POLICY options

End of project reportThe incomes of Irish cattle farmers benefited greatly from the reform of the CAP for beef and cereals in 1992 and more recently under Agenda 2000. In both of these reforms the institutional support prices were reduced and animal-based direct payments (DPs) were used to compensate farmers for the anticipated market price reductions

Consequentialist Options

According to traditional forms of act-consequentialism, an action is right if and only if no other action in the given circumstances would have better consequences. It has been argued that this view does not leave us enough freedom to choose between actions which we intuitively think are morally permissible but not required options. In the first half of this article, I will explain why the previous consequentialist responses to this objection are less than satisfactory. I will then attempt to show that agents have more options on consequentialist grounds than the traditional forms of act-consequentialism acknowledged. This is because having a choice between many permissible options can itself have value

Exchange Options

The contract is described and market examples given. Essential theoretical developments are introduced and cited chronologically. The principles and techniques of hedging and unique pricing are illustrated for the two simplest nontrivial examples: the classical Black-Scholes/Merton/Margrabe exchange option model brought somewhat uptodate from its form three decades ago, and a lesser exponential Poisson analogue to illustrate jumps. Beyond these, a simplified Markovian SDE/PDE line is sketched in an arbitrage-free semimartingale setting. Focus is maintained on construction of a hedge using Itˆo’s formula and on unique pricing, now for general homogenous payoff functions. Clarity is primed as the multivariate log-Gaussian and exponential Poisson cases are worked out. Numeraire invariance is emphasized as the primary means to reduce dimensionality by one to the projective space where the SDE dynamics are specified and the PDEs solved (or expectations explicitly calculated). Predictable representation of a homogenous payoff with deltas (hedge ratios) as partial derivatives or partial differences of the option price function is highlighted. Equivalent martingale measures are utilized to show unique pricing with bounded deltas (and in the nondegenerate case unique hedging) and to exhibit the PDE or closed-form solutions as numeraire-deflated conditional expectations in the usual way. Homogeneity, change of numeraire, and extension to dividends are discussed

Accommodating Options

Many of us think we have agent-centred options to act suboptimally. Some of these involve favouring our own interests. Others involve sacrificing them. In this paper, I explore three different ways to accommodate agent-centred options in a criterion of objective permissibility. I argue against satisficing and rational pluralism, and in favour of a principle built around sensitivity to personal cost

Options for Human Capital Acquisition

An \u27options\u27 view of human capital acquisition explains value creation through timedeferred, sequential, path-dependent investment choices and addresses gaps in the resourcebased theory explanation of the relationship between human resources and competitive advantage. Firms will invest in options for human capital, using alternative employment arrangements like temporary/contractual/part-time workers and internships, or by outsourcing the work, when uncertainty associated with human capital is high and investments in human capital are largely irreversible. We discuss various options for skills and employees, two interrelated components of human capital. These are flexibility options, options to wait or defer, options to abandon, learning options, and switching options. The opportunity cost of not having options is quantifiable, which makes the real options approach valuable for strategic HRM decisions

Other‐Sacrificing Options

I argue that you can be permitted to discount the interests of your adversaries even though doing so would be impartially suboptimal. This means that, in addition to the kinds of moral options that the literature traditionally recognises, there exist what I call other-sacrificing options. I explore the idea that you cannot discount the interests of your adversaries as much as you can favour the interests of your intimates; if this is correct, then there is an asymmetry between negative partiality toward your adversaries and positive partiality toward your intimates