Strategic Capacity Withholding by Energy Storage in Electricity Markets

Abstract: Although previous work has demonstrated the ability of large energy storage (ES) units to exercise market power by withholding their capacity, it has adopted modeling approaches exhibiting certain limitations and has not analyzed the dependency of the extent of exercised market power on ES operating properties. In this paper, the decision making process of strategic ES is modeled through a bi-level optimization problem; the upper level determines the optimal extent of capacity withholding at different time periods, maximizing the ES profit, while the lower level represents endogenously the market clearing process. This problem is solved after converting it to a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) and linearizing the latter through suitable techniques. Case studies on a test market quantitatively analyze the extent of capacity withholding and its impact on ES profit and social welfare for different scenarios regarding the power and energy capacity of ES

Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices

CWPE0619 (EPRG0602) Xinmin Hu and Daniel Ralph (Feb 2006) Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices We study a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model of electricity markets with locational marginal prices. Each player faces a bilevel optimization problem that we remodel as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, MPEC. This gives an EPEC, equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. We establish sufficient conditions for existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for this class of bilevel games and give some applications. We show by examples the effect of network transmission limits, i.e. congestion, on existence of equilibria. Then we study, for more general EPECs, the weaker pure strategy concepts of local Nash and Nash stationary equilibria. We model the latter via complementarity problems, CPs. Finally, we present numerical examples of methods that attempt to find local Nash or Nash stationary equilibria of randomly generated electricity market games. The CP solver PATH is found to be rather effective in this context

Dynamic Congestion and Tolls with Mobile Source Emission

This paper proposes a dynamic congestion pricing model that takes into account mobile source emissions. We consider a tollable vehicular network where the users selfishly minimize their own travel costs, including travel time, early/late arrival penalties and tolls. On top of that, we assume that part of the network can be tolled by a central authority, whose objective is to minimize both total travel costs of road users and total emission on a network-wide level. The model is formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) problem and then reformulated as a mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC). The MPCC is solved using a quadratic penalty-based gradient projection algorithm. A numerical study on a toy network illustrates the effectiveness of the tolling strategy and reveals a Braess-type paradox in the context of traffic-derived emission.Comment: 23 pages, 9 figures, 5 tables. Current version to appear in the Proceedings of the 20th International Symposium on Transportation and Traffic Theory, 2013, the Netherland

An MPEC approach for analysing the impact of energy storage in imperfect electricity markets

Although recent studies have investigated the impacts of energy storage on various aspects of power system operation and planning, its role in imperfect electricity markets has not been explored yet. This paper provides for the first time theoretical and quantitative evidence of the beneficial impact of energy storage in limiting market power by generation companies. Quantitative analysis is supported by a bi-level optimization model of the imperfect electricity market setting, accounting for the time-coupling operational constraints of energy storage. This bi-level problem is solved after converting it to a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). Case studies are carried out on a test market with day-ahead horizon and hourly resolution