Objectivity and Evaluation

I this article, I introduce the notion of pluralism about an area, and use it to argue that the questions at the center of our normative lives are not settled by the facts -- even the normative facts. One upshot of the discussion is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension. Another is that the concept of objectivity, not realism, should take center stage

Objectivity

In this entry, we outline the ways in which evolutionary theory has implications for the objectivity of morality

Observation and Quantum Objectivity

The paradox of Wigner's friend challenges the objectivity of description in quantum theory. A pragmatist interpretation can meet this challenge by judicious appeal to decoherence. On this interpretation, quantum theory provides situated agents with resources for predicting and explaining what happens in the physical world---not conscious observations of it. Even in Wigner's friend scenarios, differently situated agents agree on the objective content of statements about the values of physical magnitudes. In more realistic circumstances quantum Darwinism also permits differently situated agents equal observational access to evaluate their truth. In this view, quantum theory has nothing to say about consciousness or conscious experiences of observers. But it does prompt us to reexamine the significance even of everyday claims about the physical world

On Eulerian and Lagrangean objectivity in continuum mechanics

In continuum mechanics the commonly—used definition of objectivity (or frame-indifference) of a tensor field does not distinguish between Eulerian, Lagrangean and two—point tensor fields. This paper highlights the distinction and provides a definition of objectivity which reflects the different transformation rules for Eulerian, Lagrangean and two- point tensor fields under an observer transformation. The notion of induced objectivity is introduced and its implications examined

Beyond subjective and objective in statistics

We argue that the words "objectivity" and "subjectivity" in statistics discourse are used in a mostly unhelpful way, and we propose to replace each of them with broader collections of attributes, with objectivity replaced by transparency, consensus, impartiality, and correspondence to observable reality, and subjectivity replaced by awareness of multiple perspectives and context dependence. The advantage of these reformulations is that the replacement terms do not oppose each other. Instead of debating over whether a given statistical method is subjective or objective (or normatively debating the relative merits of subjectivity and objectivity in statistical practice), we can recognize desirable attributes such as transparency and acknowledgment of multiple perspectives as complementary goals. We demonstrate the implications of our proposal with recent applied examples from pharmacology, election polling, and socioeconomic stratification.Comment: 35 page

Why Originalism Won’t Die - Common Mistakes in Competing Theories of Judicial Interpretation

In the debate over proper judicial interpretation of the law, the doctrine of Originalism has been subjected to numerous seemingly fatal criticisms. Despite the exposure of flaws that would normally bury a theory, however, Originalism continues to attract tremendous support, seeming to many to be the most sensible theory on offer. This Article examines its resilient appeal (with a particular focus on Scalia’s Textualism). By surveying and identifying the fundamental weaknesses of three of the leading alternatives to Originalism (Popular Will theory, Dworkin’s value theory, and Judicial Minimalism), the Article demonstrates that the heart of Originalism’s appeal rests in its promise of objectivity. The Article also establishes, however, that Originalism suffers from a misguided conception of what objectivity is. All camps in this debate, in fact, suffer from serious misunderstandings of the nature of objectivity

Animals and Objectivity

Starting from the assumption that Kant allows for the possible existence of conscious sensory states in non-rational animals, I examine the textual and philosophical grounds for his acceptance of the possibility that such states are also 'objective'. I elucidate different senses of what might be meant in crediting a cognitive state as objective. I then put forward and defend an interpretation according to which the cognitive states of animals, though extremely limited on Kant's view, are nevertheless minimally objective

Realism, Objectivity, and Evaluation

I discuss Benacerraf's epistemological challenge for realism about areas like mathematics, metalogic, and modality, and describe the pluralist response to it. I explain why normative pluralism is peculiarly unsatisfactory, and use this explanation to formulate a radicalization of Moore's Open Question Argument. According to the argument, the facts -- even the normative facts -- fail to settle the practical questions at the center of our normative lives. One lesson is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension