The Government as Litigant: Further Tests of the Case Selection Model

We develop a model of the plaintiff's decision to file a law suit that has implications for how differences between the federal government and private litigants and litigation translate into differences in trial rates and plaintiff win rates at trial. Our case selection model generates a set of predictions for relative trial rates and plaintiff win rates depending on the type of case and whether the government is defendant or plaintiff. In order to test the model, we use data on about 350,000 cases filed in federal district court between 1979 and 1997 in the areas of personal injury and job discrimination where the federal government and private parties work under roughly similar legal rules. We find broad support for the predictions of the model.

How Well Do Measures of Judicial Ability Translate Into Performance?

Diverse measures are used as proxies for judicial ability, ranging from the college and law school a judge attended to the rate at which her decisions are cited by other judges. Yet there has been little serious examination of which of these ability measures is better or worse at predicting the quality of judicial performance—including the management and disposition of cases. In this article, we attempt to evaluate these measures of ability by examining a rich group of performance indicators. Our innovation is to derive performance measures from judicial decisions other than case outcomes (which are inherently difficult to evaluate): the decisions to preside over a securities class action, to reject a motion for lead plaintiff, to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, and to reject a request for fees. In each case, an affirmative decision requires more work from the judge, and thus may be an indicator that the judge works hard and, all else equal, performs well. Using a database of securities class action cases, we find that judges who publish frequently and are highly cited are more likely to dismiss with prejudice but no more likely to make the hard choice in the other cases. Other proxies for judicial ability (attended top law school, judicial experience, earlier position as judge, prior private practice, heavy business caseload, and senior status) are more mixed

Application of Transparency and Equality of Handling Principle in Settlement of Complaint in Indonesian Judiciary

Democratic countries embrace and incorporate the principle of transparency in every policy they made to ensure good governance. One example of transparency in the judiciary is one day publish. Transparency in justice system is closely related to settlement of complaint both in the procedural law and the court judgment. There are four steps of settlement in the judicial system: first, written complaint. Recently, the Supreme Court develops an application to handle complaint called Monitoring Information System (hereinafter referred to as SIWAS). Development of SIWAS is based on Act Republic of Indonesia Supreme Court Regulation No. 9 of 2016 on Whistle Blowing System. Second, declaring clear information. Third, addressing the complaint to where the defendant works. Lastly, submitting the complaint to complaint desk. Legal and economic justice for the defendant is important to consider in handling of complaint due to economic responsibility of the defendant (a civil servant or a judge at the Judiciary) to other parties such as husband/wife, children, parents, etc. There is an adage in handling of complaint, “The higher the rank, the more to do with politics”. Keywords: Application of transparency and Equality, Complaint, Public Service, Indonesian Judiciary

Small Claims Courts in Montana: A Statistical Study

Small Claims Court

Small Claims Courts in Montana: A Statistical Study

Small Claims Court