No. 22: South African Government and Civil Society Responses to Zimbabwean Migration

This policy brief discusses a key paradox in relation to Zimbabwean migration into South Africa. While Zimbabwean migration since 2000 has been the largest concentrated flow in South African history, South Africa’s reaction to this movement has been characterised by the attempt to continue with ‘business as usual’ and ‘no crisis’ responses.1 Compared with most other developed and developing countries, where an inflow of tens or hundreds of thousands of people is usually treated as a political crisis, such a non-response to over a million immigrants requires explanation. The lack of commensurate responses is especially noticeable within the various departments of the South African government, but also within much of organised civil society. The scale and range of responses has addressed neither the scale nor the specific nature of Zimbabwean migration.2 In practice, therefore, addressing migrant needs and migration impacts is left to social networks among Zimbabweans, (often poor) South African citizens and local level public service providers such as local clinics. As a result of this fragmented and inadequate set of responses there are two major gaps: firstly between the needs of Zimbabwean migrants and the formal institutional frameworks and services provided to them, and secondly between the impacts of Zimbabwean migration on South African society and its ability to manage these impacts. There has been increasing documentation of Zimbabwean migrants’ welfare needs in South Africa (Bloch 2005; Zimbabwe Torture Victims Project 2005; Makina 2007; CoRMSA 2008; Human Rights Watch 2008). However, in parallel to the lack of coherent government and civil society responses to Zimbabwean migration, there has been a relative dearth of academic or think-tank documentation or analysis of these responses, and indeed of the implications of non-response for South Africa (Polzer 2008). Crucially, there has been no serious research on the dispersed and privatised responses by Zimbabwean networks and South African citizens, even though the aggregate impact of these actors is likely to be at least as significant, if not more so, than formal responses

South Africa Case Study: The Double Crisis – Mass Migration From Zimbabwe And Xenophobic Violence in South Africa

