefit from timber, and how. The paper shows that Dao (ethnic minority) villagers in a 
northern upland village locating in a critical watershed area are still heavily engaged in timber 
logging despite of the government policy which bans timber exploitation. Timber exploited from 
the village is brought to the lowland market, going through a variation of government checking 
points setting up to supervise transportation of timber. Along the chain where the timber passes, 
there are many different actors involved. There has been an unequal benefit sharing among these 
actors. In this process, villagers are the ones who invest most but benefit least. Controlling the 
timber market, wholesalers in the lowland are the ones who benefit most. 
 
The paper questions the linkage between private property and the effectiveness of forest 
conservation in a post-socialist country. It shows clearly that the individual rights established 
through forest land allocation do not help protect existing forest resources as people in the village 
still perceive forest resources are common. This perception provides villagers relatively equal 
access to forest resources particularly to timber trees. In this legal pluralism context, access to 
timber of the household is determined not by property rights system, but by household productive 
assets, mainly water buffalo and labor. This paper provides empirical evidence to support the 
conclusion made by Ribot and Peluso (2003) that property right is only one mechanism among 
many which allows households to benefit from resources. 
 
The paper is structured as follow. It first provides a brief background of the study village and 
implementation of forest land allocation (FLA). Secondly, it presents a commodity chain on 
 
 
timber. In this section, vertical and horizontal benefit distributions are examined. Finally, the 
paper concludes by the conclusion part.  
 
Background 
 
The research is conducted in a small Dao village in Hoa Binh province. The village is located in 
North-west region in the uplands of Vietnam. There are 40 households in the village, making up a 
population of around 150 people. Though villagers have some wet rice land to cultivation, the 
area is too small (only 2.9 ha for all households) to provide enough staple food for households’ 
need. Consequently, people have to rely heavily on forest resources, particular on swidden 
cultivation for households’ food, and timber and bamboo shoot for cash income. Still, almost all 
households in the village lack food for 2-3 months per year.  
 
FLA was implemented in the village in 1996. On average, each household received 15.6 ha of 
protection forest land. They also received the government land use titles for using the land in 50 
years period. As stipulated by government policy, the land allocated to households is not for 
agricultural production purpose, but for forest regeneration and protection. By the law, 
households are not allowed to practice swidden on the land, nor are they allowed to cut timber in 
forest to sell.  
 
Result and discussion 
 
Vertical access relations 
 
Though the government policy does not allow villagers to cut timber to sell, all households in 
Yen village are engaged in timber exploitation in some ways. Villagers cut the timber in the 
forest near the village and sell it to buyer. This buyer then brings timber from the village to Huu 
Bang – a lowland market in Ha Tay province -- to sell to wholesaler. This wholesaler then sells 
timber to retainers in surrounding villages. Figure 1 presents the commodity chain on timber 
 
Figure 1. Commodity chain on timber 
 
 
Actor X 
Villagers/loggers 
Timber buyer 
Yen village 
Timber brought to 
Da Bac district 
center
Timber brought to 
Hoa Binh province 
center
Timber brought to 
Ha Tay province 
Timber brought to 
the market in Huu 
Bang
Commune-based staff of the 
district DFP. 
DFP, District Police, Police for 
Traffic, Tax Management Team
Xom May DFP 
Provincial Economic Police. 
Town Economic Police. Police 
113 of the province. Provincial 
DFP. DFP of the town. Police 
for Traffic at Province.
Ky Son DFP, Luong 
Son DFP, Luong Son 
Police for Traffic, 
Hatay DFP, Hatay police for 
traffic, Hatay Police for 
economic
Chuong My DFP, 
Quoc Oai Police for 
Traffic
Actor Y 
HA TAY
HOA BINH 
Retainers 
Commune PC, 
Security Guard, 
Village Officials
Legend: 
Flow of timber  
Flow of Money  
Market regulation     
Unofficial relations 
 
 
To bring timber from Yen village to lowland market in Ha Tay province, timber is gone through 
various checking points set up by government agencies to enforce market regulations. At village 
and commune, there are security guards, staff member of department of forest protection, 
commune officials. These are individuals in charging of enforcing market regulation on timber. 
At district, there are various agencies such as department of forest protection, police of traffic, tax 
management team. In the same manner, at the province, timber has to go through various 
checking points set up by department of forest protection, tax management, and policies. To get 
the timber goes through these various checking points the transporter has to bribe local officials. 
The transporter cannot bribe all agencies, but has to hire some other actors (X and Y) who have 
close relationships with the agencies to help him with that.  
 
Benefit derived from timber is unequally distributed among different actors along the chain. 
Villagers have to spend a lot of labor, water buffaloes, and invest their knowledge on finding 
good trees in the forest. They may get accidents when cutting the timber in the forest, or when 
carrying timber from forest to village. Ironically, they are the ones who get least. For a hard 
working day, each strong male laborer can get only about 46 thousand Vietnam Dong (VND), or 
about $3USD. From the village to the final market in the lowland, 23 government agencies and 
individuals involving in the chain, getting about 7 million VND ($450USD). This is an unofficial 
payment paid by transporter in order to get a truck loading about 6 cubic meters of timber to pass 
through all checking points. Timber buyer who is also the transporter in this case, get 2.1 million 
VND (or $135US) as net profit per one timber truck when he buys timber from Yen village, 
brings it to lowland market, and sells there. Actor X and Y, or the “law makers”, in local 
language, are the ones who have close relationships with various local government agencies. The 
law makers act as middlemen between the transporters and government agencies to make sure 
that the truck would go through the checking points without being checked. These actors received 
about 1 million VND ($64US) per every timber truck. The wholesaler gains 4.15 million 
($270US) as net profit for selling a truck of timber. This is the one who has strong financial asset, 
physical asset (house and store), and social asset (strong tie with retailers and transporters and 
government agencies). The wholesalers control timber market price. The vertical distribution of 
benefit derived from timber is presented in figure 2.  
  
