Under-reporting of roadcasualties ? phase 1

Although this report was commissioned by the Department for Transport, the findings and recommendations are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the DfT

Using panel data to exactly estimate under-reporting by the self-employed

The income of the self-employed is often assumed to be understated in economic statistics. Debate exists about the extent of under-reporting and the resulting measures of the size of the underground economy. This paper refines a method developed by Pissarides and Weber (1989) and uses discrepancies between food shares and reported incomes to estimate under-reporting by the self-employed. In contrast to previous studies our panel data methodology distinguishes income under-reporting from transitory income fluctuations of the self-employed, and provides an exact estimate of the degree of under-reporting rather than just an interval estimate. Using panel data from Korea and Russia we estimate that 38 percent of the income of self-employed households in Korea and 47 percent of the income of Russian self-employed households is not reported

Detecting Wage Under-reporting Using a Double Hurdle Model

We estimate a double hurdle (DH) model of the Hungarian wage distribution assuming censoring at the minimum wage and wage under-reporting (i.e. compensation consisting of the minimum wage, subject to taxation, and an unreported cash supplement). We estimate the probability of under-reporting for minimum wage earners, simulate their genuine earnings and classify them and their employers as 'cheaters' and 'non-cheaters'. In the possession of the classification we check how cheaters and non-cheaters reacted to the introduction of a minimum social security contribution base, equal to 200 per cent of the minimum wage, in 2007. The findings suggest that cheaters were more likely to raise the wages of their minimum wage earners to 200 per cent of the minimum wage thereby reducing the risk of tax audit. Cheating firms also experienced faster average wage growth and slower output growth. The results suggest that the DH model is able to identify the loci of wage under-reporting with some precision.tax evasion, double hurdle model, Hungary

AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION UNDER NAFTA: REPORTING ON THE REPORT CARD

International Relations/Trade,

Medicare Quality Measurement and Reporting Programs: Opportunities for Alliances Under Health Reform

Outlines provisions to expand Medicare quality measurement and reporting and opportunities for RWJF's Aligning Forces for Quality communities to work with providers in coordinating measures with Medicare, offer feedback, and focus on equity and cost data

Collective penalties and inducement of self-reporting

Random accidents can be contained by collective penalties. These penalties are not likely to be enforced but rather induce self-reporting that enhances welfare due to early containment. Self-reporting under collective penalties increases overall welfare, but may increase expected environmental cost. Even when regulation is constrained by an upper limit on the acceptable collective penalty, the threat of collective penalties can induce an incentive-compatible mutual insurance scheme under which a side-payment is made to the agent that self-reports an accident. This self-reporting mechanism is welfare-improving, but first-best outcomes can only be obtained when the collective penalty is unconstrained, or when an honor system applies. In cases when there is a new externality that requires fast response (avian flu), collective penalties can compliment or substitute for monitoring.Ambient tax, collective penalties, enforcement, self-reporting.