Looking at the Montreux Document from a Maritime Perspective

The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies was drafted with a view to apply to land-based settings. However, one of the prime markets of the private security industry today is the protection of merchant ships from criminal threats like piracy and armed robbery at sea. This warrants a discussion on the pertinence and applicability of the Montreux Document to security services provided in the maritime environment. Accordingly, this article engages a maritime perspective, exploring the implications that the maritime context and its specificities have on the underlying assumptions and concepts of the Montreux Document – most notably the three-fold structure of addressees, which are the Territorial, Contracting and Home States – as well as on selected substantive rules. It concludes that the Montreux Document is pertinent to maritime security services, but that it needs to be interpreted specifically with regard to its effective application at sea

The geopolitical dimension of maritime security

This article discusses the geopolitical dimension of maritime security, which has been neglected by scholars despite the growing number of studies devoted to a variety of aspects related to maritime security. The first step consists in clarifying the definitions of the two concepts; ‘geopolitics’ and ‘maritime security’. Then the article introduces the geopolitical dimension of maritime security from a conceptual perspective, and then analyses three practical examples of maritime security geo-strategies released in 2014. The results demonstrate that states’ and international institutions’ maritime security objectives and interests are indirectly and directly influenced by geographical and geopolitical considerations, although this link is only tacitly acknowledged in official documents. Scholars and practitioners interested in maritime security are encouraged to further engage with this dimension

Waves of opportunity: enhancing Australia-Indonesia maritime security cooperation

Overview: Maritime security cooperation between Australia and Indonesia is important because of our geographical proximity and common interests. With recently-installed President Joko Widodo proclaiming Indonesia as the ‘World Maritime Axis’, there’s great momentum for Australia and Indonesia to enhance maritime security cooperation. This paper looks at ways to enhance cooperation through: more interaction between policymakers; facilitating greater integration among the agencies responsible for maritime security cooperation; national and regional capacity-building, and cooperative and collective maritime domain awareness

Beyond seablindness. A new agenda for maritime security studies

This article examines the rise of maritime security in concept and practice. We argue that developments in the maritime arena have flown beneath the radar of much mainstream international relations and security studies scholarship, and that a new agenda for maritime security studies is required. In this article we outline the contours of such an agenda, with the intention of providing orientation and direction for future research. Our discussion is structured into three main sections, each of which outlines a core dimension of the maritime security problem space. We begin with a discussion of the issues and themes that comprise the maritime security agenda, including how it has been theorized in security studies to date. Our argument is that the marine environment needs to be understood as part of an interlinked security complex, which also incorporates strong connections between land and sea. Second, we examine the ways in which maritime security actors have responded to these challenges in practice, focusing on issues of maritime domain awareness, coordination of action, and operations in the field. Third, we turn to the mechanisms through which the new maritime security agenda is being disseminated to local actors through a process of devolved security governance. We focus particularly on efforts to distribute knowledge and skills to local actors through capacity building and security sector reform. In the conclusion, we outline the future challenges for maritime security studies that follow from these observations

SITREP: The NPS Maritime Defense and Security Research Program Newsletter ; v. 3 (April 2004)

This issue highlights the Maritime Domain Protection (MDP) System Architecture Design Process. "Preventing terrorists from exploiting the world's oceans to attack the United States, its forces, its force projection capability, and other interests is a very serious concern for national leadership. The Maritime Domain Protection Task Force (MDP-TF) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) is engaged in a campus-wide research effort to address this concern. Systems Engineering Design Integration (SE&I) is one of three primary independent efforts that form the core of this Maritime Domain Protection (MDP) research project. Five full-time NPS faculty members, with many years of systems engineering and project management experience, are committed to conduct SE&I with the collaboration of NPS students from the Navy, Coast Guard, Northern Command, and other MDP project participants. This multi-year SE&I effort will focus on the delivery of a proposed architecture on which to base future process and technical design."SITREP, a monthly e-news brief covering the spectrum of maritime domain defense and security research. SITREP is produced by the Maritime Defense and Security Research Program as part of the National Security Institute—a cooperative research institute whose members include the Naval Postgraduate School, University of California at Santa Barbara, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The purpose of the Maritime Defense and Security Research program is to conduct, coordinate and collaborate Maritime defense and security research, experimentation, and information exchange between partnership universities; federal, state, and local agencies; national laboratories; maritime industry, and international partners through the National Security Institute. Each month SITREP will introduce at least two on-going maritime security research projects either from the National Security Institute or other research institutions or agencies. This month we provide a glimpse at a world-wide MIO at sea experimentation program and a library repository for issues related to maritime security. In addition, we will highlight upcoming symposia and conferences associated with maritime defense and security for our readership.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

