Paradoxes and Their Resolutions

Paradoxes and their Resolutions is a ‘thematic compilation’ by Avi Sion. It collects in one volume the essays that he has written in the past (over a period of some 27 years) on this subject. It comprises expositions and resolutions of many (though not all) ancient and modern paradoxes, including: the Protagoras-Euathlus paradox (Athens, 5th Cent. BCE), the Liar paradox and the Sorites paradox (both attributed to Eubulides of Miletus, 4th Cent. BCE), Russell’s paradox (UK, 1901) and its derivatives the Barber paradox and the Master Catalogue paradox (also by Russell), Grelling’s paradox (Germany, 1908), Hempel's paradox of confirmation (USA, 1940s), and Goodman’s paradox of prediction (USA, 1955). This volume also presents and comments on some of the antinomic discourse found in some Buddhist texts (namely, in Nagarjuna, India, 2nd Cent. CE; and in the Diamond Sutra, date unknown, but probably in an early century CE)

Paradox

Excerpt: ‘Paradox’ is derived from two words that literally mean against opinion. The Oxford English Dictionary (1989; vol. 11, p. 185) identifies several meanings for ‘paradox’. It may refer to: (1) claims contrary to common opinion, often suggesting that the statement is incredible, absurd or fantastic, but sometimes with a favourable connotation as a correction for ignorance; (2) a statement that seems self-contradictory, but which is actually well founded; (3) a statement that involves a genuine *contradiction; (4) in *logic, a conclusion based on acceptable premises and sound *reasoning that nonetheless is self-contradictory. These inconsistent uses of the term pose practical problems for communication, as the intended meaning may not always be apparent

Lotteries and justification

The lottery paradox shows that the following three individually highly plausible theses are jointly incompatible: (i) highly probable propositions are justifiably believable, (ii) justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction, (iii) known contradictions are not justifiably believable. This paper argues that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox must reject (i) as versions of the paradox can be generated without appeal to either (ii) or (iii) and proposes a new solution to the paradox in terms of a novel account of justified believability

Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger paradox for continuous variables

We show how to construct states for which a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger type paradox occurs if each party measures either the position or momentum of his particle. The paradox can be ascribed to the anticommutation of certain translation operators in phase space. We then rephrase the paradox in terms of modular and binary variables. The origin of the paradox is then due to the fact that the associativity of addition of modular variables is true only for c-numbers but does not hold for operators.Comment: 4 pages, no figure

Why Black Hole Information Loss is Paradoxical

I distinguish between two versions of the black hole information-loss paradox. The first arises from apparent failure of unitarity on the spacetime of a completely evaporating black hole, which appears to be non-globally-hyperbolic; this is the most commonly discussed version of the paradox in the foundational and semipopular literature, and the case for calling it `paradoxical' is less than compelling. But the second arises from a clash between a fully-statistical-mechanical interpretation of black hole evaporation and the quantum-field-theoretic description used in derivations of the Hawking effect. This version of the paradox arises long before a black hole completely evaporates, seems to be the version that has played a central role in quantum gravity, and is genuinely paradoxical. After explicating the paradox, I discuss the implications of more recent work on AdS/CFT duality and on the `Firewall paradox', and conclude that the paradox is if anything now sharper. The article is written at a (relatively) introductory level and does not assume advanced knowledge of quantum gravity.Comment: 26 pages. Corrected error in one diagram; other minor revision

Paradigms and self-reference: what is the point of asserting paradoxical sentences?

A paradox, according to Wittgenstein, is something surprising that is taken out of its context. Thus, one way of dealing with paradoxical sentences is to imagine the missing context of use. Wittgenstein formulates what I call the paradigm paradox: ‘one sentence can never describe the paradigm in another, unless it ceases to be a paradigm.’ (PG, p.346) There are several instances of this paradox scattered throughout Wittgenstein’s writings. I argue that this paradox is structurally equivalent to Russell’s paradox. The above quotation is Wittgenstein’s version of the vicious circle principle which counteracts the paradox. The prohibition Wittgenstein describes is, however, limited to a certain language-game. Finally, I argue that there is a structural analogy between a noun being employed as a self-membered set and a paradigmatic sample being included in or excluded from the set it generates. Paradoxical sentences are not prohibited forever; they can indicate a change in our praxis with a given paradigm