An Epistemic Evolution of Intelligence

The perception of intelligence as power has intensified during the Second World War, when several intelligence agencies has been formalized and significantly increased. In all countries, new agencies and departments have been set up to deal with threats. Government publications in developed countries, following the September 11, 2001 attack, reflected a consensus that intelligence services are key to preventing mass attacks, spending huge amounts for the intelligence agencies that are considered a major component of national security systems. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.16398.2080

Historical Amnesia: British and U.S. Intelligence, Past and Present

Many intelligence scandals in the news today seem unprecedented - from Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, to British and U.S. intelligence agencies monitoring activities of their citizens. They seem new largely because, traditionally, intelligence agencies on both sides of the Atlantic were excessively secretive about their past activities: even the names “GCHQ” and “NSA” were airbrushed from declassified records, and thus missing from major historical works and scholarship on on post-war international relations. The resulting secrecy about British and U.S. intelligence has led to misunderstandings and conspiracy theories in societies about them. Newly opened secret records now reveal the long history of many subjects seen in today’s news-cycle: Anglo-American intelligence cooperation, interference by countries in foreign elections, disinformation, and the use and abuse of intelligence by governments. Newly declassified records also add to our understanding of major chapters of international history, like Britain’s post-war end of empire. Without overcoming our historical amnesia disorder about U.S. and British intelligence, citizens, scholars and policy-makers cannot hope to understand the proper context for what secret agencies are doing today

Scrutinising the secret state: parliamentary oversight of the intelligence and security agencies

This article considers the growing parliamentary scrutiny of the intelligence and security agencies. It raises a number of questions about the role and effectiveness of the Intelligence and Security Committee, Parliament and parliamentarians

A Proposal for an NYPD Inspector General

This report focuses on oversight of the NYPD's intelligence operations. Although a number of substantive legal rules set the boundaries of these types of programs, history has shown that it is exceedingly difficult to ensure that intelligence agencies adhere to these limits. Intelligence gathering, by its very nature, is clandestine and details of operations often cannot be publicly revealed. And while law enforcement agencies should be proactive in their approach to crime and terrorism, broad powers to collect intelligence in pursuit of these goals can, and have historically, bled into abuse

Law Enforcement’s Information Sharing Infrastructure: A National Assessment

The September 11 attacks impacted society generally, and law enforcement specifically, in dramatic ways. One of the major trends has been changing expectations regarding criminal intelligence practices among state, local, and tribal (SLT) law enforcement agencies and the need to coordinate intelligence efforts and share information at all levels of government. In fact, enhancing intelligence efforts has emerged as a critical issue for the prevention of all threats and crimes. To date, an increasing number of SLT law enforcement agencies have expanded their intelligence capacity, and there have been fundamental changes in the national, state, and local information sharing infrastructure. Moreover, critical to these expanding information sharing expectations is the institutionalization of fusion centers (FCs). Despite these dramatic changes, an expanding role, and the acknowledgement that local law enforcement intelligence is critical to the prevention and deterrence of threats and crimes, very little research exists that highlights issues related to the intelligence practices of SLT law enforcement agencies and FCs.1 This research describes what agencies are doing to build an intelligence capacity and assesses the state of information sharing among agencies. Specifically, a national survey was developed to examine the experiences of SLT agencies and FCs for building an intelligence capacity as well as to understand critical gaps in the sharing of information regarding intelligence

Community Policing and Intelligence-Led Policing: An Examination of Convergent or Discriminant Validity

Purpose Despite increased scholarly inquiry regarding intelligence-led policing (ILP) and popularity among law enforcement agencies around the globe, ambiguity remains regarding the conceptual foundation and appropriate measurement of ILP. Although most scholars agree that ILP is indeed a unique policing philosophy, there is less consensus regarding the relationship between ILP and the ever-present model of community-oriented policing (COP). Consequently, there is a clear need to study the empirical distinctions and overlaps in these policing philosophies as implemented by US law enforcement agencies. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach Data were gleaned from the 2007 LEMAS and 2009 NIJ Intelligence surveys. A total of 227 unique police agencies in the USA are included. A series of bivariate, exploratory factor analyses and structural models are used to determine discriminatory or convergent validity across COP and ILP constructs. Findings The goal was to answer the question: are these two policing philosophies are being implemented as separate and distinct strategies? Results of our exploratory and structural models indicate that COP and ILP loaded on unique latent constructs. This affirms the results of the bivariate correlations, and indicates that COP and ILP have discriminant measurement validity. In other words, COP and ILP are conceptually distinct, even when implemented in police departments across the USA. Implications of these findings and suggestions for future research are discussed. Originality/value This is the first study to empirically test the discriminant or convergent validity of COP and ILP

Enter the cyber dragon: understanding Chinese intelligence agencies cyber capabilities