Figure 2. Vertical benefit distribution among actors along the chain 
Timber 
cutters
30%
Agencies
35%
Transporter
10%
Law  making
5%
Wholesaler
20%
 
  Source: survey 2005 
 
Horizontal access relations 
 
Cash income derived from timber is unequally distributed among villagers in Yen. How much 
income household would gain from timber depends on main laborers within the household, 
number of water buffaloes the household has, and age of household’s head. Size of forest land 
holdings that the household received under the FLA, household wealth status, and political power 
do not differentiate household income derived from timber. Table 1 presents value of Pearson 
correlation between household annual income derived from timber and household’s assets.  
 
 
 
Table 1. Pearson correlation of household timber income and household’s assets 
 
 Main 
labor 
Water 
buffalo 
Household 
wealth 
Political 
power 
Size of 
land 
holdings 
Age of 
household 
head 
Timber 
income  
0.532(**) 0.538(**) 0.202 0.04 0.127 0.350(*) 
**correlation is significance at 0.01 level (2- tailed). *correlation is significance at 0.05 level (2-
tailed) 
 
In the village, households with more main laborers and water buffaloes are likely to have more 
income derived from timber than the households with less main laborers and the limited number 
of, or do not have, water buffaloes. The reason for this is that timber logging requires strong male 
laborers to cut and saw timber inside the forest. And importantly, water buffalo is needed to bring 
timber after sawing from forest to village to sell. Without water buffalo, it is too hard for villagers 
to bring timber from forest to the village. Age of household’s head has significantly correlated 
with household timber income. The older the household’s head is the higher income household 
would gain from timber. This is because usually the old-headed households have abundant main 
laborers, thus being able to acquire more timber from forest.  
 
Despite of government’s ban on timber, villagers would cut timber from anywhere in the forest 
where they find good trees. Villagers do not care about whose forest land on which the trees exist 
is. Also, the land owners those received the land under the FLA do not care about who get trees 
from their land. Villagers in Yen still perceive forest is common, and this provides villagers with 
relatively equal access to the trees on land. Because of this, size of forest land holdings household 
received does not make any contribution to differentiation in household timber income. Giving 
households individual property rights on land does not guarantee households’ benefit to the land. 
Assuming that establishing private property on the forest would help households to generate 
capital and protect forest resources is backfired. Property right in this case does not help to secure 
villagers’ benefit to forest resource in general and to timber in particular.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Using commodity chain framework developed by Ribot (1998), this paper exploits the process 
which timber exploited from forest in an upland village is gone through before it reaches to final 
market in the lowland. There are different actors, including villagers, buyers, transporters, and 
local government officers involving along the chain. Because all actors get benefit from the 
chain, making the exploitation of timber in the forest, and transportation of timber from the 
upland village possible despite of government’s ban on timber logging in the forest, and 
transportation of timber.   
 
Vertically, cash derived from timber long the chain is not equally distributed among actors. 
Villagers are those who invest large labor power and knowledge get least. Both transporter/buyer 
and wholesaler gain huge benefit derived from timber. This is because they are the one who 
control the timber market. Local government staffs are not responsive to their duties in enforcing 
market regulation, turning their blind eyes on violation cases, and getting a lot of money in 
return.  
 
 
 
Horizontally, though all villagers are engaged in timber logging in some ways, benefit derived 
from timber is not equally distributed among villagers. Main labor available in the house, water 
buffalo, and age of household head differentiate household’s income derived from timber. Yet 
household wealth and political power do not make any significant contribution to the 
differentiation of household income from timber. The paper shows that securing individual 
property rights does not help household to benefit from forest resource. Neither does it help to 
protect forest resources. This study supports the conclusion made by Ribot and Peluso (2003) that 
property right is only a mechanism among many others that can help household to benefit from 
forest resources. What matter in this case is “ability” of the household to benefit from timber, and 
not a right to land on which timber trees exist. This paper shows a failure case of the neo-liberal 
notion on property those assume that private property is basis for capital accumulation.   
 
Reference 
 
Government of Vietnam. The Land Law. 1993. 
Government of Vietnam. Decree 02/CP dated 15 January 1994 on the forest land allocation 
guideline 
Ribot, Jesse and Peluso, Nancy. A Theory of Access. Rural Sociology. 2003; 68(2):153-181. 
Ribot, Jesse C. Theorizing Access: Forest Profits along Senegal's Charcoal Commodity Chain. 
Development and Change. 1998; 29:307-341. 
 


Conference on International Agricultural Research for Development Accessing to Forest Products: A Commodity Change Analysis on Timber in Northern Uplands of Vietnam

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Conference on International Agricultural Research for Development Accessing to Forest Products: A Commodity Change Analysis on Timber in Northern Uplands of Vietnam

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