Endogenous Systemic Liquidity Risk

Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events. Extending our previous work (Cao & Illing, 2007), this paper analyses the adequate policy response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk. We analyse the feedback between lender of last resort policy and incentives of private banks, determining the aggregate amount of liquidity available. We show that imposing minimum liquidity standards for banks ex ante are a crucial requirement for sensible lender of last resort policy. In addition, we analyse the impact of equity requirements and narrow banking, in the sense that banks are required to hold sufficient liquid funds so as to pay out in all contingencies. We show that such a policy is strictly inferior to imposing minimum liquidity standards ex ante combined with lender of last resort policy

Liquidity risk management.

Liquidity and solvency are the heavenly twins of banking, frequently indistinguishable. An illiquid bank can rapidly become insolvent, and an insolvent bank illiquid. As Tim Congdon noted, (FT, September 2007), in the 1950s liquid assets were typically 30 percent of British clearing banks’ total assets, and these largely consisted of Treasury Bills and short dated government debt. Currently, such cash holdings are about ½ percent and traditional liquid assets about 1 percent of total liabilities. Nor have prior standards relating to maturity transformation been maintained. Increasing proportions of long-dated assets have been financed by relatively short-dated borrowing in wholesale markets. Bank conduits financing tranches of securitised mortgages on the basis of three month asset-backed commercial paper is but an extreme example of this. Northern Rock is another. Such time inconsistency issues are hard to resolve, especially in the middle of a (foreseen) crisis; it is worth noting that many, though not all, of the aspects of this present crisis were foreseen by financial regulators. They just did not have the instruments, or perhaps the will, to do anything about it. If, when trouble strikes, the lifeboats are manned immediately, with extra liquidity being provided on easy terms, then there is encouragement to the banks to build even more densely on the flood plain. Why should the banks bother with liquidity management when the Central Bank will do all that for them? The banks have been taking out a liquidity ‘put’ on the Central Bank; they are in effect putting the downside of liquidity risk to the Central Bank. What is surely needed now is a calm and comprehensive review of what the principles of bank liquidity management should be.

Funding liquidity risk: definition and measurement

In this paper we propose definitions of funding liquidity and funding liquidity risk and present a simple, yet intuitive, measure of funding liquidity risk based on data from open market operations. Our empirical analysis uses a unique data set of 135 main refinancing operation auctions conducted at the ECB between June 2005 and December 2007. We find that our proxies for funding liquidity risk are typically stable and low, with occasional spikes, especially during the recent turmoil. We are also able to document downward spirals between funding liquidity risk and market liquidity. JEL Classification: E58, G21bidding data, funding liquidity, Interbank markets, liquidity risk, money market auctions

POLICIES OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKS LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT IN THE CRISIS CONTEXT

The article focuses on liquidity management in Commercial Banks, and presents the steps that a good management has to follow to ensure that the position of the bank is not put into jeopardy following a lack of liquidity. Different management decisions andliquidity management, liquidity strategy, liquidity risk, liquidity risk exposure liquidity risk funding, currency strategy, liquidity planning procedures, alternative scenarios, liquidity crisis management

Asset Market Liquidity Risk Management: A Generalized Theoretical Modeling Approach for Trading and Fund Management Portfolios

Asset market liquidity risk is a significant and perplexing subject and though the term market liquidity risk is used quite chronically in academic literature it lacks an unambiguous definition, let alone understanding of the proposed risk measures. To this end, this paper presents a review of contemporary thoughts and attempts vis-à-vis asset market/liquidity risk management. Furthermore, this research focuses on the theoretical aspects of asset liquidity risk and presents critically two reciprocal approaches to measuring market liquidity risk for individual trading securities, and discusses the problems that arise in attempting to quantify asset market liquidity risk at a portfolio level. This paper extends research literature related to the assessment of asset market/liquidity risk by providing a generalized theoretical modeling underpinning that handle, from the same perspective, market and liquidity risks jointly and integrate both risks into a portfolio setting without a commensurate increase of statistical postulations. As such, we argue that market and liquidity risk components are correlated in most cases and can be integrated into one single market/liquidity framework that consists of two interrelated sub-components. The first component is attributed to the impact of adverse price movements, while the second component focuses on the risk of variation in transactions costs due to bid-ask spreads and it attempts to measure the likelihood that it will cost more than expected to liquidate the asset position. We thereafter propose a concrete theoretical foundation and a new modeling framework that attempts to tackle the issue of market/liquidity risk at a portfolio level by combining two asset market/liquidity risk models. The first model is a re-engineered and robust liquidity horizon multiplier that can aid in producing realistic asset market liquidity losses during the unwinding period. The essence of the model is based on the concept of Liquidity-Adjusted Value-at-Risk (L-VaR) framework, and particularly from the perspective of trading portfolios that have both long and short trading positions. Conversely, the second model is related to the transactions cost of liquidation due to bid-ask spreads and includes an improved technique that tackles the issue of bid-ask spread volatility. As such, the model comprises a new approach to contemplating the impact of time-varying volatility of the bid-ask spread and its upshot on the overall asset market/liquidity risk.Economic Capital; Emerging Markets; Financial Engineering; Financial Risk Management; Financial Markets; Liquidity Risk; Portfolio Management; Liquidity Adjusted Value at Risk

