Econymic Information Design

Information design is the defining of the requirements governing the selecting, rendering, and transmission of information for the purpose of knowledge transfer as well as the optimization of the information with respect to these requirements. In the case of econymic information, the knowledge transfer is determined by and linked to the respective markets.This paper examines its role in brand management and brand communication.branding; brand names; design; econymy

Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion

We study the effectiveness of information design in reducing congestion in social services catering to users with varied levels of need. In the absence of price discrimination and centralized admission, the provider relies on sharing information about wait times to improve welfare. We consider a stylized model with heterogeneous users who differ in their private outside options: low-need users have an acceptable outside option to the social service, whereas high-need users have no viable outside option. Upon arrival, a user decides to wait for the service by joining an unobservable first-come-first-serve queue, or leave and seek her outside option. To reduce congestion and improve social outcomes, the service provider seeks to persuade more low-need users to avail their outside option, and thus better serve high-need users. We characterize the Pareto-optimal signaling mechanisms and compare their welfare outcomes against several benchmarks. We show that if either type is the overwhelming majority of the population, information design does not provide improvement over sharing full information or no information. On the other hand, when the population is a mixture of the two types, information design not only Pareto dominates full-information and no-information mechanisms, in some regimes it also achieves the same welfare as the "first-best", i.e., the Pareto-optimal centralized admission policy with knowledge of users' types.Comment: Accepted for publication in the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20). 40 pages, 6 figure

Explaining drug-resistant infection in community pharmacies through effective information design

This paper describes a research project in which information design, human factors, architecture and pharmacy academics worked with pharmacy professionals and pharmacy users to consider how to present information about antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in a community pharmacy setting. Project outcomes – as a result of an innovative design competition – included five different design solutions that explain aspects of AMR within the context of a community pharmacy. The project raised awareness in pharmacy professionals of how design can be used to challenge ideas and encourage new ways of thinking to communicate public health messages. Two winning prototype solutions were installed in a Day Lewis pharmacy in Reading and evaluated by pharmacists and pharmacy users. We make preliminary recommendations for effective health communication in community pharmacies

Sequential Information Design

We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff‐relevant data but not the players' private information, nor the extensive form that governs their play. Alternatively, a designer may be able to build a mechanism from these ingredients. We characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of some extensive form with some information structure. We show how to specialize our main concept to capture the additional restrictions implied by extensive‐form refinements

Coarse Information Design

We study an information design problem with continuous state and discrete signal space. We find that the designer's interim value function affects the solution only through its curvature. There is a dual relation between the prior distribution and the marginal value function. Under convex value functions, the optimal information structure is interval-partitional. Moreover, in logconcave environments, a center of scrutiny emerges and information becomes coarser for states farther from it. We locate the scrutiny center and provide comparative statics on information structure with respect to prior distributions and value functions. The analysis can be extended to S-shaped value functions