A definition of shareholder value creation

In this paper, we will define and analyze shareholder value creation. To help us understand this concept better, we will use the example of a listed company, General Electric, between 1991 and 1999. To obtain the created shareholder value, we must first define the increase of equity market value, the shareholder value added, the shareholder return, and the required return to equity. A company creates value for its shareholders when the shareholder return exceeds the required return to equity. In other words, a company creates value in one year when it outperforms expectations. The created shareholder value is quantified as follows: Created shareholder value = Equity market value x (Shareholder return - Ke). The created shareholder value can also be calculated as follows: Created shareholder value = Shareholder value added - (Equity market value x Ke). We also calculate the created shareholder value of 142 American companies during the three-year period 1997-1999 and during the eight-year period 1992-1999.Financial management; Stockholders; Value creation

Shareholder value creators in the S&P 500: Year 2004

During 2004, 64% of the companies in the S&P 500 created value, while in 2003 the figure was 87%. The market value of the 500 companies was $11.2 trillion in 2004, compared to$10.1 trillion in 2003. The top shareholder value creators in 2004 were Exxon, General Electric, Ebay, Johnson & Johnson and Qualcomm. We define created shareholder value and provide the ranking of created shareholder value for the 500 companies. We also calculate the created shareholder value of the 500 companies during the twelve-year period 1993-2004. General Electric was the top shareholder value creator and AT&T was the top shareholder value destroyer during the twelve-year period. On average, the small market capitalization companies of the S&P were more profitable. Between 1998 and 2004, the volatility of the S&P as a whole fell, but the volatility of its components increased on the average.shareholder value creation; created shareholder value; equity market value; shareholder value added; shareholder return; required return to equity;

Exploring the rationale of enlightened shareholder value in the realm of UK company law – the path dependence perspective

Despite conventional beliefs in the predominance of shareholder value, a broader agenda of stakeholder consideration has been advocated in the UK by the recently-introduced ESV principle – the overriding corporate objective in the new company law regime. In this paper, the efficiency of this principle in terms of stakeholder enhancement is challenged through an interdisciplinary analysis. Through a critical review of the ESV principle, it is discovered that stakeholder enhancement practices in the context of the 2006 company law regime are still for the fundamental goal of shareholder value maximisation, and that their enlightened impact has been fairly limited in practice. Furthermore, by revisiting the interrelationships between UK economic, political and cultural factors with the predominance objective of shareholder value maximisation in the Companies Act 2006, it is discovered that the enlightened effect of this new approach in the company law regime is in fact impeded by strong, persistent forces deriving from shareholder-oriented particulars. Providing insight into the future direction of corporate governance practice, the paper concludes the rationale behind the shareholder-oriented ESV principle, and further suggests the continuing predominance of shareholder value in UK corporate governance

Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence

This Article questions the practice of framing problems concerning auditors\u27 professional responsibility inside a principal-agent paradigm. If professional independence is to be achieved, auditors cannot be enmeshed in agency relationships with the shareholders of their audit clients. As agents, the auditors by definition become subject to the principal\u27s control and cannot act independently. For the same reason, auditors\u27 duties should be neither articulated in the framework of corporate law fiduciary duty, nor conceived relationally at all. These assertions follow from an inquiry into the operative notion of the shareholder-beneficiary. The Article unpacks the notion of the shareholder and tells a particularized story about the shareholder interest. The exercise complicates the agency description, highlighting multiple and unstable shareholder demands that displace the unitary model of the shareholder usually brought to bear. This fragmented and volatile model of the shareholder provides neither a basis for articulating a coherent set of instructions respecting aggressive accounting nor for imposing conservative accounting. The Article concludes that legal positivism provides a more appropriate conceptual framework. Auditor duties should be conceived in formal rather than relational terms, with fidelity going to the rules and the system that auditors apply rather than to a client interest

The Impact of Enlightened Shareholder Value

This paper documents and analyses the findings of a study conducted in relation to selected reports of all of the retail companies that are listed on the FTSE 100 in order to ascertain the impact of enlightened shareholder value on UK corporate governance. The findings are also analysed in light of other studies and commentary

Corporate Political Spending: Why Shareholders Must Weigh In

This article focuses upon the growing problem confronting companies and their shareholders: the use of general treasury (i.e., shareholder money) to propagate political agendas which are not only contrary to companies’ policies of employment, but are committed without the input or knowledge of the shareholder, leading to an aura of distrust, alienation, and diminution of both shareholder value and principled leadership

Shareholder value creation of microsoft and GE

In this paper, we define and analyze shareholder value creation. To help us understand this concept better, we use the example of two listed companies, General Electric and Microsoft, between 1992 and 2003. To obtain the created shareholder value, we first define the increase of equity market value, shareholder value added, shareholder return, and required return to equity. A company creates value for shareholders when the shareholder return exceeds the required return to equity (Ke). In other words, a company creates value when it outperforms expectations. Created shareholder value is quantified as follows: Created shareholder value = Equity market value x (Shareholder return - Ke) Created shareholder value can also be calculated as follows: Created shareholder value = Shareholder value added - (Equity market value x Ke). We also calculate the created shareholder value of 400 American companies during the eleven-year period 1992-2003.Value creation; Shareholder value added;

Corporate culture and shareholder value in banking industry

This paper analyses the casual relationship between corporate culture and shareholder value using a sample of large banks in the French, German, Italian and U.K. banking systems over the 2000 to 2003 period. Firstly, we measure shareholder value using an Economic Value Added estimated through a procedure tailored to account for banking peculiarities. Secondly, we measure corporate culture using language as its particular artifact and developing a cultural survey based on the application of a text-analysis model to a corpus of reference texts produced by the sample of banks. We posit six hypotheses regarding the relationship between corporate culture and bank profits and shareholder value. Our results noticeably show that bank profits and shareholder value benefit from different orientations of banking corporate culture.

Shareholder value creators in the S&P 500: Year 2003

During 2003, 87% of the companies in the S&P 500 created value, compared to just 17% in 2002. The market value of the 500 companies in 2003 was $10.1 trillion, compared to$7.9 trillion in 2002. The top shareholder value creators in 2003 were Intel, Cisco, Citigroup, General Electric and Exxon. We define created shareholder value and provide the ranking of created shareholder value for the 500 companies. We also calculate the created shareholder value of the 500 companies over the eleven-year period 1993-2003. General Electric was the top shareholder value creator and AT&T, the top shareholder value destroyer during the period. On the average, the small cap companies in the S&P 500 were more profitable than the large caps. The volatility of the S&P 500 fell over the period 1998 to 2003, but the volatility of its components increased on the average.shareholder value creation; created shareholder value; equity market value; shareholder value added;

Stakeholder capitalism, corporate governance and firm value

We consider the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers as well as shareholders compared to shareholder-oriented firms. Societies with stakeholder-oriented firms have higher prices, lower output, and can have greater firm value than shareholder-oriented societies. In some circumstances, firms may voluntarily choose to be stakeholder-oriented because this increases their value. Consumers that prefer to buy from stakeholder firms can also enforce a stakeholder society. With globalization entry by stakeholder firms is relatively more attractive than entry by shareholder firms for all societies. JEL Classification: D02, D21, G34, L13, L2