Regret

Poetry by Rachel Worley

Auctions with Anticipated Regret

This paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first price auctions, overbidding with respect to risk neutral Nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret (felt when bidders lose at an affordable price). Different information structures are created to elicit regret: bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose (loser regret condition); or the second highest bid if they win (winner regret condition); or no information regarding the other bids. Bidders only in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid; in the other conditions bidders did not anticipate regret and hence did not overbid.overbidding, first price auction, anticipated regret

Pure Exploration for Multi-Armed Bandit Problems

We consider the framework of stochastic multi-armed bandit problems and study the possibilities and limitations of forecasters that perform an on-line exploration of the arms. These forecasters are assessed in terms of their simple regret, a regret notion that captures the fact that exploration is only constrained by the number of available rounds (not necessarily known in advance), in contrast to the case when the cumulative regret is considered and when exploitation needs to be performed at the same time. We believe that this performance criterion is suited to situations when the cost of pulling an arm is expressed in terms of resources rather than rewards. We discuss the links between the simple and the cumulative regret. One of the main results in the case of a finite number of arms is a general lower bound on the simple regret of a forecaster in terms of its cumulative regret: the smaller the latter, the larger the former. Keeping this result in mind, we then exhibit upper bounds on the simple regret of some forecasters. The paper ends with a study devoted to continuous-armed bandit problems; we show that the simple regret can be minimized with respect to a family of probability distributions if and only if the cumulative regret can be minimized for it. Based on this equivalence, we are able to prove that the separable metric spaces are exactly the metric spaces on which these regrets can be minimized with respect to the family of all probability distributions with continuous mean-payoff functions

On the Impossibility of Regret Minimization in Repeated Games

Regret minimizing strategies for repeated games have been receiving increasing attention in the literature. These are simple adaptive behavior rules that exhibit nice convergence properties. If all players follow regret minimizing strategies, their average joint play converges to the set of correlated equilibria or to the Hannan set (depending on the notion of regret in use), or even to Nash equilibrium on certain classes of games. In this note we raise the question of validity of the regret minimization objective. By example we show that regret minimization can lead to unrealistic behavior, since it fails to take into account the effect of one's actions on subsequent behavior of the opponents. An amended notion of regret that corrects this defect is not very useful either, since achieving a no-regret objective is not guaranteed in that case.Repeated games, Regret minimization, No-regret strategy