Modeling Mental Qualities

Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in geometrical spaces, where distances between points inversely correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This paper argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more powerful and flexible. The core problem for the standard framework is that it cannot capture precision structure: for example, consider the phenomenal contrast between seeing an object as crimson in foveal vision versus merely as red in peripheral vision. The solution I favor is to model mental qualities using regions, rather than points. I explain how this seemingly simple formal innovation not only provides a natural way of modeling precision, but also yields a variety of further theoretical fruits: it enables us to formulate novel hypotheses about the space and structures of mental qualities, formally differentiate two dimensions of phenomenal similarity, generate a quantitative model of the phenomenal sorites, and define a measure of discriminatory grain. A noteworthy consequence is that the structure of the mental qualities of conscious experiences is fundamentally different from the structure of the perceptible qualities of external objects

Enkinaesthetic polyphony: the underpinning for first-order languaging

We contest two claims: (1) that language, understood as the processing of abstract symbolic forms, is an instrument of cognition and rational thought, and (2) that conventional notions of turn-taking, exchange structure, and move analysis, are satisfactory as a basis for theorizing communication between living, feeling agents. We offer an enkinaesthetic theory describing the reciprocal affective neuro-muscular dynamical flows and tensions of co- agential dialogical sense-making relations. This “enkinaesthetic dialogue” is characterised by a preconceptual experientially recursive temporal dynamics forming the deep extended melodies of relationships in time. An understanding of how those relationships work, when we understand and are ourselves understood, when communication falters and conflict arises, will depend on a grasp of our enkinaesthetic intersubjectivity

A Phenomenological Critique of Ratcliffe's Existential Feeling: Affect as Temporality

Matthew Ratcliffe’s model of existential feelings can be seen as a critical engagement with perspectives common to analytic, theory of mind and psychological orientations that view psychological functions such as cognition and affectivity within normative objective propositional frameworks. Ratcliffe takes a step back from and re-situates objective reifications within an interactive subject-object matrix inclusive of the body and the interpersonal world. In doing so, he turns a mono-normative thinking into a poly-normative one, in which determinations of meaning and significance are relative to the changing structural coherence of felt bodily and inter-socially shaped schemes of interaction. And yet, from the phenomenological vantages of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Gendlin and Heidegger, Ratcliffe’s approach retains the metaphysical presupposition of subject-object dualism as interacting bodies, with a separate causative glue necessary to provide for the means of their relation. Ratcliffe re-purposed Damasio‘s concept of background feeling and dressed it up in the garb of phenomenology , but it remains a reciprocal causal model of psychological function. What Heidegger’s Being-in-the -World, Merleau-Ponty’s figure-background structure of corporeal inter-subjectivity, Gendlin’s implicit intricacy and Husserl’s reduced transcendental ego have in common is a radicalized notion of temporality that overcomes the split between subject and object informing Ratcliffe’s understanding of being ‘immersed in’ and connected to a world, and thus abandons the need to posit bodily feeling as a ‘glue’ organizing and maintaining the meaningful structure of consciousness of a world. Temporality , not the empirically causal body, provides the basis of affect, cognition and the organizational glue for structures of meaning

Fear, Where Is Your Sting?

Exploration, it appears, is a family trait. I can recall the feeling of Mama and Daddy’s hands holding my tiny ones as they guided me into partially-built houses with for-sale signs poking out of the front lawns. At five years old, I could march confidently into any framed structure, swiftly identify the unfinished rooms, and definitively pronounce my opinion of the floorplan. Over the course of the next seven years, looking for the property of our dreams became as much a hobby as a necessity. Although we’d nearly fallen through floors in fixer-uppers, harmlessly trespassed in neighborhoods of new construction, and once been entirely unnerved by a basement full of peculiar painted people, nothing could have quite prepared us for the fiasco at Jack’s Creek Polo Club

Something to Die for. The Individual as Interruption of the Political in Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political

