London, Libel Capital No Longer? The Draft Defamation Act 2011 and the Future of Libel Tourism

[Excerpt] “In the past decade, London emerged as the forum of choice for “libel tourists”—strategic, often foreign, plaintiffs who bring defamation actions in a jurisdiction with plaintiff-friendly libel laws, even if they and the defamatory material at issue lack a substantial connection with that jurisdiction. England’s defamation laws and procedures make it significantly easier for claimants to commence and prevail in libel actions than do the laws and procedures of many other countries, particularly the United States. As a result, English courts have entertained several high-profile defamation cases involving foreign parties who have only tenuous connections to England, such as disputes between a Saudi billionaire and a U.S. journalist; a Russian businessman and a U.S. magazine; and a French director and a U.S. publisher. Cases like these have cemented London’s reputation as the “libel capital of the world.” The establishment of that notorious title, reflecting the notion that England does not value free expression as highly as other countries, has helped ignite a movement to reform English libel laws and procedures. On March 15, 2011, the U.K. Ministry of Justice unveiled a draft bill entitled the Draft Defamation Act 2011, proposing a substantial overhaul of English libel laws as well as the procedures applied in libel actions. The Draft Act aims to combat the perception that England is a refuge for libel tourism by, among other reforms, requiring English courts to determine whether England is the most appropriate forum in which the action should be heard before exercising jurisdiction. The Draft Defamation Act comes less than one year after the enactment of the Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage (“SPEECH”) Act of 2010 in the United States. The SPEECH Act prohibits U.S. courts, both state and federal, from recognizing or enforcing defamation judgments rendered by a foreign court unless that court applied a standard that was as protective of free speech as a U.S. court would have applied. In the context of libel tourism, this means that a libel tourist cannot force a U.S. author or publisher to comply with a foreign judgment unless a U.S. court finds that the judgment comported with First Amendment principles. This Note analyzes the efficacy of the Draft Defamation Act and its impact on the enforcement of English defamation judgments in U.S. courts. Specifically, it proposes that the Draft Act’s procedural clauses will effectively reduce the prevalence of libel tourism in England. Moreover, this Note argues that, in light of the Draft Act’s reforms as well as longstanding principles of international comity, U.S. courts should not narrowly construe the SPEECH Act to require exact congruence between U.S. and English defamation laws. Finally, this Note presents evidence suggesting that England’s problem of libel tourism could be supplanted by the new phenomenon of privacy tourism. Thus, in addition to modifying and enacting the Draft Defamation Act, English policymakers should consider reviewing and possibly reforming English privacy laws. This Note proceeds in four sections. Section II provides a background to issues related to libel tourism, including its prevalence in England and the U.S. response to it. Section III reviews the Draft Defamation Act’s procedural clauses related to libel tourism. Section IV analyzes the Draft Act’s potential to eradicate libel tourism and its effect on U.S. courts’ construction and application of the SPEECH Act. Section IV also proposes modifications to the Draft Act, including the adoption of a defamation-specific choice-of-law rule. Finally, Section V explores the interplay between English defamation and privacy laws, considering whether the Draft Act’s aim to eliminate libel tourism inadvertently opens the door to the development of privacy tourism

Can President Trump \u27Open Up\u27 the Libel Laws?

[Excerpt] Libel and slander are branches of the law of defamation. Defamation law authorizes remedies for reputational harm caused by some false statements of fact. A libel is a defamatory statement that is printed or written; a slander is a defamatory statement that is spoken. During the 2016 presidential campaign, candidate Donald Trump suggested that, if elected, he would open up our libel laws to facilitate lawsuits by public officials against news organizations

