Disability insurance and unemployment insurance as substitute pathways

In this paper, we estimate the degree of substitution between enrolment into Disability Insurance (DI) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) in the Netherlands. Starting in the 1990s many policy measures aimed at reducing DI enrolment, and increase labour force participation. We quantify whether these policy measures have led to a reduction in hidden unemployment in DI. A side effect of the reforms may be increased pressure on UI. Therefore, we simultaneously estimate reverse substitution, that is, hidden disability in UI. To this end, we employ a sample of firms in the Dutch AVO database from the period 1993-2002. Using instrumental variables in a bivariate Tobit specification, we identify the hidden components in both respective schemes. The estimation results indicate that about 3% of all dismissals took place through DI, which implies that about one quarter of the DI enrolments observed in our sample in fact consists of hidden unemployment. We find no evidence for reverse substitution of disabled persons ending up in UI.

Towards solutions for assistive technology

Introduction What is assistive technology? The agreed World Health Organisation definition is "Assistive technology can be defined as “any piece of equipment, or product, whether it is acquired commercially, modified, or customized, that is used to increase, maintain, or improve the functional capabilities of individuals with disabilities” (WHO, 2011) The array of possible assistive technology products and solutions reflects the diversity of the needs of people with disabilities – ranging from digital technologies that can support social engagement, communication, employment, learning, memory, planning and safe guarding services through to products and devices that support mobility and personal care requirements. Typically as the complexities of assistive technology solutions increase, so do the costs and potential risks (if not appropriately set up or maintained). This document is primarily focused on the Assistive Technology solutions derived from aids and equipment. Home and vehicle modifications and prosthetics have not yet been explored in the same level of detail and will be subject of further work. Proposed approach The proposed assistive technology service approach has been developed in line with the strategic goals of the NDIA. It is one aspect of a broader strategic approach the NDIA has to using technologies to enhance its engagement and management of relationships, services and supports with suppliers, providers, participants and the Australian community. The NDIA’s goal is to use technology in its various forms to ensure that services, supports, and communications between all stakeholders are as streamlined as possible and services are timely and effective. This document outlines the elements of a proposed service delivery approach for individuals to access assistive technology solutions and is based on the three key objectives outlined above

Health-Status Insurance: How Markets Can Provide Health Security

None of us has health insurance, really. If you develop a long-term condition such as heart disease or cancer, and if you then lose your job or are divorced, you can lose your health insurance. You now have a preexisting condition, and insurance will be enormously expensive -- if it's available at all.Free markets can solve this problem, and provide life-long, portable health security, while enhancing consumer choice and competition. "Heath-status insurance" is the key. If you are diagnosed with a long-term, expensive condition, a health-status insurance policy will give you the resources to pay higher medical insurance premiums. Health-status insurance covers the risk of premium reclassification, just as medical insurance covers the risk of medical expenses. With health-status insurance, you can always obtain medical insurance, no matter how sick you get, with no change in out-of-pocket costs. With health-status insurance, medical insurers would be allowed to charge sick people more than healthy people, and to compete intensely for all customers. People would have complete freedom to change jobs, move, or change medical insurers. Rigorous competition would allow us to obtain better medical care at lower cost. Most regulations and policy proposals aimed at improving long-term insurance -- including those advanced in Barack Obama's presidential campaign -- limit competition and consumer choice by banning risk-based premiums, forcing insurers to take all comers, strengthening employer-based or other forced pooling mechanisms, or introducing national health insurance. The individual health insurance market is already moving in the direction of health-status insurance. To let health-status insurance emerge fully, we must remove the legal and regulatory pressure to provide employer-based group insurance over individual insurance and remove regulations limiting risk-based pricing and competition among health insurers

Medical benefits for workmen under social insurance in Japan

Japan was the first Asian country to introduce social insurance measures and she has expanded them during the last few decades. The first social insurance law was passed in 1922 dealing with worker's health insurance in general. It was followed by many schemes of social insurance. National Health Insurance in 1938, Seamen's Insurance in 1939, Employees' Pension Insurance in 1941 and so forth. After World War II the new Constitution was enacted by which the Japanese Government was made responsible for the provision of medical care services for the whole nation. At present approximately the whole population is covered by either one or more of the various social insurance schemes. The main social insurance programs are shown in Figure 1 and Table 1. Most of these insurance schemes are compulsory under Japanese law. Since it would be too difficult and complicated to explain all of these forms of social insurance in detail, we will discuss only about two schemes directly related to medical care services for the workers; namely, the Health Insurance Scheme for non. occupational diseases and disorders (sickness or injury off the job) and Workmen's Compensation Insurance for occupational diseases and disorders (sickness or injury on the job).</p

An Introduction to Health Insurance: What Should a Consumer Know?