The protracted economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe led directly to a major increase in mixed migration flows to South Africa. Migrants were drawn from every sector of society, all education and skill levels, equal numbers of both sexes, and all ages (including unaccompanied child migration). Many migrants claimed asylum in South Africa which gave them the right to work while they waited for a refugee hearing. Many others were arrested and deported back to Zimbabwe. Migrants who were unable to find employment in the formal economy turned to employment and self-employment in the informal economy. These migrant entrepreneurs used personal savings to establish small and micro enterprises in many urban areas. The businesses focused on retail trading, manufacturing and services and contributed to the South African economy in various ways, including providing employment for South Africans. Nationwide xenophobic violence in 2008 targeted all migrants, irrespective of origin and legal status. From 2008 onwards, violent attacks on migrant-owned informal businesses began to escalate. This culminated in a second round of nationwide xenophobic violence in early 2015 when migrant-owned businesses were targeted by mobs. Migrants send essential remittances to family in Zimbabwe and return migration is not a viable or long-term response until Zimbabwe’s economic crisis is resolved. As a result, informal migrant entrepreneurs have adapted to hostile business conditions by adopting a range of strategies to avoid and protect themselves and their businesses from xenophobia. Against this backdrop, this report first discusses the nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe and its connections with large-scale out-migration, particularly to South Africa. The South African response to crisis-driven migration is reviewed showing how the government shifted from a predominantly coercive and control-oriented policy towards a more realistic assessment of the need to accommodate migrants through an immigration amnesty and the right to work in the formal and informal sector. One of the major challenges facing migrants and all stakeholders in South Africa is xenophobic violence. Nationwide attacks on migrants and refugees in 2008 and 2015 have been interspersed with ongoing lower-level episodes of violence. These attacks have increasingly targeted migrants and refugees, including many Zimbabweans, seeking to make a living in the country’s urban informal economy. The research for this report focused on the business activities and responses to xenophobic violence of Zimbabweans in the informal economy. Amongst the key findings were the following: • Between 20-30% of Zimbabwean migrants in South African cities are involved in the informal economy and the importance of informal sector employment to Zimbabweans has increased over time. • Zimbabweans operating enterprises in the informal economy are predominantly young (50- 75% under the age of 35) and male (60-70%). • Nearly two-thirds of the migrant entrepreneurs arrived in South Africa in the peak years of the Zimbabwean crisis between 2000 and 2010 (42%). Another 32% migrated after 2010. Less than 2% migrated to South Africa before the end of apartheid. • Economic hardship, unemployment and political persecution are the main push drivers of migration to South Africa. Pull drivers include the assistance of relatives already in South Africa and the prospect of employment. • The majority of the Zimbabwean migrant enterprises are in the retail, trade and wholesale sector, followed by services and manufacturing. Around three-quarters of the migrants relied on their personal savings to start their businesses and many worked in the formal economy first. • Business expansion has occurred despite the prime obligation of the entrepreneurs to support family still in Zimbabwe. Instead of reinvesting all of the business profits into further expansion, a portion is therefore diverted into remittance channels. Over one-third remit funds at least once per month and only 12% never send remittances. • A significant number of the entrepreneurs had been victims of or knew other who had been victims of crime such as looting and robbery, xenophobic abuse and police misconduct abuse. The report then presents the results of in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean business-owners who had experienced xenophobic violence in 2008 and 2015 or at other times. The narratives of the migrants provide insights into the unpredictable nature of the violence, their vulnerability to attack, the loss of business goods and property during mob violence and the need to restart from scratch, and the various strategies that they adopt to reduce risk. These strategies include operating in safer areas (not feasible for all), avoiding areas where corrupt police tend to operate, paying for protection and flight when xenophobic violence erupts. Return to Zimbabwe is not considered a viable option because of the economic conditions there. The interviews also provide insights into the migrants’ perceptions of government and stakeholder responses to the xenophobic violence. Almost without exception, the migrants felt that neither government (the Zimbabwean or South African) had done anything to protect or assist them during and after the violence. This perception of inaction also extended to international and non-governmental organisations. The migrants were particularly harsh in their comments about the police who were widely seen as either conniving in the violence or uninterested in protecting migrants. The perceptions of the migrants that nothing is done may simply be a function of who was interviewed and does not necessarily reflect the actual reality. The report therefore evaluates the response of the South African government to the ongoing crisis of xenophobia and concludes that some actions – such as sending in the army – are taken during episodes of nationwide violence but that ongoing daily and weekly attacks are generally ignored. There is a strong official line that these attacks are not motivated by xenophobia and. Indeed, that xenophobia does not even exist. This is clearly contradicted by the migrants who view the attacks as motivated by xenophobia. A second element of the official response is that the migrants are partially to blame for what happens to them as their business success builds resentment amongst South Africans. Government has yet to acknowledge that migrant-owned informal enterprises make a valuable contribution to the economy of the country, including through job creation for South Africans. The primary response to the violence of 2015 was the launching of a military-style Operation Fiela which was justified as a crime-fighting initiative but appears to have targeted migrant enterprises. The final sections of the report examine the responses and programmes of various non-governmental and international organisations to the crisis of xenophobia. During large-scale xenophobic violence there is considerable mobilisation of anti-xenophobia civil society organisations to offer protection and protest. Their effectiveness and impact tends to dissipate when the violence is more scattered and random. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has played a major role in the past in holding government to account and articulating extensive recommendations for remedial action, most of which have not been taken up and many of which are still highly relevant. International organisations have tended to target integration and education programming at the community level but there has only been one systematic evaluation (of the UNHCR’s response) which was highly critical of the organisation. These organisations and other governments are considerably hamstrung by xenophobia denialism at the highest level because it means that government will avoid the kinds of partnership that are urgently needed to address this endemic crisis

Multi-Country Study on Trusted Partners among Youth: Eritrea, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe

