Building the normative dimension(s) of a global polity

Globalisation is not what it used to be. Earlier debates over how to read the indicators of economic liberalisation and the impact of technological expansion have now been joined by the increasingly pressing need to explore the social, environmental and political aspects of global change. Earlier discussions emphasised a number of dichotomies within the international political economy – open/closed, state/market and so on. These have proved limited in their ability to inform explanations of change under conditions of globalisation. To these we must now add what we might call the ‘governance from above’, ‘resistance from below’ dichotomy as a popular metaphor for understanding order and change in international relations under conditions of globalisation. But this new binary axis is in many ways as unsatisfactory as those that went before. It too can obscure as much as it reveals in terms of understanding the normative possibilities of reforming globalisation. In this article we wish to suggest that there is perhaps a more useful way of thinking about politics and the changing contours of political life in the contemporary global order. This approach blurs the distinction between governance and resistance by emphasising an ethical take on globalisation

The Genetic and Environmental Sources of Resemblance Between Normative Personality and Personality Disorder Traits

Recent work has suggested a high level of congruence between normative personality, most typically represented by the big five factors, and abnormal personality traits. In 2,293 Norwegian adult twins ascertained from a population-based registry, the authors evaluated the degree of sharing of genetic and environmental influences on normative personality, assessed by the Big Five Inventory (BFI), and personality disorder traits (PDTs), assessed by the Personality Inventory for DSM-S-Norwegian Brief Form (PID-5NBF). For four of the five BFI dimensions, the strongest genetic correlation was observed with the expected PID-5-NBF dimension (e.g., neuroticism with negative affectivity [+], conscientiousness with disinhibition [-]). However, neuroticism, conscientiousness, and agreeableness had substantial genetic correlations with other PID-S-NBF dimensions (e.g., neuroticism with compulsivity [+], agreeableness with detachment [-]). Openness had no substantial genetic correlations with any PID-5-NBF dimension. The proportion of genetic risk factors shared in aggregate between the BFI traits and the PID-5-NBF dimensions was quite high for conscientiousness and neuroticism, relatively robust for extraversion and agreeableness, but quite low for openness. Of the six PID-S-NBF dimensions, three (negative affectivity, detachment, and disinhibition) shared, in aggregate, most of their genetic risk factors with normative personality traits. Genetic factors underlying psychoticism, antagonism, and compulsivity were shared to a lesser extent, suggesting that they are influenced by etiological factors not well indexed by the BFI

The Grin of Schrödinger's Cat; Quantum Photography and the limits of Representation

The famous quantum physics experiment 'Schrödinger's cat' suggests that some situations are undecidable, i.e. they exist outside of the normative distinctions between 'truth' and 'false' because both states can co-exist under certain conditions. This paper suggests that photography has very close links with this state of affairs, because photography allows one to move from the world of certainty into the quantum dimension of undecidability and indeterminate states

Norm-Establishing and Norm-Following in Autonomous Agency

Living agency is subject to a normative dimension (good-bad, adaptive-maladaptive) that is absent from other types of interaction. We review current and historical attempts to naturalize normativity from an organism-centered perspective, identifying two central problems and their solution: (1) How to define the topology of the viability space so as to include a sense of gradation that permits reversible failure, and (2) how to relate both the processes that establish norms and those that result in norm-following behavior. We present a minimal metabolic system that is coupled to a gradient-climbing chemotactic mechanism. Studying the relationship between metabolic dynamics and environmental resource conditions, we identify an emergent viable region and a precarious region where the system tends to die unless environmental conditions change. We introduce the concept of normative field as the change of environmental conditions required to bring the system back to its viable region. Norm-following, or normative action, is defined as the course of behavior whose effect is positively correlated with the normative field. We close with a discussion of the limitations and extensions of our model and some final reflections on the nature of norms and teleology in agency

Causation and the Law: Preemption, Lawful Sufficiency, and Causal Sufficiency

This article briefly describes the normative/nonnormative distinction, and how one might invoke this distinction to locate a nonnormative dimension of actual causation. After briefly introducing Richard Wright\u27s concept of a necessary element in a set of conditions for an effect, the article notes ambiguities in the critical concepts of necessity and sufficiency that he deploys. The article suggests the most plausible interpretation of Wright\u27s use of different modal concepts

Der Grund der Kritik : zum Begriff der Menschenwürde in sozialen Rechtfertigungsordnungen

