Self-Correcting Mechanisms in Public Procurement: Why Award and Contract Should be Separated

In public procurement a temporal separation of award and actual contracting can frequently be observed. In this paper we give an explanation for this institutional setting. For incomplete procurement contracts we show that such a separation may increase efficiency. We show that efficiency can be increased by post-award, pre-contract negotiations between the award-winning seller and one of the `losing' sellers. Surprisingly, the efficiency gains can be higher if the award is given to a seller with a lower reputation for quality instead of to a seller with higher reputation. Under certain conditions post-award, pre-contract rent-seeking activities also increase efficiency. This is always the case if the procurement agency is corrupt, but may also occur in the case of lobbying.Procurement, Incomplete contracts, lobbying, corruption

The optimisation of the estimating and tendering process in warship refit - a case study

The optimisation of a tendering process for warship refit contracts is presented. The tendering process, also known as the pre-contract award process (PCA), involves all the activities needed to be successfully awarded a refit contract. Process activities and information flows have been modelled using Integrated Definition Language IDEF0 and a Dependency Structure Matrix (DSM) with optimisation performed via a Genetic Algorithm (DSM-GA) search technique. By utilising this approach the process activities were re-sequenced in such an order that the number and size of rework cycles were reduced. The result being a 57% reduction in a criterion indicating 're-work' cycles

Kajian Quantity Surveyor Pada Tahap Pre Contract Dan Post Contract Study Kasus Proyek Ad-premier Office – Jakarta

Proses Pre Contract merupakan suatu proses dimana pihak pemberi tugas dan team Konsultanmelakukan persiapan sebelum proyek dilaksanakan dilapangan, sedangkan dalam Post Contract sendirimerupakan suatu proses dimana pemantauan pekerjaan pada saat pelaksanaan dilapangan sampai proses serahterima oleh Penerima Tugas kepada Pemberi tugas. Dengan meneliti tahap-tahap baik Pre Contract maupun PostContract dapat diketahui pihak-pihak yang bertanggung jawab, masalah-masalah yang sering timbul sepertiperbedaan Budget yang terjadi antara Estimasi Biaya dengan nilai yang keluar pada Bill of Quantity (BQ) padasaat Pre Contract dan permasalahannya, lingkup kontrak yang terjadi saat Post Contract yang merupakanpermasalahan yang sering timbul pada Consultant Quantity Surveyor sebagai pihak independen antara PemberiTugas dengan Penerima Tugas.Studi kasus ini akan melakukan penelitian permasalahn yang terjadi pada kedua tahap tersebut,melakukan perbandingan antara budget saat Estimasi Biaya dengan hasil Bill of Quantity (BQ) pada proyek ADPremier Office – Jakarta. Hasil dari penelitian ini memberikan jawaban bahwa nilai BQ dengan akurasiperhitungan yang sesuai dengan Standart of Remeusurment tidak terlalu jauh nilai perbedaanya dengan tingkatakurasi yang dihasilkan oleh Estimasi awal yang merupakan nilai budget perkiraan yang dihitung olehConsultant Quantity Surveyor

The optimisation of a strategic business process

The optimisation of a Tendering Process for Warship Refit Contracts is presented. The Pre Contract Award process (PCA) involves all the activities needed to successfully win a Refit Contract, e.g. estimating, planning, tendering and negotiation. Process activities and information flows have been modelled using Integrated computer aided manufacturing DEFinition methodology (IDEF0) and a Design Structure Matrix (DSM) with optimisation performed via a Genetic Algorithm (DSM-GA) search technique [1]. The aim of the DSM-GA is to provide the user with an enhanced sequence of performing process activities. A new process was extracted from the optimised solution, showing an improved sequence with reduced iteration and planned activity concurrency based on carefully considered information requirements. This is of practical benefit to enhance understanding and to provide a guide to implementation. The approach suggests an enhanced sequence of process activities, based on information requirements, and can lead to improved business practice. This Paper discusses the potential benefits and limitations of this approach in a practical setting