ObjectivesExplore youth's definitions of "trust"Establish criteria youth use to determine the trustworthiness of partnersIdentify types of individuals youth believe they can and cannot "trust"Examine trust's influence on sexual decision-making and STI/HIV risk perceptionIdentify how sexual partners violate trust and the effects on sexual decision-makingStudy designData were collected in October 2001 as part of a regional Behavior Change Communication (BCC) strategy in East and Southern Africa. Country programs chose to participate in research based on project priorities and levels of interest in participating in a regional BCC strategy. Four county programs agreed to collect and share data, Eritrea, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.A total of 33 focus groups were conducted. Research teams in each country used the same discussion guide and pretested the guide prior to data collection. Discussion groups lasted between an hour and an hour and a half, were audiotaped, and transcribed into English. Each research team conducted two discussion groups in the major urban area composed of the following strata: males 15-19 years, females 15-19 years, males 20-24 years, and females 20-24 years. The Zambia program conducted one additional focus group with males aged 15-19.FindingsExplore youth's definition of "trust" and criteria used to determine trustworthinessThe major components of trust did not vary greatly across countries. Youth in all countries placed a high value on sexual fidelity and its role in trusted partnerships. Youth believed that partners met through family or friends are more trustworthy than those met in bars or nightclubs. In addition, youth in all countries expressed that trusted partners must pass informal assessments, dress appropriately, demonstrate appropriate social conduct, talk sweetly to each other, come from the right neighborhood, meet one another's family, be punctual for appointments/dates, and remain emotionally committed to one another. Eritrean youth appeared to place greater importance on the roles that religion, virginity, and marriage (or intent to marry) play in establishing trust than youth from other countries.Differences in criteria for trust were more apparent by gender. In terms of testing partners' trustworthiness, females discussed passive ways of questioning partners, while males discussed elaborate methods for entrapping females in lies. Males were concerned with partners' sexual reputation and appearance. Females were primarily concerned with partners' emotional commitment, willingness to accept responsibility for pregnancies, and ability to display affection in public in order to demonstrate intimacy and trust.Identify types of individuals youth believe they can and cannot "trust"Across countries, youth place prospective partners into groups that can and cannot be trusted according to key attributes and behaviors. Similar to the findings above, most participants said that youth that come from good families, are well respected in the community, are religious, do not drink, avoid bars and nightclubs, and are faithful can be trusted. Youth believe that they cannot trust anyone outside of committed, monogamous relationships. Male participants added that virgins can be trusted.Examine trust's influence on sexual decision-making and STI/HIV risk perceptionYouth do not appear to take effective preventive measures with trusted partners. Trust can blind them to their risk for STIs/HIV and render them unwilling to explore partners' sexual histories. Sex usually occurs early in relationships and condom use remains low. When youth use condoms, they are more likely to incorporate them into casual than trusted relationships, or use them for pregnancy prevention rather than protection from STIs/HIV. Condoms are usually abandoned once relationships appear to be serious and partners fail to show signs or symptoms of STIs or HIV infection. There were few differences in risk perception and risk behavior across countries; however, male participants in Zambia reported that they discuss their sexual histories, while participants from other countries said that couples rarely discuss their sexual histories.Identify how sexual partners violate trust and the effects on sexual decision-makingInfidelity represents the most serious violation of trust and usually results in the end of relationships. A common theme across all countries was youth's refusal to learn from past experiences and apply them to future sexual decision-making. Even when trust is broken, youth fail to apply lessons learned to new relationships, repeating the same scenarios of trust, infidelity and exposure to STIs/HIV.Programmatic implicationsYouth must understand that partners' trustworthiness and character are independent of their risk for STIs/HIV. Although a checklist may help youth select a good partner, unprotected sex with this or any other person must be perceived as risky. Youth must also personalize their risk for STIs/HIV and avoid thinking that only people outside of their community are at risk for infection. It is likely that interpersonal communication campaigns or other community-level activities will help achieve an improved risk perception. Finally, in order to communicate new and appropriate levels of personal risk assessment, programs should strive to achieve broad social support, if not pressure for, consistent condom use, knowledge of one's own HIV status as well as that of all partners, and delay of sexual activity where possible

Zimbabwean medication use in New Zealand: The role of indigenous and allopathic substances

Over millennia, indigenous communities have developed distinct health systems and a range of medications. Many of these traditions have been disrupted, delegitimised and changed through processes of colonisation. Changes to medicative practices also occur for groups who move from their places of origin to new countries. This article explores understandings of medications and their storage and use among 4 Zimbabwean households in New Zealand. Our findings highlight some of the ways in which allopathic medications have become acculturated as familiar objects within the everyday lives and health-related practices of these households

The Economic Decline of Zimbabwe

For the past decade, Zimbabwe has been experiencing an economic decline that has resulted in an inflation rate of 231 million percent and an unemployment rate of over 90 percent. Past research has concluded that the economic decline of Zimbabwe has mainly been caused by poor monetary policies and failure of fiscal policies to control the budget deficit. This research aimed to closely examine some of these policies that the Zimbabwean government implemented, the effects of these policies on economic activity, employment and inflation levels in the country. By interviewing many economic analysts in Zimbabwe, I managed to gather the main causes of the country’s decline. In an effort to understand the effects of inflation on a country, I looked at other developing countries that have survived similar economic challenges and assessed some of the steps they took to overcome the challenges. From the research, I managed to conclude that although government policies on agriculture, participation in armed conflicts, government spending and investment have been weak, structural reforms can be successfully implemented to get the economy functioning again

