The temporary nature of number-space interactions

It is commonly accepted that the mental representation and processing of numbers and of space are tightly linked. This is evident from studies that have shown relations between math ability and visuospatial skill. Also, math instruction and education rely strongly on visuospatial tools and strategies. The dominant explanation for these number—space interactions is that the mental representation of numbers takes the form of a mental number line with numbers positioned in ascending order according to our reading habits. A long-standing debate is whether the link between numbers and space can be considered as evidence for a spatial number representation in long-term semantic memory, or whether this spatial frame is a temporary representation that emerges in working memory (WM) during task execution. We summarise our recent work that suggests basic number processing tasks do not operate on a long-term spatial memory representation, but on a representation constructed in serial order WM, where the elements are spatially coded as a function of their ordinal position in the memorised sequence. Implications for a new theoretical framework linking serial order WM and basic number processing are discussed

A Deflationary Account of Mental Representation

Among the cognitive capacities of evolved creatures is the capacity to represent. Theories in cognitive neuroscience typically explain our manifest representational capacities by positing internal representations, but there is little agreement about how these representations function, especially with the relatively recent proliferation of connectionist, dynamical, embodied, and enactive approaches to cognition. In this talk I sketch an account of the nature and function of representation in cognitive neuroscience that couples a realist construal of representational vehicles with a pragmatic account of mental content. I call the resulting package a deflationary account of mental representation and I argue that it avoids the problems that afflict competing accounts

Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation

This paper examines Spinoza’s view on the consistency of mental representation. First, I argue that he departs from Scholastic tradition by arguing that all mental states—whether desires, intentions, beliefs, perceptions, entertainings, etc.—must be logically consistent. Second, I argue that his endorsement of this view is motivated by key Spinozistic doctrines, most importantly the doctrine that all acts of thought represent what could follow from God’s nature. Finally, I argue that Spinoza’s view that all mental representation is consistent pushes him to a linguistic account of contradiction

Ontologies, Mental Disorders and Prototypes

As it emerged from philosophical analyses and cognitive research, most concepts exhibit typicality effects, and resist to the efforts of defining them in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This holds also in the case of many medical concepts. This is a problem for the design of computer science ontologies, since knowledge representation formalisms commonly adopted in this field do not allow for the representation of concepts in terms of typical traits. However, the need of representing concepts in terms of typical traits concerns almost every domain of real world knowledge, including medical domains. In particular, in this article we take into account the domain of mental disorders, starting from the DSM-5 descriptions of some specific mental disorders. On this respect, we favor a hybrid approach to the representation of psychiatric concepts, in which ontology oriented formalisms are combined to a geometric representation of knowledge based on conceptual spaces

The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents

Neuroimaging research has demonstrated that mentalizing about false beliefs held by other people recruits the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). However, earlier work was limited to a single agent that held a false belief. We investigated the effect of two agents that held similar or mixed false and/or true beliefs. Participants saw animated stories with two smurfs holding true or false beliefs (Story phase). At the end of each trial, they were requested to take the perspective of the self or one of the smurfs (Question phase). We predicted that an increasing number of smurfs holding a false belief would increase activation in the TPJ when participants have to report the belief of the smurf, because the incongruent belief should have a stronger influence if it is held by two compared with one agent. This prediction was confirmed as activation in the TPJ during the Story and Question phase increased when more smurfs held a false belief. Taking the perspective of the self led to stronger activation of the TPJ in the two conditions that involved a true belief and weakest activation in the condition of two false beliefs. These data suggest that activation in TPJ depends on the perspective participants take, and that the number of agents holding a false belief influences activation in the TPJ only when taking the agent's perspective

The Cognitive Representation of Fantasy Versus Pretense

Do our minds process fantasy, pretense, and reality differently? Participants read fantastical (Snow White eating an apple), pretend (a girl pretending to be Snow White), or realistic (a girl eating an apple) vignettes. Participants’ reaction to a property of each vignette’s realistic context (apple as ‘delicious’) or its unrealistic context (apple as ‘poisonous’) was measured by a computer program. Differences in study 1 reaction time indicate that fantasy may require different mental representation than pretense and reality. Differences in study 2 fail to duplicate results from the fantasy condition in study 1, instead finding differences in mental representation after reading pretend vignettes. Trends in both study 1 and 2 indicate possible influences of fantasy and pretense on realistic thought

Unpacking constructs: a network approach for studying war exposure, daily stressors and post-traumatic stress disorder

Conflict affected populations are exposed to stressful events during and after war, and it is well established that both take a substantial toll on individuals' mental health. Exactly how exposure to events during and after war affect mental health is a topic of considerable debate. Various hypotheses have been put forward on the relation between stressful war exposure (SWE), daily stressors (DS) and the development of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by critically reflecting upon conventional modeling approaches and by advancing an alternative model to studying interrelationships between SWE, DS, and PTSD variables. The network model is proposed as an innovative and comprehensive modeling approach in the field of mental health in the context of war. It involves a conceptualization and representation of variables and relationships that better approach reality, hence improving methodological rigor. It also promises utility in programming and delivering mental health support for war-affected populations

Quantifying the resolution of spatial and temporal representation in children with 22q11.2 deletion syndrome.

ObjectivesOur ability to generate mental representation of magnitude from sensory information affects how we perceive and experience the world. Reduced resolution of the mental representations formed from sensory inputs may generate impairment in the proximal and distal information processes that utilize these representations. Impairment of spatial and temporal information processing likely underpins the non-verbal cognitive impairments observed in 22q11.2 deletion syndrome (22q11DS). The present study builds on prior research by seeking to quantify the resolution of spatial and temporal representation in children with 22q11DS, sex chromosome aneuploidy (SCA), and a typically developing (TD) control group.Participants and methodsChildren (22q11DS = 70, SCA = 49, TD = 46) responded to visual or auditory stimuli with varying difference ratios. The participant's task was to identify which of two sequentially presented stimuli was of larger magnitude in terms of, size, duration, or auditory frequency. Detection threshold was calculated as the minimum difference ratio between the "standard" and the "target" stimuli required to achieve 75% accuracy in detecting that the two stimuli were different.ResultsChildren with 22q11DS required larger magnitude difference between spatial stimuli for accurate identification compared with both the SCA and TD groups (% difference from standard: 22q11DS = 14; SCA = 8; TD: 7; F  = 8.42, p < 0.001). Temporal detection threshold was also higher for the 22q11DS group to both visual (% difference from standard: 22q11DS = 14; SCA = 8; TD = 7; F  = 8.33, p < 0.001) and auditory (% difference from standard: 22q11DS = 23; SCA = 12; TD: 8; F  = 8.99, p < 0.001) stimuli compared with both the SCA and TD groups, while the SCA and TD groups displayed equivalent performance on these measures (p's > 0.05). Pitch detection threshold did not differ among the groups (p's > 0.05).ConclusionsThe observation of higher detection thresholds to spatial and temporal stimuli indicates further evidence for reduced resolution in both spatial and temporal magnitude representation in 22q11DS, that does not extend to frequency magnitude representation (pitch detection), and which is not explained by generalized cognitive impairment alone. These findings generate further support for the hypothesis that spatiotemporal hypergranularity of mental representations contributes to the non-verbal cognitive impairment seen in 22q11DS