This paper argues that the nature and tempo of Chinese cyber‑activities have policy implications for the Australian government. The paper provides an understanding of the key elements of the Chinese intelligence agencies that exploit the cyberdomain. It also shows that, while cybersecurity is a concern, much media coverage tends to oversimplify the issue and not present the public with the fuller picture. 2013 is the year that cyber issues have taken on a heightened priority and strategic weight. Governments must now work out how to handle cyber matters as an element of their foreign policy to prevent long-term damage to international relationships

Intelligence Whistleblower Protections: In Brief

Intelligence whistleblowers are generally Intelligence Community (IC) employees or contractors who bring to light allegations of agency wrongdoings by, for example, disclosing information on such wrongdoings to congressional intelligence committees. Such disclosures can aid oversight of, or help curb misconduct within, intelligence agencies. However, intelligence whistleblowers could face retaliation from their employers for their disclosures, and the fear of such retaliation may deter whistleblowing. Congress and President Obama have taken measures to protect certain intelligence whistleblowers from retaliation, and thereby seemingly encourage these whistleblowers to disclose information on agency wrongdoing. These measures are the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (ICWPA), Presidential Policy Directive 19 (PPD-19), and Title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2014 (Title VI). Each of these measures details what disclosures fall within the scope of its protections, which generally include certain disclosures through government channels (e.g., disclosures to agency inspectors general or congressional intelligence committees). None of these measures protect against retaliation or potential criminal liability arising from disclosures to media sources. The ICWPA applies to both IC employees and contractors, whereas PPD-19 and Title VI appear to apply only to IC employees. The ICWPA is the oldest of the three intelligence whistleblower protections and, of the three, provides the least amount of protection to those falling within its scope. The ICWPA does not explicitly prohibit retaliation against IC whistleblowers. Rather, it outlines procedures through which whistleblowers can disclose to the congressional intelligence committees information on “urgent concerns,” such as violations of law or false statements to Congress. The ICWPA further contains no explicit mechanism for obtaining a remedy for retaliation stemming from disclosure of an urgent concern to Congress. It merely allows an IC whistleblower who has faced an adverse personnel action because he disclosed an urgent concern to the congressional intelligence committees to then use the ICWPA’s disclosure procedures to inform the committees of the retaliation. PPD-19, unlike the ICWPA, expressly prohibits an IC employee from taking an adverse personnel action or security clearance determination against another employee because of a protected disclosure. It additionally requires intelligence agencies to develop procedures for internally investigating, through agency Inspectors General, allegations of impermissible retaliation. After finding that impermissible retaliation has occurred, Inspectors General can recommend that agency heads take corrective action. When an employee has exhausted the internal review procedures that must be established under PPD-19, he can appeal to the Director of National Intelligence, who then has the discretion to convene a review panel. If it finds that improper retaliation occurred, the review panel can recommend that the agency head take remedial action. Title VI seemingly codifies, and expands upon, some of the protections of PPD-19. Its protections, and modes of enforcement, differ depending on the type of retaliation alleged. More specifically, Title VI’s protected disclosures and enforcement methods in the context of allegations of adverse personnel action are distinct from its protected disclosures and enforcement methods for allegations of adverse security clearance or information access determinations

Implementing Intelligence-Led Policing: An Application of Loose-Coupling Theory

Author's manuscript made available in accordance with the publisher's policy.Purpose: This research is intended to inform a knowledge gap in the literature and present the first national findings related to intelligence-led policing adoption among state and local agencies. Specific practices are identified to inform scholars and practitioners regarding intelligence-led policing behaviors. Methods: Original survey research from a federally-funded project is gleaned to explore intelligence-led policing adoption through a loose-coupling theoretical perspective. Negative binomial and logistic regression models are employed to identify predictive relationships. Results: Agencies nationwide appear to be closely following the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan recommendations to enhance information sharing. Consistent with the Department of Homeland Security’s Target Capabilities List is also observed. Agency size appears to have a significant effect on key organizational information sharing behaviors. The findings are tempered due to limitations in the research design. Conclusions: Local agencies appear to be tightly-coupled with the recommendations put forth in the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan in their efforts to adopt intelligence-led policing. Agency size appears to enhance adoption across most dependent metrics. This research progresses the limited evidence base and progress regarding this emerging policing philosophy

Intelligence and the machinery of government: conceptualizing the intelligence community

This article argues that the failure to address intelligence agencies as public organizations part and parcel with the overt machinery of government constitutes a significant lacuna both in the specialist study of intelligence and the broader discipline of public administration studies. The role and status of intelligence institutions as aspects of the machinery of central government is examined, along with the prospects of certain key paradigms in the field for understanding those institutions are considered. Finally, the implications for the wider study of decision-making, policy and public management will be examined