Libel

Defamatory statements are those which harm an individual’s reputation in the eyes of the community. The law distinguishes between slander (spoken defamation) and libel (written or broadcast defamation). Libel law attempts to balance the interests of journalists and others with the rights of individuals and organizations to protect themselves against false and injurious attacks. American libel law has changed significantly since the 1960s, offering greater freedom to journalists to criticize public figures. At the same time, libel law has also become more complex, creating ongoing uncertainty about when journalists are on safe ground. Libel lawsuits are still the most common legal complaints filed against the news media. Defense against these can be time-consuming and costly; suits occasionally result in large monetary damage awards, and can be abused by the powerful to divert attention from their own wrongdoing and muzzle their critics. Despite these problems, attempts to reform libel law have rarely succeeded, in part because of opposition from news organizations

An unsavoury business

Fear of libel actions and of losing advertising revenue has persuaded most media organisations to leave well alone when it comes to exposing some of the more unsavoury aspects of the burger giant McDonald's

Ética, Constituição e direito privado

Tem por escopo a análise das relações entre Direito Constitucional, Direito Ordinário e Direito Judicial, isso a partir do exame dos efeitos do fenômeno da chamada constitucionalização do Direito Privado

Sanggar Anak Jalanan Kota Solo

Keberadaan anak jalanan merupakan permasalahan yang umum terjadi di kota-kota besar, termasuk Kota Solo. Kebutuhan ekonomi menjadi faktor utama anak-anak jalanan turun ke jalan. Dengan begitu diperlukan wadah pengembangan sumber daya anak jalanan berupa sanggar. Melalui pelatihan yang dilakukan di sanggar tersebut, diharapkan anak-anak jalanan tersebut nantinya memiliki keterampilan khusus yang dapat digunakan sebagai sumber pendapatan, sehingga anak-anak tersebut tidak kembali turun ke jalan. Pendekatan karakteristik anak jalanan diperlukan sebagai pendekatan desain, sehingga dapat mengakomodasi karakteristik anak jalanan. Persoalan desain adalah bagaimana mewujudkan karakteristik anak jalanan ke dalam desain sanggar anak jalanan. Metode yang digunakan adalah metode menggunakan Pendekatan Karakteristik Anak Jalanan ke dalam desain Sanggar Anak Jalanan di Kota Solo ini. Hasil yang diperoleh adalah berupa desain sanggar anak jalanan yang sesuai dengan karakteristik anak jalanan

Reframing Libel - Taking All Rights Seriously and where it leads us

In preparing this paper, we have returned to first principles and re-evaluated fundamental aspects of libel law, its purposes, its substance, and its processes. Our thinking has been informed by, first, philosophical understandings of democracy and the public sphere and in particular the role of freedom of speech and of the media therein, and secondly, the social psychology of reputation and privacy. By doing this, we are able to ground some of the proposals for reform made previously by Index on Censorship, English PEN, Lord Lester, and others. We do so, however, not through the prism of an over-weaned emphasis on freedom of expression, but rather by triangulating the rights and interests of claimants, defendants, and the wider public. Ultimately, we recommend a coherent set of significant substantive and procedural reforms that if enacted would enhance access to justice and reduce costs for all but the most serious and/or most damaging libels. This involves the recommendation of the introduction of a two-track libel regim

Reputational Injury Without a Reputational Attack: Addressing Negligence Claims for Pure Reputational Harm

This Note examines the unsettled relationship between defamation and negligence. The law of defamation, through the torts of libel and slander, constitutes a well-developed and complex body of state common law and constitutional considerations. However, some claims for reputational harm may fall outside of this framework, as the law of defamation does not account for all of the ways that an individual’s reputation may be injured. Thus, plaintiffs sometimes bring negligence claims to seek redress for damage to reputation. When a plaintiff brings a negligence claim for pure reputational harm, the court is faced with a variety of options for handling the claim. This Note argues that courts should adopt a multistep approach to handling such claims. The court should first determine whether the claim is communication-based or not. If it is a noncommunicative claim, it should be allowed to stand as a simple negligence claim. If, however, the claim is communication-based, it should be presumptively displaced by the torts of libel and slander