Liquidity Risk and Monetary Policy

This paper provides a framework to analyse emergency liquidity assistance of central banks on financial markets in response to aggregate and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. The model combines the microeconomic view of liquidity as the ability to sell assets quickly and at low costs and the macroeconomic view of liquidity as a medium of exchange that influences the aggregate price level of goods. The central bank faces a trade-off between limiting the negative output effects of dramatic asset price declines and more inflation. Furthermore, the anticipation of central bank intervention causes a moral hazard effect with investors. This gives rise to the possibility of an optimal monetary policy under commitment

Endogenous Systemic Liquidity Risk

Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events. Extending our previous work (Cao & Illing, 2008), this paper analyses the adequate policy response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk. We analyse the feedback between lender of last resort policy and incentives of private banks, determining the aggregate amount of liquidity available. We show that imposing minimum liquidity standards for banks ex ante are a crucial requirement for sensible lender of last resort policy. In addition, we analyse the impact of equity requirements and narrow banking, in the sense that banks are required to hold sufficient liquid funds so as to pay out in all contingencies. We show that both policies are strictly inferior to imposing minimum liquidity standards ex ante combined with lender of last resort policy.liquidity risk, free-riding, narrow banking, lender of last resort

LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT IN BANKING

The objective of this paper is to provide a global perspective of the liquidity risk from a banking societies‘ viewpoint. Our paper belongs to the technical studies that analyze the concrete way in measuring the liquidity risk at the level of the banking societies from Romania. The study is structured on chapters that present the theoretical background in liquidity risk management and new trends in measuring, monitoring and controlling liquidity risk. Also, the paper contains a study cases part, which presents the actual stage and the challenges of the measuring the liquidity risk. We try to underline the importance of a flexible banking system, which should be able to measure and forecast its prospective cash flows for assets, liabilities, off-balance sheet commitments and derivatives over a variety of time horizons, under normal conditions and a range of stress scenarios, including scenarios of severe stress.liquidity risk,, simple net liabilities, cumulated net liabilities, liquidity, rate, average maturities transformation, immediate liquidity

Liquidity in the Foreign Exchange Market: Measurement, Commonality, and Risk Premiums

This paper develops a liquidity measure tailored to the foreign exchange (FX) market, quantifies the amount of commonality in liquidity across exchange rates, and determines the extent of liquidity risk premiums embedded in FX returns. The new liquidity measure utilizes ultra high frequency data and captures cross-sectional and temporal variation in FX liquidity during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Empirical results show that liquidity co-moves across currency pairs and that systematic FX liquidity decreases dramatically during the crisis. Extending an asset pricing model for FX returns by the novel liquidity risk factor suggests that liquidity risk is heavily priced.foreign exchange market, measuring liquidity, commonality in liquidity, liquidity risk premium, subprime crisis

Estimating liquidity risk using the exposure-based cash-flow-at-risk approach: an application to the UK banking sector

This paper uses a relatively new quantitative model for estimating UK banks' liquidity risk. The model is called the exposure-based cash-flow-at-risk (CFaR) model, which not only measures a bank's liquidity risk tolerance but also helps to improve liquidity risk management through the provision of additional risk exposure information. Using data for the period 1997–2010, we provide evidence that there is variable funding pressure across the UK banking industry, which is forecasted to be slightly illiquid with a small amount of expected cash outflow (i.e. £0.06 billion) in 2011. In our sample of the six biggest UK banks, only the HSBC maintains positive CFaR with 95% confidence, which means that there is only a 5% chance that HSBC's cash flow will drop below £0.67 billion by the end of 2011. RBS is expected to face the largest liquidity risk with a 5% chance that the bank will face a cash outflow that year in excess of £40.29 billion. Our estimates also suggest Lloyds TSB's cash flow is the most volatile of the six biggest UK banks, because it has the biggest deviation between its downside cash flow (i.e. CFaR) and expected cash flow