The EC and Enhancing Ship and Port Facility Security

With regard to these new measures, the European Union (EU) issued its own maritime security legislationunder the official slogan of better implementation of standards of the International Maritime Organization(IMO). A single and harmonized application of security regulations was announced. These Europeaninitiatives suggested a European opposition against the International regulations, in particular within the sphereof maritime affairs.The implementation of the maritime security regulations by the EC bears a strong resemblance to theEU’s aspiration to become “une grande puissance maritimeâ€.The purpose of this paper is to review the incorporation of the existing IMO maritime security measuresinto the law of the EU and examine the compliance of the new security regime with Community interests,needs and existing legislation. The paper will also attempt to identify possible collisions between new EUmaritime security regulations and International law and analyze this development in the legislation of the EUin general

Maritime security and nuclear cargoes

Civilian nuclear operations entail the transportation of sometimes substantial quantities of radioactive material. These can range from large quantities of weakly radioactive fresh fuel for power reactors, with the corresponding removal of highly radioactive spent fuel and operational wastes, to the shipment of small quantities of radioactive isotopes (“sources”) for medical, industrial or research purposes and their subsequent disposal. In relation to the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, there may also be relatively large quantities of radioactive material produced by “back-end” activities, such as the reprocessing of spent fuel to recover plutonium and then create mixed oxide, or MOX, fuel.1 In between these extremes, there are occasional consignments of fresh and spent fuel to and from research reactors, together with the associated wastes. In many of these cases, circumstances will dictate that consignments are dispatched overland, or by air, but there are some cases where a substantial maritime component is entailed and where there will be particular security and safety concerns that arise from that. Traditionally, the focus of this concern has been on the possibility of accidents, which might result in environmental contamination or human harm, but more recently, and certainly since 11 September 2001, the locus of concern has somewhat shifted to risks that might arise from the activities of non-state armed groups, or terrorists (or even pirates). This is the focus of the present review

Climate change and maritime security narrative: the case of the international maritime organisation

Both climate change and maritime security are currently ranking high on states’ and international organisations’ political and governance agendas. However, academics and practitioners alike have hardly tackled the actual interlinkages and dependencies between the two issues. Taking the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as a case study, this article pioneers the use of corpus linguistic method to unravel the nonexistence of a narrative linking climate change impacts and the occurrence of maritime criminality despite some connections in practice. However, direct narrative links between climate change and migration as well as migration and maritime security were found, which can point at an indirect link between climate change and maritime security. The article concludes on the implications of these findings for academics and practitioners alike. The latter are encouraged to reflect on their current narrative in a bid to contribute to a better acknowledgement of the existing links between the impacts of climate change on natural and human systems and aspects of maritime security

Security and risk-based models in shipping and ports: Review and critical analysis

The primary aim of maritime security assessment models is to assess the level of security within and across the maritime network. When managing risk through legislation, regulatory assessment models are used to assess risk levels and examine the impact of policy options, usually in terms of the costs and benefits of a regulatory proposal. This paper reviews the development, application and adequacy of existing risk assessment and management models to maritime and port security. In particular, we examine the problematical issues of security perception, value and impact, and discuss the limitations of the current regulatory framework in providing an integrated and effective approach to risk assessment and management, including for supply chain security

Securing SLOCs by Cooperation - China’s Perspective of Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean

The essay addresses that, after 30years open and reform policy, with the increasing connectivity with the rest of the world, China has been transforming from a traditional land power to a new type of sea power. This transformation requires a sophisticate and modernized Chinese navy, and more frequent international engagement on maritime security, but it not necessary means that China would follow the model of traditional Western sea power to seek for its regional thalassocracy. The essay argues that, at least in the medium term, even for the long term, Chinas maritime strategy pursues to control its marginal sea and secure its SLOCs. Chinese sea policy is and will be peace-nature and encourages regional and international maritime cooperation. The essay points out, the strategic value of the Indian Ocean for China, an energy-thirsty giant is vital. The vulnerability of the SLOCs for China from the Gulf to the Malacca Straits has drawn a lot of concern of China, and to secure this energy transportation channel has become a significant component of Chinas maritime security strategy. Meanwhile, more intensive participation and wide presence of Chinese Navy and merchant marine in the Indian Ocean will make greater contribution to its Western Development Strategy, and also could be regarded as an indirect strategy to enhance Chinas position on its marginal water dispute with some Southeast Asia countries. The essay suggests that, in the framework of Chinas Indian Ocean security strategy, Pakistan should be regarded as a decisive partner and Gwadar project should lay the cornerstone for this strategy. The meaning of Gwadar port for China is a bridge to reach energy diversity, not a fort to scout and dominate the Indian Ocean. The article consists of four parts, 1. Review of Chinas Maritime Strategy; 2. Chinese Perspective on Sea Power; 3. "String of Pearls" or Line of Life; and 4. Secure SLOCs via Cooperation.SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communications), Indian Ocean, China, Pakistan