Alfven-Wave Studies On Pretext

Fusion Research Cente

Good work, little soldier: Text and pretext

This article reads the relation between Denis's Beau Travail and Jean-Luc Godard's 1960 film Le Petit Soldat as a film-on-film variant of film-on-book adaptation. The model informing this reading is not so much intertextual as pretextual. The principal points of contact between the two films discussed are 'actor' (Michel Subor), 'character' (Bruno Forestier) and 'narrator' (Forestier/Galoup). The use in Beau Travail of Le Petit Soldat is compared with and differentiated from the use of Melville's 'Billy Budd, Sailor'. The conclusion arrived at is that the film-on-film relation can be read as a development of the mirror motif borrowed from Godard by Denis, in order to replace abyssal models of intertextual infinity with the finitudes of abyssal reflexivity. This is to offer a model of pretextuality that is not dependent on privileging the pretext: implicit is the suggestion that Beau Travail and Le Petit Soldat may be read as a single, if hybrid, text

Nevermore: pretext machine

Our proposal is to make a graphic representation of the sound syntax and the syllabic structure enclosed in The Raven, published in 1845 by Edgar Allan Poe, using a script that works simultaneously as reading-text-machine, a drawing-machine and a synthesis-text-machine. The script translates the poem structure into an abstract grid, generating a drawing. The geometric definition of the poem is then constrained by the characters and their correspondent location to the sound code: the word nevermore and the textual reverberation it produces. A synthesis of the poem is achieved by a recursive selection of syllables, resulting in a graphical and textual configuration towards a rewritten final stanza. The process is repeated with the Portuguese translation of the poem, made by Fernando Pessoa in 1924. Although it follows the same initial structure and algorithms the change of idiom introduces different geometries and sound reverberations

Pretext in Peril

This Article addresses the connections among substance, procedure, and equality in the American workplace. Exploring the deepening struggle for plaintiffs under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this Article seeks to add clarity to an enduring quandary—why does Title VII fail to combat the prejudicial disparate treatment it was designed to eradicate? This Article offers a critique of the hardships shouldered by plaintiffs in proving contemporary workplace discrimination. Challenging the seemingly unfettered discretion of the courts in evaluating claims of workplace bias, this Article pursues the interplay of procedural and substantive law to expose how courts chip away at pretext under Title VII\u27s analytical evidentiary scheme. Specifically, this Article explores various evaluative constructs that have evolved from the courts\u27 interpretive rulemaking in the context of the litigation process with particular emphasis on the summary judgment stage. Using one sub-rule—the same-actor principle—as a case study reference, the Article embeds a striking example of how procedure and the substance of Title VII collide to distort the pretext prong. This evidentiary dilution with its procedural reinforcement straightjackets plaintiffs\u27 efforts to prove pretext for discrimination. My premise is that pretext is now the endangered element under the disparate treatment framework—hollow and forceless in evidentiary value. This Article situates the courts\u27 interpretive rulemaking within the larger problem of establishing the contours of discriminatory workplace behavior and theorizes on the elusive nature of discrimination. Exposing the myths about fairness and justice embedded in the rhetoric of Title VII and interpretive case law, I demonstrate the necessity of redefining discrimination and employing a more workable evaluative framework for circumstantial evidence claims of workplace discrimination. Accordingly, this work can be seen as contributing to a larger movement to redefine what constitutes discrimination, in part, conceptualizing workplace bias as an amalgamation of complex human, cultural, and organizational dimensions. Straddling procedure and substance, this Article highlights the complexity of proving discriminatory bias in the modern employment setting

Pretext without Context

First, this response addresses the lower courts\u27 opinions in Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., as well as the Supreme Court\u27s per curiam opinion in this case, which espouses a more contextualized analysis of pretext in race-based disparate treatment cases. Next, this response examines Holiness v. MooreHandley, Inc. and the acontextual, colorblind analysis the court applied. Each case illustrates the negative effects of courts analyzing pretext without context at different stages of race discrimination litigation: during post-trial phases in Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc. and at the summary judgment stage in Holiness v. Moore-Handley, Inc. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc. and Holiness v. Moore-Handley, Inc. reveal judicial nullification of the jury\u27s role and provide an opportunity to show the importance of contextualizing facts in race discrimination cases. I argue that judges should not eliminate this jury function summarily in disparate treatment cases; moreover, courts must apply a more nuanced methodology to these claims. Accordingly, I proffer a more contextualized approach to the Holiness case that considers historical and contemporary race and gender relations in the United States and their manifestations in the workplace. Finally, this response briefly considers transformations of jurisprudential methodology needed in disparate treatment cases to redress the subtleties of racial inequality and stigmatization and thus unlawful race discrimination in the contemporary workplace

