Promoting the Readiness of Minors in Supplemental Security Income (PROMISE) [CFDA 84.418P]

Over the past two decades, New York State (NYS) has been actively and collaboratively engaged in systems change across three primary domains: 1) to develop a comprehensive employment system to reduce barriers to work and improve employment outcomes of individuals with disabilities; 2) to enhance the post-school adult outcomes of youth with disabilities, by collaboratively advancing evidence-based secondary transition practices at the regional, school district and individual student levels; and, 3) to support the return-to-work efforts of individuals with disabilities who receive Social Security Administration (SSA) disability benefits under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). These domains have been supported by numerous federal and state initiatives including: the US Department of Education’s Office of Special Education and Rehabilitation Services (OSERS)-sponsored Transition Systems Change grant; the SSA-sponsored State Partnership Initiative (NYWORKS); two Youth Transition Demonstrations (YTD); the Benefits Offset National Demonstration (BOND); and, three cycles of funding for the National Work Incentives Support Center (WISC); the US Department of Labor (DOL)-sponsored Work Incentive Grant, Disability Program Navigator Initiative, and Disability Employment Initiative; three rounds of funding from the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) for Medicaid Infrastructure Grants (MIG, NY Makes Work Pay); the NYS Education Department (NYSED) sponsored Model Transition Program (MTP); and three multi-year cycles of the statewide Transition Coordination Site network. Most recently, NYS has sponsored the Statewide Transition Services Professional Development Support Center (PDSC); the NYS Developmental Disability Planning Council (DDPC)-sponsored Transition Technical Assistance Support Program (T-TASP), NYS Work Incentives Support Center (NYS WISC), and NYS Partners in Policy Making (PIP); the NYS Office of Mental Health (OMH)-sponsored Career Development Initiative; and others. The growing statewide and gubernatorial emphasis on employment for New Yorkers with disabilities developed over the past two decades stemming from these initiatives, supported by service innovations and shared vision across state agencies and employment stakeholders, establishes a strong foundation for implementing and sustaining a research demonstration to “Promote the Readiness of Minors in Supplemental Security Income” (PROMISE). The NYS PROMISE will build upon NYS’ past successes and significantly support NYS in removing systems, policy and practice barriers for transition-age youth who receive SSI and their families. The NYS OMH through the Research Foundation for Mental Hygiene (RFMH), with their management partners the New York Employment Support System (NYESS) Statewide Coordinating Council (SCC) and Cornell University Employment and Disability Institute, along with the proposed research demonstration site community, join the NYS Governor’s Office in designing and implementing a series of statewide strategic service interventions to support the transition and employment preparation of youth ages 14-16 who receive SSI

Mental Ownership and Higher Order Thought

Mental ownership concerns who experiences a mental state. According to David Rosenthal (2005: 342), the proper way to characterize mental ownership is: ‘being conscious of a state as present is being conscious of it as belonging to somebody. And being conscious of a state as belonging to somebody other than oneself would plainly not make it a conscious state’. In other words, if a mental state is consciously present to a subject in virtue of a higher-order thought (HOT), then the HOT necessarily representsthe subject as the owner of the state. But, we contend, one of the lessons to be learned from pathological states like somatoparaphrenia is that conscious awareness of a mental state does not guarantee first-person ownership. That is to say, conscious presence does not imply mental ownership

Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution

Factive mental states, such as knowing or being aware, can only link an agent to the truth; by contrast, nonfactive states, such as believing or thinking, can link an agent to either truths or falsehoods. Researchers of mental state attribution often draw a sharp line between the capacity to attribute accurate states of mind and the capacity to attribute inaccurate or “reality-incongruent” states of mind, such as false belief. This article argues that the contrast that really matters for mental state attribution does not divide accurate from inaccurate states, but factive from nonfactive ones

Consciousness as Inner Sensation: Crusius and Kant

What is it that makes a mental state conscious? Recent commentators have proposed that for Kant, consciousness results from differentiation: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is distinguished, by means of our conceptual capacities, from other states and/or things. I argue instead that Kant’s conception of state consciousness is sensory: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is accompanied by an inner sensation. Interpreting state consciousness as inner sensation reveals an underappreciated influence of Crusius on Kant’s view, solves some long-standing puzzles concerning Kant’s difficult doctrine of self-affection, and sheds light on his theory of inner experience

Mental Health And The Role Of The States

Researchers from the State Health Care Spending Project -- a collaboration between The Pew Charitable Trusts and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation -- sought to better understand the country's mental health challenges and, in particular, the states' role in addressing them. The project found that:In 2013, approximately 44 million adults -- 18.5 percent of the population 18 and older -- were classified as having a mental illness. Of these, 10 million had a serious mental illness. The rate of serious mental illness varied from state to state.In 2009, the most recent year for which national mental health data are available, $147 billion was spent on mental health treatment in the United States. A majority of the spending, 60 percent, came from public sources such as Medicaid, state and local governments, Medicare, and federal grants. Private sources, including health insurance and individual out-of-pocket spending, made up the difference.Funding from states and localities totaled$22 billion (15 percent) in 2009. This total does not include state and local Medicaid expenditures. Counting those contributions brings total state and local spending up to $35.5 billion (24 percent).This report is intended to help federal, state, and local policymakers working to address the country's mental health challenges to better understand their prevalence, treatment, and funding trends

Steady-state evoked potentials possibilities for mental-state estimation

The use of the human steady-state evoked potential (SSEP) as a possible measure of mental-state estimation is explored. A method for evoking a visual response to a sum-of-ten sine waves is presented. This approach provides simultaneous multiple frequency measurements of the human EEG to the evoking stimulus in terms of describing functions (gain and phase) and remnant spectra. Ways in which these quantities vary with the addition of performance tasks (manual tracking, grammatical reasoning, and decision making) are presented. Models of the describing function measures can be formulated using systems engineering technology. Relationships between model parameters and performance scores during manual tracking are discussed. Problems of unresponsiveness and lack of repeatability of subject responses are addressed in terms of a need for loop closure of the SSEP. A technique to achieve loop closure using a lock-in amplifier approach is presented. Results of a study designed to test the effectiveness of using feedback to consciously connect humans to their evoked response are presented. Findings indicate that conscious control of EEG is possible. Implications of these results in terms of secondary tasks for mental-state estimation and brain actuated control are addressed