Tools for legislative oversight : an empirical investigation

Parliaments are the institutions through which governments are held accountable to the electorate. They have a wide range of tools with which to carry out this oversight function, but until recently little analysis had been undertaken on the characteristics or use of such tools. This paper uses data for 83 countries that was collected in 2001 to investigate whether the oversight potential relates to three variables, namely the form of government (presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary), per capita income levels, and the level of democracy. The paper finds that oversight potential is greatly affected by the form of government, per capita income levels, and levels of democracy. Countries with parliamentary forms of government, higher income levels, and which are more democratic have a greater number of oversight tools and greater oversight potential. While the oversight potential follows this general trend, the use of committees of enquiry, interpellations and ombudsman offices follows a different pattern. The use of interpellations as an oversight tool is most common in high income countries, less common in low income countries and least common in middle income countries while the presence of committees of enquiry and of the ombudsman offices is most common in middle income countries, less common in high income countries and least common in low income countries.Labor Policies,Municipal Financial Management,Income,Parliamentary Government,Health Economics&Finance,Governance Indicators,National Governance,TF054599-PHRD-KYRGYZ REPUBLIC: WATER MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT,Parliamentary Government,Municipal Financial Management

Scrutinising the secret state: parliamentary oversight of the intelligence and security agencies

This article considers the growing parliamentary scrutiny of the intelligence and security agencies. It raises a number of questions about the role and effectiveness of the Intelligence and Security Committee, Parliament and parliamentarians

Models of Party Democracy : Patterns of Party Regulation in Post-War European Constitutions

This article investigates the ways in which political parties are codified in modern democratic constitutions, providing a unique cross-sectional and longitudinal overview of the patterns of party constitutionalization in post-war Europe. Although the constitutions of western liberal democracies traditionally have paid little attention to the role of parties, evidence suggests that in contemporary democracies, both old and new, they are increasingly accorded a formal constitutional status. Little is known, however, about the substantive content of their constitutional position or about the normative connotations of their constitutional codification. In this article, we demonstrate that there is a clear correlation between the nature and the intensity of party constitutionalization and the newness and historical experience of democracy and that, with time, the constitutional regulation of the extra-parliamentary organization and the parties’ rights and duties has gained in importance at the expense of their parliamentary and electoral roles. The analysis furthermore suggests that three distinct models of party constitutionalization can be identified – Defending Democracy, Parties in Public Office, and Parties as Public Utilities – each of which is related to a particular conception of party democracy

Parliamentary committees in Zambia's Third Republic: partial reforms; unfinished agenda

This article critically examines the contribution of parliamentary committees in Zambia to democratic government. Several committees are of long-standing, including the Committee on Government Assurances and Committee on Delegated Legislation; others, notably committees involved in departmental oversight, were refashioned, expanded and given additional powers in 1999. They have worked hard to make government more open and accountable. Additional proposals for reforms to the committee system are currently being studied by a committee of Parliament. Although measuring the 'effectiveness' of such committees is not easy due to conceptual and methodological difficulties, their ability to influence policy and administration is found to be severely limited due to the absence of effective mechanisms to enforce their recommendations. This article maintains that this situation is unlikely to alter significantly unless there are wider changes in the party system, the institutional balance of power between executive and legislature, and the political culture more generally

Administrative review and oversight: the experience of Westminster

Parliament has been left behind by far-reaching changes to the constitution, government and society in the past two decades. Despite recent innovations, particularly in the handling of legislation, the central question of Westminster's scrutiny of the executive has not been addressed. (Report of the Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny, 2001: x) Prior to the Labour Party's election victory in 1997, Labour's manifesto promised an 'effective House of Commons' to be realised in large part through the creation of a special Select Committee with remit to review procedures in light of the 'need for modernisation'. Shortly after victory, Labour established a 'Modernisation Committee' chaired by the Leader of the Commons and with a remit to review four key areas: the legislative process; ministerial accountability; working practices (such as sitting hours); and the style and forms of proceedings. Between 1997 and 2003 the Committee published 19 reports starting with a report on the legislative process. However, to date, most of the reports have focused on the modernisation of working practices and the style and form of proceedings. Reports that deal with improving the effectiveness of ministerial accountability have been notably lacking. Consequently, the view of the Hansard Society that 'parliamentary reform has been one of improving the efficiency of Parliament, but not its effectiveness' appears just as valid three years on

Creative tension: parliament and national security

Overview: This paper argues that enhancing parliament’s role in national security will reinforce executive accountability, improve the quality of public debate over national security and serve to strengthen the foundations of Australia’s parliamentary democracy. There are several measures that would materially improve parliament’s role in the conduct of national security:  enhance respect for parliament as the forum for consideration of national security issues by utilising the parliament’s existing procedures to more fully consider issues of foreign affairs, defence, intelligence and border security develop parliamentarians’ education in national security by providing a new members’ orientation program focussed on national security examine parliament’s exercise of war powers  encourage parliamentary diplomacy  a material improvement in parliament’s role demands more attention to increasing the human and financial resources available to key national security committees undertake an examination of national security committee mandates, particularly in intelligence oversigh