Press release: Lèse majésté as pretext to silence critical voices

Press_release.pdf: 64 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020

Privacy as Pretext

The terms of the debate over LGBT rights have shifted in recent years, particularly since the Supreme Court made marriage equality the law of the land in Obergefell v. Hodges. Today, people against LGBT equality argue that curtailing LGBT rights is necessary to protect the rights of others. One potent rhetorical weapon used to oppose LGBT rights is the claim that antidiscrimination protections for LGBT people undermine privacy because they permit transgender people to use facilities that accord with their gender identity. This Article uses legal privacy theory to show that allowing transgender people into gendered facilities does not undermine privacy in any legally cognizable sense. In making this argument, I engage with the work of scholars who have developed various philosophical understandings of privacy thought to justify a legal right to its protection. Privacy has been conceptualized as: a right to be let alone ; a means to limit access to the self; a safeguard of intimacy; a right to control information; a defense for personhood; and protection for social networks. But none of these conceptions of privacy support a right for cisgender objectors to exclude transgender people from facilities that accord with their gender identity. Indeed, examining the issue through these privacy theories shows that excluded transgender people are the ones whose privacy is violated. Opponents\u27 privacy claims are just a pretext to justify rolling back antidiscrimination protections for LGBT people. I also show that accepting a privacy right to exclude transgender people from gendered facilities would harm all women and girls. The privacy arguments being made to oppose LGBT rights echo a troubling history of using privacy concerns to justify unequal treatment of women. They also reify negative stereotypes about men and women, undermining sex equality and making all people more vulnerable to discrimination, mistreatment, and assault

Solving the Pretext Puzzle: The Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabrications in the Supreme Court\u27s Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine

This Article first analyzes the debate between Professors John M. Burkoff and James B. Haddad over the current state of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the pretext issue. It shows that the Supreme Court\u27s definition of pretext is broader than the definition of pretext used by these commentators. The Supreme Court\u27s definition includes both legal and fabricated pretexts. In a legal pretext, the government offers a justification that is not the true reason for the police activity, but that, if the motivation of the officer is not considered, legally justifies the activity. In a fabricated pretext, the government offers a justification that is not the true reason for the police activity and, in fact, is legally insufficient because it is not supported by the facts. This Article argues that although fabricated pretexts should be struck down on a case-by-case basis, a pretext doctrine that strikes down legal pretexts on a case-by-case basis based on the motivation of the officer is misguided. This Article demonstrates that the true evil of the pretext case is the virtually unlimited authority of police officers to arrest and search based on minor offenses. Thus, an approach that declares legal pretexts constitutional but re-examines the underlying authority of police officers to arrest and search based on a minor offense, offers the better solution to the pretext problem.\u27\u2

Solving the Pretext Puzzle: The Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabrications in the Supreme Court\u27s Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine

This Article first analyzes the debate between Professors John M. Burkoff and James B. Haddad over the current state of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the pretext issue. It shows that the Supreme Court\u27s definition of pretext is broader than the definition of pretext used by these commentators. The Supreme Court\u27s definition includes both legal and fabricated pretexts. In a legal pretext, the government offers a justification that is not the true reason for the police activity, but that, if the motivation of the officer is not considered, legally justifies the activity. In a fabricated pretext, the government offers a justification that is not the true reason for the police activity and, in fact, is legally insufficient because it is not supported by the facts. This Article argues that although fabricated pretexts should be struck down on a case-by-case basis, a pretext doctrine that strikes down legal pretexts on a case-by-case basis based on the motivation of the officer is misguided. This Article demonstrates that the true evil of the pretext case is the virtually unlimited authority of police officers to arrest and search based on minor offenses. Thus, an approach that declares legal pretexts constitutional but re-examines the underlying authority of police officers to arrest and search based on a minor offense, offers the better solution to the pretext problem.\u27\u2