[Excerpt] Congress has seen a renewed interest in questions related to the market for private health insurance since the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111- 148, as amended). Recent health insurance marketplace changes include a different way to purchase health insurance (exchanges) and a new system of categorizing the generosity of plans’ health coverage based on the names of various metals (e.g., bronze and silver). Some consumers may face different choices of health insurance plans than in the past. Not all consumers are comfortable with the various concepts governing which health insurance plan might be best for them. This report provides an overview of private-sector (as opposed to government-provided) health insurance. It serves as an introduction to health insurance from the point of view of consumers under the age of 65 who purchase a health insurance plan. No background in health insurance is assumed, and all terms are defined. The report therefore can be viewed as an introduction to the more comprehensive discussion of health insurance found in the Congressional Research Service (CRS) health insurance primer

A Roadmap to Health Insurance for All: Principles for Reform

Presents principles for health insurance reform and compares the potential of three approaches -- tax incentives for the individual insurance market; mixed private-public group insurance with shared financing responsibility; and public insurance

The Impact of Insurance Prices on Decision-Making Biases: An Experimental Analysis

This paper tests whether the use of endogenous risk categorization by insurers enables consumers to make better-informed decisions even if they do not choose to purchase insurance. We do so by adding a simple insurance market to an experimental test of optimal (Bayesian) updating. In some sessions, no insurance is offered. In others, actuarially fair insurance prices are posted, and a subset of subjects is allowed to purchase this insurance. We find significant differences in the decision rules used depending on whether or not one observes insurance prices. Although the majority of choices correspond to Bayesian updating, the incidence of optimal decisions is higher in sessions with an insurance option. Most subjects given the option to purchase actuarially fair insurance choose to do so, however fewer subjects purchase insurance when the probability of a loss is higher. Working Paper 06-1

Insuring non-verifiable losses

Insurance contracts are often complex and difficult to verify outside the insurance relation. We show that standard one-period insurance policies with an upper limit and a deductible are the optimal incentive-compatible contracts in a competitive market with repeated interaction. Optimal group insurance policies involve a joint upper limit but individual deductibles and insurance brokers can play a role implementing such contracts for the group of clients. Our model provides new insights and predictions about the determinants of insurance

The Revision of the Insurance Mediation Rules at EU Level and its Impact on Consumer Protection

The European Commission has put forward a new proposal for a directive on insurance mediation which should provide for significant changes in practices of selling insurance products and guarantee enhanced level of consumer protection. This proposal accompanies other regulatory initiatives in the insurance sector, all of them pursuing three main objectives: firstly, a strengthened insurance supervision with convergent supervisory standards at EU level; secondly, a better risk management of insurance companies; and thirdly a greater protection of policyholders. All these initiatives contribute to the EU programme on consumer protection and herald a new approach to EU insurance regulation and supervision. However, while the new supervisory rules are a direct response to the financial crisis and shortcomings of crossborder cooperation between national supervisors, the plans for the revision of insurance mediation rules were conceived much earlier due to scandals with mis-selling of insurance products in the United States and some EU Member States. This article will focus entirely on the Commission’s initiative in the consumer mediation area and the aspects of insurance supervision and risk management will be dealt with in separate articles

More Than 95 Percent of U.S. Children Had Health Insurance in 2015

In this brief, author Michael Staley examines rates of children’s health insurance across the United States, by region and by place type, breaking down rates by private and public coverage. He reports that over 95 percent of all U.S. children under age 18 were covered by some form of health insurance in 2015—the highest share since the American Community Survey began measuring insurance rates in 2008. Rates of coverage increased between 2014 and 2015 in all four U.S. regions, and the greatest growth occurred in the South and West. Growth in public insurance—Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program— remained a major driver of increases in children’s coverage: over 375,000 more children were covered in 2015 than in the previous year. For the second consecutive year, however, rates of private health insurance coverage increased among children: in 2015, approximately 150,000 more children were covered by private insurance than in the previous year. The author concludes that any future attempts to reform health insurance ought to be scrutinized for their impact on children’s health insurance