The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment

I argue that our best science supports the rationalist idea that, independent of reasoning, emotions aren’t integral to moral judgment. There’s ample evidence that ordinary moral cognition often involves conscious and unconscious reasoning about an action’s outcomes and the agent’s role in bringing them about. Emotions can aid in moral reasoning by, for example, drawing one’s attention to such information. However, there is no compelling evidence for the decidedly sentimentalist claim that mere feelings are causally necessary or sufficient for making a moral judgment or for treating norms as distinctively moral. I conclude that, even if moral cognition is largely driven by automatic intuitions, these shouldn’t be mistaken for emotions or their non-cognitive components. Non-cognitive elements in our psychology may be required for normal moral development and motivation but not necessarily for mature moral judgment

Emotion, Neuroscience, and Law: A Comment on Darwin and Greene

Darwin’s (1871) observation that evolution has produced in us certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct that lack any obvious basis in individual utility is a useful springboard from which to clarify the role of emotion in moral judgment. The problem is whether a certain class of moral judgments is “constituted” or “driven by” emotion (Greene 2008, p. 108) or merely correlated with emotion while being generated by unconscious computations (e.g., Huebner et al. 2008). With one exception, all of the “personal” vignettes devised by Greene and colleagues (2001, 2004) and subsequently used by other researchers (e.g., Koenigs et al. 2007) in their fMRI and behavioral studies of emotional engagement in moral judgment involve violent crimes or torts. These studies thus do much more than highlight the role of emotion in moral judgment; they also support the classical rationalist thesis that moral rules are engraved in the mind

Disgust as embodied moral judgment.

How, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judgment? In four experiments participants made moral judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of disgust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a disgusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a video induction. In each case, the results showed that disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments relative to controls. Experiment 4 found that disgust had a different effect on moral judgment than did sadness. In addition, Experiments 2-4 showed that the role of disgust in severity of moral judgments depends on participants' sensitivity to their own bodily sensations. Taken together, these data indicate the importance-and specificity-of gut feelings in moral judgments

With a clean conscience: cleanliness reduces the severity of moral judgments.

Theories of moral judgment have long emphasized reasoning and conscious thought while downplaying the role of intuitive and contextual influences. However, recent research has demonstrated that incidental feelings of disgust can influence moral judgments and make them more severe. This study involved two experiments demonstrating that the reverse effect can occur when the notion of physical purity is made salient, thus making moral judgments less severe. After having the cognitive concept of cleanliness activated (Experiment 1) or after physically cleansing themselves after experiencing disgust (Experiment 2), participants found certain moral actions to be less wrong than did participants who had not been exposed to a cleanliness manipulation. The findings support the idea that moral judgment can be driven by intuitive processes, rather than deliberate reasoning. One of those intuitions appears to be physical purity, because it has a strong connection to moral purity

Moral Reasoning and Emotion

This chapter discusses contemporary scientific research on the role of reason and emotion in moral judgment. The literature suggests that moral judgment is influenced by both reasoning and emotion separately, but there is also emerging evidence of the interaction between the two. While there are clear implications for the rationalism-sentimentalism debate, we conclude that important questions remain open about how central emotion is to moral judgment. We also suggest ways in which moral philosophy is not only guided by empirical research but continues to guide it

Moral Experience: Its Existence, Describability, and Significance

One of the newest research areas in moral philosophy is moral phenomenology: the dedicated study of the experiential dimension of moral mental life. The idea has been to bring phenomenological evidence to bear on some central issues in metaethics and moral psychology, such as cognitivism and noncognitivism about moral judgment, motivational internalism and externalism, and so on. However, moral phenomenology faces certain foundational challenges, pertaining especially to the existence, describability, and importance of its subject matter. This paper addresses these foundational challenges, arguing that moral experiences – in the phenomenal, what-is-like sense of the term – exist, are informatively describable, and are central for the concerns of moral philosophy at large

Moral reasoning and judgment in childhood. Relations to mind understanding and peer acceptance

Abstract de póster presentado a First meeting of the SEJyD (Society for the Advancement of Judgment and Decision Making Studies)Children’s moral reasoning on compliance and rules violation, and their moral judgments, are linked to the development of their “theory of mind”. Greater ability to attribute mental states (intentions, knowledge and emotions) enable to base the attribution of responsibility, and judgment on the degree of punishment deserved, not only on the outcome of the action (harmful or not), but also on the intent to cause damage. This effect could vary depending on whether: a) the rule transgressed is a social conventional rule or a moral rule, b) the damage is physical-material or psychological-emotional. Moreover, understanding of other minds and moral reasoning that children make about the actions of others appears to be a key element in their degree of popularity and social impact. The aim of this study is to evaluate the developmental relationship between child moral reasoning, understanding of other minds and degree of acceptance by their peers. Participants were 89 children from 4 to 13 years; they were administered: a battery of stories that assessed moral reasoning abilities, a battery of “theory of mind” tasks, peer-nomination inventory. Results show that by 6 years of age begin differences in mind understanding and moral reasoning and judgment among children of the same age: popular and average distinguish between accidental and deliberate transgression (although up to 8 years all children believe that both deserve to be punished); only rejected children consider that the transgression of conventional norms does not deserve punishment; their moral judgments are not different for physical damage than for psychological-emotional damage. By age 8 differences between popular and rejected children in their mind understanding ability and moral reasoning are increased, especially in situations of accidental damage. Children’s moral reasoning ability may have important implications for their social relationships and positive peer interactions.Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tec

Menorah Review (No. 8, Fall, 1986)

History and Moral Judgment -- Jews in Old China: Some New Findings -- What May We Ask of Holocaust Reflections? -- Book Briefing

What Is Sentimentalism? What Is Rationalism? Commentary on Joshua May

In Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind, Joshua May argues successfully that many claims about the causal influence of affect on moral judgment are overblown. But the findings he cites are compatible with many of the key arguments of philosophical sentimentalists. His account of rationalism, in turn, relies on an overly broad notion of inference, and leaves open crucial questions about how we reason to moral conclusions

Developmental Level of Moral Judgment Influences Behavioral Patterns during Moral Decision-making

We developed and tested a behavioral version of the Defining Issues Test-1 revised (DIT-1r), which is a measure of the development of moral judgment. We conducted a behavioral experiment using the behavioral Defining Issues Test (bDIT) to examine the relationship between participants’ moral developmental status, moral competence, and reaction time when making moral judgments. We found that when the judgments were made based on the preferred moral schema, the reaction time for moral judgments was significantly moderated by the moral developmental status. In addition, as a participant becomes more confident with moral judgment, the participant differentiates the preferred versus other schemas better particularly when the participant’s abilities for moral judgment are more developed