Karma, Rebirth, and Mental Causation

Attempts to provide a thoroughly naturalized reading of the doctrine of karma have raised important issues regarding its role in the overall economy of the Buddhist soteriological project. This paper identifies some of the most problematic aspects of a naturalized interpretation of karma: (1) the strained relationship between retributive action and personal identity, and (2) the debate concerning mental causation in modern reductionist accounts of persons. The paper explores the benefits of a phenomenological approach in which reductionist accounts of karma are replaced with accounts that interpret virtuous and compassionate actions as emergent properties of consciousness that can be further enhanced through socialization

Kim on Causation and Mental Causation

Jaegwon Kim’s views on mental causation and the exclusion argument are evaluated systematically. Particular attention is paid to different theories of causation. It is argued that the exclusion argument and its premises do not cohere well with any systematic view of causation

Mary does not learn anything new: Applying Kim's critique of mental causation to the knowledge argument and the problem of consciousness

Within the discourse surrounding mind-body interaction, mental causation is intimately associated with non-reductive physicalism. However, such a theory holds two opposing views: that all causal properties and relations can be explicated by physics and that special sciences have an explanatory role. Jaegwon Kim attempts to deconstruct this problematic contradiction by arguing that it is untenable for non-reductive physicalists to explain human behavior by appeal to mental properties. In combination, Kim’s critique of mental causation and the phenomenal concept strategy serves as an effectual response to the anti-physicalist stance enclosed within the Knowledge Argument and the Zombie Thought Experiment

Mental causation: a defence

If we accept causal exclusion, property dualism and physical determinism, mental epiphenomenalism follows. Accord-ing to Yablo (1992), we can save mental causation by rejecting causal exclusion and considering the mental/physical relation as an instance of the determinable/determinate relation. In this paper I ex-amine Crane’s argument (2008) against the causal relevance of de-terminables, and I argue that we still have good reasons to think that determinables may be causally efficacious. As mental properties can be also considered as exhaustive disjunctions of physical realizers, the causal relevance of mental properties is also questioned by the widely shared opinion that disjunctive properties can not be causally efficacious. I consider Clapp’s arguments (2001) in favor of the causal relevance of disjunctive properties, and I conclude that dis-junctive properties may survive both Armstrong’s famous objections (1978)

Morse, Mind, and Mental Causation

Stephen Morse’s illuminating scholarship on law and neuroscience relies on a “folk psychological” account of human behavior in order to defend the law’s foundations for ascribing legal responsibility. The heart of Morse’s account is the notion of “mental state causation,” in which mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, and intentions) cause behavior. Morse argues that causation of this sort is necessary to support legal responsibility. We challenge this claim. First, we discuss problems with the conception of mental causation on which Morse appears to rely. Second, we present an alternative account to explain the link between mental states, reasons, and actions (the “rational–teleological” account). We argue that the alternative account avoids the conceptual problems that arise for Morse’s conception of mental causation and that it also undergirds ascriptions of legal responsibility. If the alternative succeeds, then Morse’s conception of “mental state causation” is not necessary to support legal responsibility

El problema de lo mental

Este artículo se ocupa de un aspecto central del problema de la relación mente-cuerpo, a saber, la causalidad mental y, más concretamente, lo que llamaremos 'causalidad intencional'. Caracterizamos en primer lugar nociones básicas como propiedad mental, causalidad mental y causalidad intencional. Presentamos luego tesis metafísicas inspiradas en las ciencias naturales que parecen entrar en conflicto con la causalidad intencional. Exponemos a continuación algunos intentos de abordar este problema, comentando sus dificultades. Finalmente, proponemos, de manera tentativa, algunas sugerencias para abordarlo con éxito. This paper deals with a central aspect of the mind-body problem, namely, mental causation and, more exactly, what we shall call 'intentional causation'. We start with a characterization of such basic notions as mental property, mental causation and intentional causation. We go on by stating some metaphysical theses, inspired in the natural sciences, which seem to conflict with intentional causation. Next, we expound some attempts to deal with this problem, and comment their difficulties. Finally, we make, in a tentative manner, some suggestions as to how that problem might be successfully treated

Grounding, mental causation, and overdetermination

Recently, Kroedel and Schulz have argued that the exclusion problem—which states that certain forms of non-reductive physicalism about the mental are committed to systematic and objectionable causal overdetermination—can be solved by appealing to grounding. Specifically, they defend a principle that links the causal relations of grounded mental events to those of grounding physical events, arguing that this renders mental–physical causal overdetermination unproblematic. Here, we contest Kroedel and Schulz’s result. We argue that their causal-grounding principle is undermotivated, if not outright false. In particular, we contend that the principle has plausible counterexamples, resulting from the fact that some mental states are not fully grounded by goings on ‘in our heads’ but also require external factors to be included in their full grounds. We draw the sceptical conclusion that it remains unclear whether non-reductive physicalists can plausibly respond to the exclusion argument by appealing to considerations of grounding

Are Reasons Causally Relevant for Action? Dharmakīrti and the Embodied Cognition Paradigm

How do mental states come to be about something other than their own operations, and thus to serve as ground for effective action? This papers argues that causation in the mental domain should be understood to function on principles of intelligibility (that is, on principles which make it perfectly intelligible for intentions to have a causal role in initiating behavior) rather than on principles of mechanism (that is, on principles which explain how causation works in the physical domain). The paper considers Dharmakīrti’s kāryānumāna argument (that is, the argument that an inference is sound only when one infers from the effect to the cause and not vice versa), and proposes a naturalized account of reasons. On this account, careful scrutiny of the effect can provide a basis for ascertaining the unique causal totality that is its source, but only for reasoning that is context‐specific

Psychopathology and Crime Causation: Insanity or Excuse?

One of the most controversial topics in the criminal justice industry is the insanity defense and its applicability or validity in prosecuting criminal cases. The purpose of this assignment is to identify and discuss psychopathology and crime causation in terms of mental illness, research, and the insanity defense. For this evaluation, information was gathered from scholarly research, textbooks, dictionaries, and published literature. These sources were then carefully reviewed and applied to the evaluation in a concise, yet informative, manner. This assignment also addresses some of the key terms in psychopathology and crime causation, including various theories, definitions, and less commonly known relevant factors influencing claims of mental instability or insanity. The conclusion of this evaluation shows that mental illness is a very real issue facing society and the criminal justice system. This evaluation is not exhaustive and while it does provide insight into the factors of psychopathology and crime causation, the evaluation could benefit from the input of professionals currently working within the criminal justice industry

A Non-Reductionist Solution to the Problem of Social Causation

The thesis of the causal closure of the physical world renders mental and social causation philosophically problematic. In The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle offers a partial solution to the problem of the causal efficacy of social and institutional facts by an appeal to the notion of the Background, or, as I will argue, by an appeal to its physical components. Since Searle's solution refers to physical facts in order to explain social causation, it does not seem to differ from the solution offered by reductive physicalists to the problem of mental causation. In this paper, I will discuss both responses to these two problems of higher-order causation. As a result of this investigation, the paper offers an account of how and to what extent does Searle's solution solve the problem of the causal efficacy of social facts, without implying their reducibility to physical facts