Managing an arts institutional repository

The article describes the background to UCA Research Online which originated from the Kultur project of 2007-2009 and then goes onto detail the management of the institutional repository at UCA

FCC Regulation: Indecency by Interest Groups

FCC regulations are among the most controversial administrative law regulations because of their impact on broadcast television. This iBrief analyzes the history of FCC regulation and highlights the problems associated with the current model. Applying theories of economics, this iBrief proposes solutions to the current problems of selective enforcement and vagueness in enforcement. While the Supreme Court recognized that FCC regulation is necessary, it is also necessary for there to be a clearer model for how the agency should be run

Do interest groups affect US immigration policy?

While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobby expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important

When Do Interest Groups Use Electronic Rulemaking?

This paper analyzes how electronic rulemaking is affecting the propensity of interest groups to file comments and replies at the Federal Communications Commission. The paper shows that exogenous events and a handful of issues drive filing behavior. Implications of the analysis are discussed

Do Interest Groups Compete?

This paper conducts a test of the hypothesis that interest groups compete strategically for influence with a policy-making agency. It adapts econometric methodology from the empirical industrial organization literature that was designed to work with discrete game-theoretic models, and uses data on whether or not supporting and opposing interest groups submitted comments to the Fish and Wildlife Service about each of 173 proposals to add new species to the endangered species list. The results imply that groups do respond to variations in the expected costs and benefits of a listing when deciding whether to pressure the agency. There is no support, however, for the hypothesis that the levels of pressure exerted by the groups emerge from the Nash equilibrium of games with simultaneous moves and perfect information.

Do Interest Groups affect US Immigration Policy?

While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobby expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important.Immigration, Immigration Policy, Interest Groups, Political Economy

Interest Groups and Trade Reform in Mexico

Mexico experienced widespread economic reform in the last two decades. From being a protectionist economy with a policy of import substitution, it has turned into an export-oriented open economy. Why was protectionism a stable policy, and how was it overturned by a reform that went against entrenched interests? I apply a game theoretic model of political influence and economic reform to answer these questions using data to calculate the payoffs for the relevant interest groups. In the underlying cooperative game, the core is empty and a protectionist coalition of import-substituting firms and the government was "stable" until the eighties. Adjusting the model's parameters to changes in the government's financing options in the late eighties and early nineties leads to a different and unique outcome. In the predicted outcome a free trade policy is adopted through cooperation between all players.Trade Reform, Mexico, Coalition Formation, Aspirations, Cooperative Games, Interest Groups

Interest groups and patent reform in India

India's patent reforms represent a shift in India's policy from one of enormous opposition to revising patent laws according to the WTO, to one of compliance with many aspects of TRIPs (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement. Industry and civil society had a strong interest in blocking reforms on IPRs (Intellectual Property Rights), and initially played an important role in preventing reforms of India's patent law. India has recently changed its patent regime, led by important industry groups who revised their positions, and new NGOs that promoted reform. The preferences of actors and their changing interests are important factors in the reform process. Perceived benefits from the new regime partly explain the rise of a pro-reform constituency among industry and NGOs. Yet preference formation is complex and depends on interpretation of strategies by various actors. The Indian pharmaceutical case reflects the imperatives both to forge ahead on patent reform, while protecting the generic market and restricting IPRs. NGOs that emerged to support patent reform also played a role in directing policy towards protecting traditional knowledge. The interests of actors do not always follow predictable paths, and are not fixed. Evaluating the preferences of actors rather than assuming them provides insights into the way policy processes are shaped.Intellectual Property Rights, industry groups, NGOs, reform, preferences

Interest Groups: An Introduction

This paper reviews public choice theories of interest groups.Interest groups; rent-seeking