This article aims to question the anti-individualist stance in Carl Schmitt's concept of the political by uncovering the historical bias of Schmitt's anti-individualism, seen here as one of the main driving forces behind his argument. For Schmitt, the political can take place only when a collectivity is able to declare war to another collectivity on the basis of feeling existentially threatened by the latter. As such, Schmitt's framework implies the inescapable possibility of war, as the condition which makes possible the political. Acknowledging the previous criticisms of Schmitt raised by John Rawls and Iris Marion Young, this article takes a different path by pointing to certain historically tacit assumptions in 1927 Germany which Schmitt took for granted, but which are not suitable for a contemporary political theory. The demonstration is done first by showing how the structure of interruption functions in the works of Schmitt, then showing how he conceives of the individual as a possible interruption of the political in history, and then placing this structure of interruption in the historical context of Schmitt's writing

A Multiscale Guide to Brownian Motion

We revise the Levy's construction of Brownian motion as a simple though still rigorous approach to operate with various Gaussian processes. A Brownian path is explicitly constructed as a linear combination of wavelet-based "geometrical features" at multiple length scales with random weights. Such a wavelet representation gives a closed formula mapping of the unit interval onto the functional space of Brownian paths. This formula elucidates many classical results about Brownian motion (e.g., non-differentiability of its path), providing intuitive feeling for non-mathematicians. The illustrative character of the wavelet representation, along with the simple structure of the underlying probability space, is different from the usual presentation of most classical textbooks. Similar concepts are discussed for fractional Brownian motion, Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, Gaussian free field, and fractional Gaussian fields. Wavelet representations and dyadic decompositions form the basis of many highly efficient numerical methods to simulate Gaussian processes and fields, including Brownian motion and other diffusive processes in confining domains

Pig farmers’ perceptions, attitudes, influences and management of information in the decision-making process for disease control

The objectives of this study were (1) to explore the factors involved in the decision-making process used by pig farmers for disease control and (2) to investigate pig farmers’ attitudes and perceptions about different information sources relating to disease control. In 2011 a qualitative study involving 20 face-to-face interviews with English pig farmers was conducted. The questionnaire was composed of three parts. The first part required farmers to identify two diseases they had experienced and which were difficult to recognize and/or control. They were asked to report how the disease problem was recognized, how the need for control was decided, and what affected the choice of control approach. For the latter, a structure related to the Theory of Planned Behaviour was used. Their verbal responses were classified as associated with: (1) attitude and beliefs, (2) subjective norms, or (3) perceived behavioural control (PBC). In the second part, five key sources of information for disease control (Defra, BPEX, research from academia, internet and veterinarians) and the factors related to barriers to knowledge were investigated. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. A qualitative analysis of the text of the interview transcripts was carried out using templates. Drivers for disease control were ‘pig mortality’, ‘feeling of entering in an economically critical situation’, ‘animal welfare’ and ‘feeling of despair’. Veterinarians were perceived by several participating farmers as the most trusted information source on disease control. However, in particular non-sustainable situations, other producers, and especially experiences from abroad, seemed to considerably influence the farmers’ decision-making. ‘Lack of knowledge’, ‘farm structure and management barriers’ and ‘economic constrains’ were identified in relation to PBC. Several negative themes, such as ‘lack of communication’, ‘not knowing where to look’, and ‘information bias’ were associated with research from academia. This study identified a range of factors influencing the decision-making process for disease control by pig farmers. In addition, it highlighted the lack of awareness and difficult access of producers to current scientific research outputs. The factors identified should be considered when developing communication strategies to disseminate research findings and advice for disease control

Raymond Williams's "structure of feeling" and the problem of democratic values in Britain, 1938-1961

This article traces a history of the literary critic and theorist Raymond Williams’s idea of the “structure of feeling”, the formation of which is situated within debates about the place of artistic and moral values in democratic politics during the 1940s and 1950s. It demonstrates that the “structure of feeling” was intended to circumvent an equation of collective normative legislation with totalitarianism in the early cultural Cold War, by conceiving the definition of values as a process upon which all individuals in a society were always, necessarily, engaged. In articulating this quasi-democratic account of the production of artistic and moral standards, Williams also sought to escape the various theories of “minority culture” that dominated literary and cultural criticism in mid-century Britain. However, his concept of the “structure of feeling” required him to maintain a privileged role for artistic and intellectual arbiters, which constrained his vision of a properly democratic culture. In conclusion, the article argues that the problem of “democratic values” that Williams addressed in his work of the 1950s was a major factor in the marginalization or exclusion of moral criticism from political argument in Britain after 1945, and suggests that this passage of intellectual history may therefore be of considerable importance to contemporary debates about the lineages and reform of, in a broad sense, neoliberal political economy