Self-Correcting Mechanisms in Public Procurement: Why Award and Contract Should be Separated

In public procurement a temporal separation of award and actual contracting can frequently be observed. In this paper we give an explanation for this institutional setting. For incomplete procurement contracts we show that such a separation may increase efficiency. We show that efficiency can be increased by post-award, pre-contract negotiations between the award-winning seller and one of the `losing' sellers. Surprisingly, the efficiency gains can be higher if the award is given to a seller with a lower reputation for quality instead of to a seller with higher reputation. Under certain conditions post-award, pre-contract rent-seeking activities also increase efficiency. This is always the case if the procurement agency is corrupt, but may also occur in the case of lobbying

Self-Correcting Mechanisms in Public Procurement: Why Award and Contract Should be Separated

In public procurement a temporal separation of award and actual contracting can frequently be observed. In this paper we give an explanation for this institutional setting. For incomplete procurement contracts we show that such a separation may increase efficiency. We show that efficiency can be increased by post-award, pre-contract negotiations between the award-winning seller and one of the 'losing' sellers. Surprisingly, the efficiency gains can be higher if the award is given to a seller with a lower reputation for quality instead of to a seller with higher reputation. Under certain conditions post-award, pre-contract rent-seeking activities also increase efficiency. This is always the case if the procurement agency is corrupt, but may also occur in the case of lobbying

Formulation of one organizational methodology to improve a contractual process of the Ministry of Interior aimed in the PMI´s parameter

El artículo presenta una metodología organizacional bajo el enfoque PMI (Project Management Institute) que aplica y ajusta los procesos planteados para el alcance, el tiempo, los costos y comunicaciones de metodologías tradicionales usadas por el Ministerio del Interior para el manejo de los procesos precontractuales. La metodología es válida durante la etapa precontractual cuando se establecen los parámetros iniciales para las contrataciones de acuerdo a las necesidades de las áreas. La metodología plantea la participación de las áreas técnicas, jurídica, financiera y contractual con el fin de asignar a cada una de las actividades que se deben realizar en el proceso un responsable, y unos tiempos máximos con el fin de eliminar los tiempos ineficientes en los procesos de contratación que generen demoras, reprocesos o retrasos en la etapa precontractual, y se presentan los procedimientos de seguimiento y control de la implementación de la metodología.The article presents an organizational methodology under PMI (Project Management Institute) approach that applies and adjust the proposed process for the scope, costs and traditional communications methodologies used by the Ministry of the Interior to manage pre-contract processes. The Methodology it is valid during pre-contract time where the initial parameters are stablished to according to the needs of the areas. The methodology consider the participation of technical, legal, financial and contractual’ areas in order to assign to each of the activities to be performed in the process responsibly, and a maximum times in order to eliminate inefficient times recruitment processes that generate delays, rework or delays in the pre-contractual stage, and procedures for monitoring and control of the implementation of the methodology are presented

Should insurance risk avoidance be reformed and would reform be of a right of equitable rescission or a right sui generis?

This article explores the distinction between the alternative explanations for the remedy of insurance risk avoidance in the event of breach of the duty of utmost good faith. It asks whether the remedy is an avoidance of a void contract, or a rescission of a voidable contract. The article then considers the general significance of that distinction to the capacity of a party to exercise its primary right of avoidance, and to the secondary rights of the contracting parties - arising in consequence of the avoidance - to prevent unjust enrichment or achieve restitution. Before considering the potential for - and the desirability of - further reform in the area, the article evaluates the importance of the legal characterisation of insurance risk avoidance in the particular context of insurance contracts affording indemnity to multiple insured parties

Land Law – The fight against gazumping

Professor M.P. Thompson (University of Leicester) considers the background and needs for the government review of conveyancing procedures in England and Wales which has focussed on stamping out the practice of gazumping. Note published in Amicus Curiae - Journal of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies and its Society for Advanced Legal Studies. The Journal is produced by the Society for Advanced Legal Studies at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London