Zimbabwe's new diaspora: displacement and the cultural politics of survival

Zimbabwe’s crisis since 2000 has produced a dramatic global scattering of people. This volume investigates this enforced dispersal, and the processes shaping the emergence of a new ‘diaspora’ of Zimbabweans abroad, focusing on the most important concentrations in South Africa and in Britain. Not only is this the first book on the diasporic connections created through Zimbabwe’s multifaceted crisis, but it also offers an innovative combination of research on the political, economic, cultural and legal dimensions of movement across borders and survival thereafter with a discussion of shifting identities and cultural change. It highlights the ways in which new movements are connected to older flows, and how displacements across physical borders are intimately linked to the reworking of conceptual borders in both sending and receiving state

Periodization of Robert Mugabe’s Land Policy In Zimbabwe

This project explores how Zimbabwean leader Robert Mugabe handled the culturally vital land issue. Research was conducted using scholarly sources including books and academic articles related to Zimbabwe, Rhodesia, land policy, economic analysis, and governmental legal policies. Information collected was divided into four historical periods based on the major land policies shaping government action. This periodization helps simplify the land issue by contextualizing the vast information surrounding Zimbabwean history. Analysis of government actions during these periods shows the land issue consistently being tied to other goals. The essay argues that Mugabe has used the call of land reform to fulfill personal political objectives and consolidate power. In the process, this project explores the modern history of Zimbabwe and the reasons land has become central to African identity