Ernst Bloch pointed out in a particularly emphatic way that the concept of human dignity featured centrally in historical struggles against different forms of unjustified rule, i.e. domination – to which one must add that it continues to do so to the present day. The “upright gait,” putting an end to humiliation and insult: this is the most powerful demand, in both political and rhetorical terms, that a “human rights-based” claim expresses. It marks the emergence of a radical, context-transcending reference point immanent to social conflicts which raises fundamental questions concerning the customary opposition between immanent and transcendent criticism. For within the idiom of demanding respect for human dignity, a right is invoked “here and now,” in a particular, context-specific form, which at its core is owed to every human being as a person. Thus Bloch is in one respect correct when he asserts that human rights are not a natural “birthright” but must be achieved through struggle; but in another respect this struggle can develop its social power only if it has a firm and in a certain sense “absolute” normative anchor. Properly understood, it becomes apparent that these social conflicts always affect “two worlds”: the social reality, on the one hand, which is criticized in part or radically in the light of an ideal normative dimension, on the other. For those who engage in this criticism there is no doubt that the normative dimension is no less real than the reality to which they refuse to resign themselves. Those who critically transcend reality always also live elsewhere

Hegel and the Ethics of Brandom’s Metaphysics

In order to develop his pragmatist and inferentialist framework, Robert Brandom appropriates, reconstructs and revises key themes in German Idealism such as the self-legislation of norms, the social institution of concepts and facts, a norm-oriented account of being and the critique of representationalist accounts of meaning and truth. However, these themes have an essential ethical dimension, one that Brandom has not explicitly acknowledged. For Hegel, the determination of norms and facts and the institution of normative statuses take place in the context of Sittlichkeit (‘ethical life’). By engaging with some of the more ontologically and ethically substantive points raised by Hegel, I argue that, from a Hegelian perspective, Brandom’s project regarding the social determination of truth and meaning cannot be divorced from ethics, specifically, the ethical dimension of social recognition. Furthermore, I argue that, in real situations (as opposed to ideal ones), claims to normative authority cannot be considered independently from the legitimacy of those claims, a legitimacy that Brandom is unable to reasonably explain. Finally, I argue that a Hegelian solution to the problems facing Brandom’s framework calls into question the unity of reason that is at the core of Brandom’s normative pragmatics and inferential semantics

Equity Analysis and Natural Hazards Policy

What is an "equitable" policy for mitigating the impacts of hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and other natural hazards. Economists tend to see "equity" or "distribution" as irreducibly political and subjective. But, in truth, equity analysis and cost-benefit analysis are on a par. Both require a normative justification. Moreover, normative argument can help structure equity analysis, just as it can with cost-benefit analysis. This paper argues that equity is a normative consideration distinct from efficiency or overall well-being. It then argues that equity is individualistic, not group-based; ex post, not ex ante; that the "currency" for equity consists in the multiple dimensions of well-being, not income or longevity; and that, at a minimum, equity analysis should be concerned to avoid serious deprivations with respect to any well-being dimension. The upshot is a set of concrete recommendations for how equity analysis of natural hazards policy should be structured.Environment, Regulatory Reform

A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief

In virtue of what are we responsible for our beliefs? I argue that doxastic responsibility has a crucial social component: part of being responsible for our beliefs is being responsible to others. I suggest that this responsibility is a form of answerability with two distinct dimensions: an individual and an interpersonal dimension. While most views hold that the individual dimension is grounded in some form of control that we can exercise over our beliefs, I contend that we are answerable for our beliefs as long as they reflect our evaluative commitments and dispositions, or are products of our reasoning, where this does not amount to a form of control. I next argue that answerability has a second, largely neglected dimension: the interpersonal dimension, which is grounded in what I call our relations of doxastic dependence. As social creatures, we depend on one another in our capacity as believers. We depend on one another as believers not only in epistemic ways, but also in practical ways, because our beliefs inform and motivate our actions, and allow us to participate in shared practical goals. Depending on one another in these ways is an unavoidable part of cooperating in the shared project of pursuing epistemic and practical success, and it makes us vulnerable to both epistemic and moral harm. It is because of this, I argue, that answerability has interpersonal normative force upon us: we are subject to legitimate expectations associated with participating in relations of doxastic dependence

CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE NORMATIVE DIMENSION OF THE JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY

The judicial responsibility, understood as an assembly of rules and obligations which are born by committing an illicit fact, can be taken only under the condition of the judicial responsibility. Knowing that the basis of the judicial responsibility is the illicit fact, the irresponsibility cancels the illicit character of the fact. So, the judicial responsibility should be analyzed depending on two criteria: the normative criterion (when the responsibility of some categories of people is established and defined by law) and the bio-psychological criterion (the state of psychic normality which includes the presence of discernment)