Why is Voting Habit-Forming: Evidence from Sweden

For decades, scholars of electoral behavior have noted persistence in individuals' turnout decisions and hypothesized that such persistence is the result of habit. Recent empirical studies provide persuasive evidence supporting the habitual voting hypothesis, but we still do not know why individuals develop habits for voting. One theory is that voting causes individuals' to view themselves as "voters," increasing their future probabilities of voting. Another theory asserts that voting may ease institutional barriers, making future voting less costly and changing conative attitudes towards voting. This study seeks to disentangle these two causal mechanisms by testing the habitual voting hypothesis in Sweden. Since institutional barriers to voting are minimal in Sweden, evidence in favor of the habitual voting hypothesis will lend credence to a psychological mechanism. The opposite result will point to an institutional mechanism. Ultimately, habitual voting is found in Sweden, which suggests the psychological mechanism is valid

Classification of voting algorithms for N-version software

A voting algorithm in N-version software is a crucial component that evaluates the execution of each of the N versions and determines the correct result. Obviously, the result of the voting algorithm determines the outcome of the N-version software in general. Thus, the choice of the voting algorithm is a vital issue. A lot of voting algorithms were already developed and they may be selected for implementation based on the specifics of the analysis of input data. However, the voting algorithms applied in N-version software are not classified. This article presents an overview of classic and recent voting algorithms used in N-version software and the authors' classification of the voting algorithms. Moreover, the steps of the voting algorithms are presented and the distinctive features of the voting algorithms in Nversion software are defined. © Published under licence by IOP Publishing Ltd

Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms

Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings. We then focus on sub-committee voting with approvals and propose extensions of the justified representation axioms that have been considered for proportional representation in approval-based committee voting. We study the properties and relations of these axioms. For each of the axioms, we analyse whether a representative committee exists and also examine the complexity of computing and verifying such a committee

Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control

We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show that a voting system resists a case of control by proving that performing that case of control is computationally infeasible. Range Voting is a natural extension of approval voting, and Normalized Range Voting is a simple variant which alters each vote to maximize the potential impact of each voter. We show that Normalized Range Voting has among the largest number of control resistances among natural voting systems

Vulnerability analysis of three remote voting methods

This article analyses three methods of remote voting in an uncontrolled environment: postal voting, internet voting and hybrid voting. It breaks down the voting process into different stages and compares their vulnerabilities considering criteria that must be respected in any democratic vote: confidentiality, anonymity, transparency, vote unicity and authenticity. Whether for safety or reliability, each vulnerability is quantified by three parameters: size, visibility and difficulty to achieve. The study concludes that the automatisation of treatments combined with the dematerialisation of the objects used during an election tends to substitute visible vulnerabilities of a lesser magnitude by invisible and widespread vulnerabilities.Comment: 15 page