Re-examining Husserl’s Non-Conceptualism in the Logical Investigations

A recent trend in Husserl scholarship takes the Logische Untersuchungen (LU) as advancing an inconsistent and confused view of the non-conceptual content of perceptual experience. Against this, I argue that there is no inconsistency about non-conceptualism in LU. Rather, LU presents a hybrid view of the conceptual nature of perceptual experience, which can easily be misread as inconsistent, since it combines a conceptualist view of perceptual content (or matter) with a non-conceptualist view of perceptual acts. I show how this hybrid view is operative in Husserl’s analyses of essentially occasional expressions and categorial intuition. And I argue that it can also be deployed in relation to Husserl’s analysis of the constitution of perceptual fullness, which allows it to avoid a objection raised by Walter Hopp—that the combination of Husserl’s analysis of perceptual fullness with conceptualism about perceptual content generates a vicious regress

Computational models of the development of perceptual expertise

In a recent article, Palmeri, Wong and Gauthier have argued that computational models may help direct hypotheses about the development of perceptual expertise. They support their claim by an analysis of models from the object-recognition and perceptual-categorization literatures. Surprisingly, however, they do not consider any computational models from traditional research into expertise, essentially the research deriving from Chase and Simon’s chunking theory, which itself was influenced by De Groot’s study of chessplayers. This is unfortunate, as a series of computational models based on perceptual chunking have explained a substantial number of phenomena related to expert behaviour and provide mechanisms that directly address the question of perceptual expertise

Why Are Deep Representations Good Perceptual Quality Features?

Recently, intermediate feature maps of pre-trained convolutional neural networks have shown significant perceptual quality improvements, when they are used in the loss function for training new networks. It is believed that these features are better at encoding the perceptual quality and provide more efficient representations of input images compared to other perceptual metrics such as SSIM and PSNR. However, there have been no systematic studies to determine the underlying reason. Due to the lack of such an analysis, it is not possible to evaluate the performance of a particular set of features or to improve the perceptual quality even more by carefully selecting a subset of features from a pre-trained CNN. This work shows that the capabilities of pre-trained deep CNN features in optimizing the perceptual quality are correlated with their success in capturing basic human visual perception characteristics. In particular, we focus our analysis on fundamental aspects of human perception, such as the contrast sensitivity and orientation selectivity. We introduce two new formulations to measure the frequency and orientation selectivity of the features learned by convolutional layers for evaluating deep features learned by widely-used deep CNNs such as VGG-16. We demonstrate that the pre-trained CNN features which receive higher scores are better at predicting human quality judgment. Furthermore, we show the possibility of using our method to select deep features to form a new loss function, which improves the image reconstruction quality for the well-known single-image super-resolution problem.Comment: To be presented at ECCV 202

A Processive View of Perceptual Experience

The goal of this piece is to put some pressure on Brian O’Shaughnessy’s claim that perceptual experiences are necessarily mental processes. The author targets two motivations behind the development of that view. First, O’Shaughnessy resorts to pure conceptual analysis to argue that perceptual experiences are processes. The author argues that this line of reasoning is inconclusive. Secondly, he repeatedly invokes a thought experiment concerning the total freeze of a subject’s experiential life. Even if this case is coherent, however, it does not show that perceptual experiences are processes

Time and information in perceptual adaptation to speech

Presubmission manuscript and supplementary files (stimuli, stimulus presentation code, data, data analysis code).Perceptual adaptation to a talker enables listeners to efficiently resolve the many-to-many mapping between variable speech acoustics and abstract linguistic representations. However, models of speech perception have not delved into the variety or the quantity of information necessary for successful adaptation, nor how adaptation unfolds over time. In three experiments using speeded classification of spoken words, we explored how the quantity (duration), quality (phonetic detail), and temporal continuity of talker-specific context contribute to facilitating perceptual adaptation to speech. In single- and mixed-talker conditions, listeners identified phonetically-confusable target words in isolation or preceded by carrier phrases of varying lengths and phonetic content, spoken by the same talker as the target word. Word identification was always slower in mixed-talker conditions than single-talker ones. However, interference from talker variability decreased as the duration of preceding speech increased but was not affected by the amount of preceding talker-specific phonetic information. Furthermore, efficiency gains from adaptation depended on temporal continuity between preceding speech and the target word. These results suggest that perceptual adaptation to speech may be understood via models of auditory streaming, where perceptual continuity of an auditory object (e.g., a talker) facilitates allocation of attentional resources, resulting in more efficient perceptual processing.NIH NIDCD (R03DC014045

Up the nose of the beholder? Aesthetic perception in olfaction as a decision-making process

Is the sense of smell a source of aesthetic perception? Traditional philosophical aesthetics has centered on vision and audition but eliminated smell for its subjective and inherently affective character. This article dismantles the myth that olfaction is an unsophisticated sense. It makes a case for olfactory aesthetics by integrating recent insights in neuroscience with traditional expertise about flavor and fragrance assessment in perfumery and wine tasting. My analysis concerns the importance of observational refinement in aesthetic experience. I argue that the active engagement with stimulus features in perceptual processing shapes the phenomenological content, so much so that the perceptual structure of trained smelling varies significantly from naive smelling. In a second step, I interpret the processes that determine such perceptual refinement in the context of neural decision-making processes, and I end with a positive outlook on how research in neuroscience can be used to benefit philosophical aesthetics

Associative learning and perceptual style: Are associated events perceived analytically or as a whole? \ud \ud

The present study examined whether the formation of associations is affected by individual differences in perceptual style (analytic vs. holistic). Ninety undergraduate students were tested on their ability to associate concurrent events (i.e. word—colour) and were assessed on measures of field dependence and intelligence. The analysis revealed that analytic perceptual style (field independence) was associated with better performance on associative learning, and that this relationship was retained after controlling for differences in intelligence, age, and gender. The obtained results lent support to elemental theories of associative learning suggesting that concurrent stimuli tend to be perceived as separate units.\u

Color naming reflects both perceptual structure and communicative need

Gibson et al. (2017) argued that color naming is shaped by patterns of communicative need. In support of this claim, they showed that color naming systems across languages support more precise communication about warm colors than cool colors, and that the objects we talk about tend to be warm-colored rather than cool-colored. Here, we present new analyses that alter this picture. We show that greater communicative precision for warm than for cool colors, and greater communicative need, may both be explained by perceptual structure. However, using an information-theoretic analysis, we also show that color naming across languages bears signs of communicative need beyond what would be predicted by perceptual structure alone. We conclude that color naming is shaped both by perceptual structure, as has traditionally been argued, and by patterns of communicative need, as argued by Gibson et al. - although for reasons other than those they advanced