Evidence of preference construction in a comparison of variants of the standard gamble method

An increasingly important debate has emerged around the extent to which techniques such as the standard gamble, which is used, amongst other things, to value health states, actually serve to construct respondents' preferences rather than simply elicit them. According to standard theory, the variant used should have no bearing on the numbers elicited from respondents, i.e. procedural invariance should hold. This study addresses this debate by comparing two variants of standard gamble in the valuation of health states. It is a mixed methods study that combines a quantitative comparison with the probing of respondents in order to ascertain possible reasons for the differences that emerged. Significant differences were found between variants and, furthermore, there was evidence of an ordering effect. Respondents' responses to probing suggested that they were influenced by the method of elicitation

Under pressure: Response urgency modulates striatal and insula activity during decision-making under risk

When deciding whether to bet in situations that involve potential monetary loss or gain (mixed gambles), a subjective sense of pressure can influence the evaluation of the expected utility associated with each choice option. Here, we explored how gambling decisions, their psychophysiological and neural counterparts are modulated by an induced sense of urgency to respond. Urgency influenced decision times and evoked heart rate responses, interacting with the expected value of each gamble. Using functional MRI, we observed that this interaction was associated with changes in the activity of the striatum, a critical region for both reward and choice selection, and within the insula, a region implicated as the substrate of affective feelings arising from interoceptive signals which influence motivational behavior. Our findings bridge current psychophysiological and neurobiological models of value representation and action-programming, identifying the striatum and insular cortex as the key substrates of decision-making under risk and urgency

Modeling uncertainty using accept & reject statements

Uncertainty and preference is often modeled using linear previsions and linear orders. Some more expressive models use sets of probabilities, lower previsions, or partial orders (see, e.g., the work of Seidenfeld et al. and Walley). In the discussion of these more expressive models, or even to justify them, alternative representations in terms of sets of so-called acceptable, favorable, or desirable gambles appear (cf. the work of Williams, Seidenfeld et al., and Walley). Such ‘sets of gambles’-based models are attractive because of their geometric nature. We generalize these ‘sets of gambles’-based models by considering a pair of sets, one with accepted gambles and one with rejected gambles. We develop a framework based on a small number of axioms—No Confusion, Deductive Closure, No Limbo, and Indifference to Status Quo—and provide an interesting characterization of the resulting models. Furthermore, we define a pair of equivalent gamble relations that generalize the partial orders mentioned earlier; the corresponding characterization result is also given

Gambling in Contests

This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner-take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian Motion with drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with the highest stopping point wins. Contrary to the explicit cost for a higher stopping time in a war of attrition, here, higher stopping times are riskier, because players can go bankrupt. We derive a closed-form solution of the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the game. In equilibrium, the trade-off between risk and reward causes a non-monotonicity: highest expected losses occur if the process decreases only slightly in expectation

The gaming industry's role in the prevention and treatment of problem gambling

There are many factors that could be incorporated within a gaming company’s framework of social responsibility and that while the industry should be proactive in the prevention of problem gambling, the treatment of problem gambling should be done by those outside of the gaming industry and that one of the ways forward may be online rather than offline help. This is reinforced by the gaming industry having formal relationships with numerous organisations that address training, compliance, accreditation, and governance

A New Genus of Miniaturized and Pug-Nosed Gecko from South America (Sphaerodactylidae: Gekkota)

Sphaerodactyl geckos comprise five genera distributed across Central and South America and the Caribbean. We estimated phylogenetic relationships among sphaerodactyl genera using both separate and combined analyses of seven nuclear genes. Relationships among genera were incongruent at different loci and phylogenies were characterized by short, in some cases zero-length, internal branches and poor phylogenetic support at most nodes. We recovered a polyphyletic Coleodactylus, with Coleodactylus amazonicus being deeply divergent from the remaining Coleodactylus species sampled. The C. amazonicus lineage possessed unique codon deletions in the genes PTPN12 and RBMX while the remaining Coleodactylus species had unique codon deletions in RAG1. Topology tests could not reject a monophyletic Coleodactylus, but we show that short internal branch lengths decreased the accuracy of topology tests because there were not enough data along these short branches to support one phylogenetic hypothesis over another. Morphological data corroborated results of the molecular phylogeny, with Coleodactylus exhibiting substantial morphological heterogeneity. We identified a suite of unique craniofacial features that differentiate C. amazonicus not only from other Coleodactylus species, but also from all other geckos. We describe this novel sphaerodactyl lineage as a new genus, Chatogekko gen. nov. We present a detailed osteology of Chatogekko, characterizing osteological correlates of miniaturization that provide a framework for future studies in sphaerodactyl systematics and biology

Surreal Decisions

Although expected utility theory has proven a fruitful and elegant theory in the finite realm, attempts to generalize it to infinite values have resulted in many paradoxes. In this paper, we argue that the use of John Conway's surreal numbers shall provide a firm mathematical foundation for transfinite decision theory. To that end, we prove a surreal representation theorem and show that our surreal decision theory respects dominance reasoning even in the case of infinite values. We then bring our theory to bear on one of the more venerable decision problems in the literature: Pascal's Wager. Analyzing the wager showcases our theory's virtues and advantages. To that end, we analyze two objections against the wager: Mixed Strategies and Many Gods. After formulating the two objections in the framework of surreal utilities and probabilities, our theory correctly predicts that (1) the pure Pascalian strategy beats all mixed strategies, and (2) what one should do in a Pascalian decision problem depends on what one's credence function is like. Our analysis therefore suggests that although Pascal's Wager is mathematically coherent, it does not deliver what it purports to, a rationally compelling argument that people should lead a religious life regardless of how confident they are in theism and its alternatives

Wearing a bike helmet leads to less cognitive control, revealed by lower frontal midline theta power and risk indifference

A recent study claims that participants wearing a bike helmet behave riskier in a computer-based risk task compared to control participants without a bike helmet. We hypothesized that wearing a bike helmet reduces cognitive control over risky behavior. To test our hypothesis, we recorded participants' EEG brain responses while they played a risk game developed in our laboratory. Previously, we found that, in this risk game, anxious participants showed greater levels of cognitive control as revealed by greater frontal midline theta power, which was associated with less risky decisions. Here, we predicted that cognitive control would be reduced in the helmet group, indicated by reduced frontal midline theta power, and that this group would prefer riskier options in the risk game. In line with our hypothesis, we found that participants in the helmet group showed significantly lower frontal midline theta power than participants in the control group, indicating less cognitive control. We did not replicate the finding of generally riskier behavior in the helmet group. Instead, we found that participants chose the riskier option in about half of trials, no matter how risky the other option was. Our results suggest that wearing a bike helmet reduces cognitive control, as revealed by reduced frontal midline theta power, leading to risk indifference when evaluating potential behaviors