No. 55: The Engagement of the Zimbabwean Medical Diaspora

Despite the well-documented negative impacts of the ‘brain drain’ of health professionals from Africa, there is an argu­ment that their departure is not an absolute loss and that transnationally-oriented medical migrants (or diasporas) can act as development agents in their home countries. Financial remittances, in particular, are said to have significant transformative development potential. African countries are also expected to benefit from knowledge and skills transfer through the return of health professionals from abroad. Other diaspora engagement initiatives that do not require permanent return (such as short term work assignments, technological transfer to country of origin and ‘virtual’ participation of the diaspora involving the use of communication technologies) are seen as another positive feed­back mechanism, mitigating the negative impact of out-migration. Zimbabwe’s economic and political crisis has led to the emigration of many physicians over the last twenty years as the skills and experience which they possess are valued in countries in the North as well as in South Africa. Previous studies have focused on the magnitude and damaging impact of this exodus on the Zimbabwean health system. This is the first study to focus exclusively on physicians in the diaspora. The study is based on a global email survey of physicians and in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean doctors living and working in South Africa. The results of the survey and interviews provide new insights into the nature of the Zimbabwean medical diaspora, their motivations for leaving the county, the links which they maintain with Zimbabwe, the prospects of them returning to Zimbabwe and their interest in making their skills, knowledge and resources available to the country in the future. The conventional wisdom on the brain drain is that skilled profes­sionals move directly from a country of origin to a country of destination. The impacts of this movement for both countries are then assessed. However, this fails to capture the complexity of the migration patterns of Zimbabwean physicians. Only 42% of those surveyed had moved directly from Zimbabwe to their current country of residence. Seventy one percent of the Zimbabwean doctors in South Africa came directly from Zimbabwe. The rest had first been to a variety of other destinations including the United Kingdom, Australia, Asia and elsewhere in Africa. This suggests that there has been “return migration” from overseas, but benefitting South Africa not Zimbabwe. A common feature of studies on the causes of skills migration is to ask respondents to identify discrete “causes” of migration and then to rank them. In this study, respondents were presented with a set of possible reasons for leaving and then asked to rate the importance of each of them to the decision-making process on a five point scale from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree.’ The three factors with the highest levels of concurrence were the bad political environment (74% in agreement), lack of opportunities for career advancement (73% agreed) and poor economic conditions in Zimbabwe (71% agreed). Other factors cited by the majority of respondents were unsatisfactory working conditions, inadequate remuneration and benefits, the collapse of the health care system and a better future for their children. The relative importance of each of these factors varied with race and the year when the physician left. Another 30% of the respondents moved first from Zimbabwe to South Africa and then joined the “brain drain” from South Africa and migrated onwards to a variety of overseas destinations. Less than half of the doctors who had migrated to the UK did so directly from Zimbabwe. Only 5% of the Zimbabwean doctors in the USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand came direct from Zimbabwe. South Africa and the UK are clearly the main transit countries for medical doctors from Zimbabwe. These two intermediary destinations seem to act as “stepping stones” to get to the ultimate destination. The intermediate point allows them to specialise in their chosen field which then increases their chances of gaining entry to their ultimate destination. Furthermore, it enables them to develop networks with similar professionals located elsewhere who can assist them in making an onward move. Eventually, a migration chain develops linking the emigrant Zimbabwean medical doctors in an intermediate country to their counterparts located in a more attractive destination. Previous surveys have shown that migrant remittances play a major role in ensuring household survival in Zimbabwe. We do not know if physicians are distinctive in their remitting behaviour or whether they follow the general pattern. This study therefore focused on whether phy­sicians, who are amongst the highest earning occupational category in the Zimbabwean diaspora, display different remitting practices than other Zimbabweans. The survey found the following: 60% of the diaspora physicians send money to Zimbabwe while 40% never do so. The propensity to remit was highest among medical doctors working in South Africa, with 79% sending money to Zimbabwe. Two thirds of doctors in the USA remit but only 42% in the UK and a third of those in Canada. To put these figures in context, various surveys of Zimbabweans in South Africa have found that 85-95% of migrants remit money home. Another study of Zimbabweans in the UK found that 80% remit­ted funds to Zimbabwe. the propensity of physicians to remit varies with the year of emi­gration (with 95% of those who left after 2000 remitting) and race (only a third of white doctors remit compared to 100% of black doctors.) around 50% of those who remit do so at least once a month. Amongst the general Zimbabwean migrant population in the UK, around 41% remit at least once a month. Remitting frequencies from South Africa are higher; 60-75% at least once a month. There is thus nothing particularly unusual about the frequency with which physicians remit. the vast majority of Zimbabwean migrants (over 90%) use various informal channels when remitting to Zimbabwe. Highly-educated, middle-class migrants such as physicians might be expected to make more use of formal remitting channels such as banks and money transfer companies. In fact, at the time of the survey (2008), most physicians were also using informal channels and stayed away from the banks. the research on Zimbabwean remittances clearly shows that the bulk of it is spent on household survival needs with very little investment of the proceeds. The question is whether remittances from physicians are any different. The answer is no. Over 90% of the respondents who send cash remittances do so to meet the day to day expenses of family members in Zimbabwe including food purchase, rent and the cost of electricity and water. the only thing that really distinguishes the physicians’ remit­ting behaviour is the volume sent (which is well above aver­age). However, even if the average physician remittance figure of US$2,616 p.a. was sustained over a 30 year period, the total remittances from one individual would still not compensate for their training costs in the first place. Considerable international enthusiasm surrounds the idea of “return migration.” In the case of Zimbabwean physicians outside the country, the probability of permanent return migration is generally low but varies with race, age, year of emigration and location: 53% of black physicians said they are likely to return compared to only 11% of white physicians. Conversely, 70% of the whites said they would never return compared to only 16% of the blacks. In other words, the potential for return is higher amongst black physicians and only a small minority (16%) definitely ruled out the possibility. the possibility of return is highest amongst the younger doctors: 78% in the 31-40 age group said they are likely to return, compared to 23% in the 41-50 age group, 10% in the 51-60 age group and none over the age of 60. the year of emigration is positively correlated with the possibility of return: 12% of those who left in the 1980s said they might return compared to 30% of those who left in the 1990s and 79% of those who left after 2000. possibility of return varies with a doctor’s current country of residence. Return was more likely among those located in South Africa (40%) than amongst those in the UK (21%) or in the USA (13%). Diaspora engagement has been increasingly advanced as a possible solution to the skills problems facing developing countries. In Zimbabwe, the diaspora option arguably offers the most sensible policy prescription since it entails the use of the skills of the diaspora without requiring them to return home permanently. Options proposed by the physicians and discussed in this report include: medical training, short-term medical visits, raising funds, sourcing supplies and telemedicine. In each case the opportunities and obstacles to the particular form of engagement are discussed

No. 30: Zimbabwe’s Exodus to Australia

This paper focuses on emigration of Zimbabwe-born migrants to Australia, partly because Australia is largely omitted from the important text, Zimbabwe’s Exodus even though it has become an important destination, and partly because the data is better for Australia, and for New Zealand, than for other major destination countries. This profile discusses the characteristics of persons born in Zimbabwe and of Zimbabwean ancestry, by undertaking primary analysis of the 2011 Australian Census using the TableBuilder software of the Australian Bureau of Statistics, together with the settlement reporting facility of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP)