Counter-intuitive moral judgement following traumatic brain injury

Several neurological patient populations, including Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), appear to produce an abnormally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of judgements to moral dilemmas; they tend to make judgements that maximise the welfare of the majority, rather than deontological judgements based on the following of moral rules (e.g., do not harm others). However, this patient research has always used extreme dilemmas with highly valued moral rules (e.g., do not kill). Data from healthy participants, however, suggests that when a wider range of dilemmas are employed, involving less valued moral rules (e.g., do not lie), moral judgements demonstrate sensitivity to the psychological intuitiveness of the judgements, rather than their deontological or utilitarian content (Kahane et al., 2011). We sought the moral judgements of 30 TBI participants and 30 controls on moral dilemmas where content (utilitarian/deontological) and intuition (intuitive/counterintuitive) were measured concurrently. Overall TBI participants made utilitarian judgements in equal proportions to controls; disproportionately favouring utilitarian judgements only when they were counterintuitive, and deontological judgements only when they were counterintuitive. These results speak against the view that TBI causes a specific utilitarian bias, suggesting instead that moral intuition is broadly disrupted following TBI

"I would like to see that one is able to say I'm proud of being a citizen of the EU…" – the way Hungarian people see Europe and the European Union

This paper explores the concepts of Europe, Europeanism and European Union, their meaning to Hungarians, how people define them and how they relate to these concepts through the analysis of qualitative in-depth interviews. The main question is whether the discourse, expressing attitudes towards Europe and the European Union, are of symbolic or utilitarian character. The symbolic way to relate to the EU is based on principles, an ideological or an emotional approach of the subject, while the pragmatic or utilitarian logic is based on rational cost-benefit analysis. The main argument of this current paper is that the way Hungarians tend to relate to the EU is rather utilitarian and it is the utilitarian logic that represents the relevant frame to understand people’s attitudes on the subject

Population Principles with Number-Dependent Critical Levels

This paper introduces and characterizes the number-sensitive critical-level generalized utilitarian family of population principles which is a generalization of the critical-level generalized-utilitarian family. Number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian principles rank alternatives by using a value function that is equal to total utility minus a sum of critical levels that may depend on population size but not on individual utilities, and number-sensitive critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles use transformed utilities and critical levels. Ethical properties of the principles are investigated and the new family is compared to number-dampened generalized utilitarianism whose value functions are equal to transformed representative utility (average utility in the utilitarian case) multiplied by a function of population size.

The Case for Utilitarian Voting

Utilitarian voting (UV) is defined in this paper as any voting rule that allows the voter to rank all of the alternatives by means of the scores permitted under a given voting scale. Specific UV rules that have been proposed are approval voting, allowing the scores 0, 1; range voting, allowing all numbers in an interval as scores; evaluative voting, allowing the scores -1, 0, 1. The paper deals extensively with Arrow’s impossibility theorem that has been interpreted as precluding a satisfactory voting mechanism. I challenge the relevance of the ordinal framework in which that theorem is expressed and argue that instead utilitarian, i.e. cardinal social choice theory is relevant for voting. I show that justifications of both utilitarian social choice and of majority rule can be modified to derive UV. The most elementary derivation of UV is based on the view that no justification exists for restricting voters’ freedom to rank the alternatives on a given scale

Multi-Utilitarian Bargaining Solutions.

This paper introduces and analyzes the class of multi-utilitarian solutions for cooperative bargaining problems. We show that generalized Gini solutions and inequality averse Choquet bargaining solutions are particular cases of this new multi-valued solution concept and provide a complete characterization of inequality averse multi-utilitarian solutions in which an invariance property consisting of a weakening of both the linear invariance axiom in Blackorby et al. (1994) and the restricted invariance axiom in Ok and Zhou (2000). Moreover, by relaxing the assumptions involved in the characterization, the class is extended to include equality averse multi-utilitarian solutions which are also studied in the paper.Axiomatic bargaining theory, multi-valued bargaining solutions, generalized Gini solutions, inequality adverse Choquet solutions.

A Fundamental Objection to Tax Equity Norms: A Call for Utilitarianism

Anti-utilitarian norms often are used in assessing tax systems. Two motivations support this practice. First, many believe utilitarianism to be insufficiently egalitarian. Second, utilitarianism does not give independent weight to other equitable principles, notably concerns that reforms may violate horizontal equity or result in rank reversals in the income distribution. This investigation suggests that a policy maker who believes in the Pareto principle -- that any reform preferred by everyone should be adopted - - cannot consistently adhere to any of these anti-utilitarian sentiments. Moreover, the affirmative case for utilitarian tax policy assessment is stronger than is generally appreciated.

Utilitarian Collective Choice and Voting

In his seminal Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow stated that his theory applies to voting. Many voting theorists have been convinced that, on account of Arrow’s theorem, all voting methods must be seriously flawed. Arrow’s theory is strictly ordinal, the cardinal aggregation of preferences being explicitly rejected. In this paper I point out that all voting methods are cardinal and therefore outside the reach of Arrow’s result. Parallel to Arrow’s ordinal approach, there evolved a consistent cardinal theory of collective choice. This theory, most prominently associated with the work of Harsanyi, continued the older utilitarian tradition in a more formal style. The purpose of this paper is to show that various derivations of utilitarian SWFs can also be used to derive utilitarian voting (UV). By this I mean a voting rule that allows the voter to score each alternative in accordance with a given scale. UV-k indicates a scale with k distinct values. The general theory leaves k to be determined on pragmatic grounds. A (1,0) scale gives approval voting. I prefer the scale (1,0,-1) and refer to the resulting voting rule as evaluative voting. A conclusion of the paper is that the defects of conventional voting methods result not from Arrow’s theorem, but rather from restrictions imposed on voters’ expression of their preferences. The analysis is extended to strategic voting, utilizing a novel set of assumptions regarding voter behavior

ADVERTISING AND PRODUCT TRIAL - THE EFFECT OF MESSAGE’S REGULATORY FOCUS AND PRODUCT TYPE ON CONSUMER EVALUATIONS

The objective of this research is to examine the effect of message’s regulatory focus (promotion versus prevention) and product types (hedonic versus utilitarian) on advertising effectiveness, as well as how direct product experience alters these effects. The findings show that, for hedonic products, promotion messages are more persuasive, generate more positive product attitudes, and willingness to pay a higher price than prevention messages. For utilitarian products, prevention messages are more persuasive and generate more positive product attitudes than promotion messages. However, product trial moderates most of these effects. Managerial implications of these results are discussed.Hedonic and utilitarian products, Product Trial, Regulatory focus.

An Incongruent Amalgamation: John Stuart Mill\u27s Utilitarianism on Naturalism

John Stuart Mill\u27s utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, often surfaces in cultural debates in the contemporary West over the extent and foundations of moral duties. Given the drift from its historical Judeo-Christian moorings, naturalism now provides much of the epistemic grounding in Western culture in relation to moral duties. The amalgamation of Mill’s utilitarianism and naturalism has resulted in a cultural and epistemic disconnect. Naturalism is hard-pressed to provide consistent epistemic support for Mill’s utilitarian principle. This essay provides a number of suggestions as to why Mill’s utilitarianism may be inconsistent on naturalism

A question of taste? The difference in perceived helpfulness of online reviews for utilitarian versus hedonic products

While online reviews have become an indispensable marketing tool, their impact may depend on several factors. This paper demonstrates that online reviews are perceived as more helpful for utilitarian products than for hedonic products (study 1 & 2). Applying theory about opinions and taste, we show that the quality of hedonic products is depending on personal taste, while the quality of utilitarian products is seen as a matter of general opinion (study 3). We provide evidence that this opinion versus taste attribution mediates the effect of product type on perceived helpfulness of online reviews (study 4)