Aggregation functions with given super-additive and sub-additive transformations

Aggregation functions and their transformations have found numerous applications in various kinds of systems as well as in economics and social science. Every aggregation function is known to be bounded above and below by its super-additive and sub-additive transformations. We are interested in the “inverse” problem of whether or not every pair consisting of a super-additive function dominating a sub-additive function comes from some aggregation function in the above sense. Our main results provide a negative answer under mild extra conditions on the super- and sub-additive pair. We also show that our results are, in a sense, best possible

Quasi-arithmetic means and OWA functions in interval-valued and Atanassov's intuitionistic fuzzy set theory

In this paper we propose an extension of the well-known OWA functions introduced by Yager to interval-valued (IVFS) and Atanassov’s intuitionistic (AIFS) fuzzy set theory. We first extend the arithmetic and the quasi-arithmetic mean using the arithmetic operators in IVFS and AIFS theory and investigate under which conditions these means are idempotent. Since on the unit interval the construction of the OWA function involves reordering the input values, we propose a way of transforming the input values in IVFS and AIFS theory to a new list of input values which are now ordered

Axiomatizations of Lov\'asz extensions of pseudo-Boolean functions

Three important properties in aggregation theory are investigated, namely horizontal min-additivity, horizontal max-additivity, and comonotonic additivity, which are defined by certain relaxations of the Cauchy functional equation in several variables. We show that these properties are equivalent and we completely describe the functions characterized by them. By adding some regularity conditions, these functions coincide with the Lov\'asz extensions vanishing at the origin, which subsume the discrete Choquet integrals. We also propose a simultaneous generalization of horizontal min-additivity and horizontal max-additivity, called horizontal median-additivity, and we describe the corresponding function class. Additional conditions then reduce this class to that of symmetric Lov\'asz extensions, which includes the discrete symmetric Choquet integrals

On non-monotonic Choquet integrals as aggregation functions

This paper deals with non-monotonic Choquet integral, a generalization of the regular Choquet integral. The discrete non-monotonic Choquet integral is considered under the viewpoint of aggregation. In particular we give an axiomatic characterization of the class of non-monotonic Choquet integrals.We show how the Shapley index, in contrast with the monotonic case, can assume positive values if the criterion is in average a benefit, depending on its effect in all the possible coalition coalitions, and negative values in the opposite case of a cost criterion.

Aggregation functions: Means

The two-parts state-of-art overview of aggregation theory summarizes the essential information concerning aggregation issues. Overview of aggregation properties is given, including the basic classification of aggregation functions. In this first part, the stress is put on means, i.e., averaging aggregation functions, both with fixed arity (n-ary means) and with open arity (extended means).

The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem

In participatory budgeting, communities collectively decide on the allocation of public tax dollars for local public projects. In this work, we consider the question of fairly aggregating the preferences of community members to determine an allocation of funds to projects. This problem is different from standard fair resource allocation because of public goods: The allocated goods benefit all users simultaneously. Fairness is crucial in participatory decision making, since generating equitable outcomes is an important goal of these processes. We argue that the classic game theoretic notion of core captures fairness in the setting. To compute the core, we first develop a novel characterization of a public goods market equilibrium called the Lindahl equilibrium, which is always a core solution. We then provide the first (to our knowledge) polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium for a broad set of utility functions; our algorithm also generalizes (in a non-trivial way) the well-known concept of proportional fairness. We use our theoretical insights to perform experiments on real participatory budgeting voting data. We empirically show that the core can be efficiently computed for utility functions that naturally model our practical setting, and examine the relation of the core with the familiar welfare objective. Finally, we address concerns of incentives and mechanism design by developing a randomized approximately dominant-strategy truthful mechanism building on the exponential mechanism from differential privacy

Characterizations of bivariate conic, extreme value, and Archimax copulas

Based on a general construction method by means of bivariate ultramodular copulas we construct, for particular settings, special bivariate conic, extreme value, and Archimax copulas. We also show that the sets of copulas obtained in this way are dense in the sets of all conic, extreme value, and Archimax copulas, respectively