Home Rule in New York: The Need for a Change

This article is intended to provide a practical lens into how Home Rule issues unfold in complex matters involving the City, and to suggest how a much-needed Home Rule constitutional amendment could re-shape or, at the very least, clarify Home Rule standards. Section II will provide some historical and legal background on Home Rule; Section III will analyze some of the more well-known Home Rule cases that the Law Department litigated during the Bloomberg Administration; and Section IV will discuss insights gleaned with respect to, and will offer several recommendations for, the future of Home Rule in New York

The Legality of Staten Island\u27s Attempt to Secede from New York City

This Note argues that, according to judicial interpretations of state and federal constitutions, Staten Island should be allowed to secede from New York City, regardless of the City\u27s position. This Note begins by analyzing the background history of Staten Island\u27s secession and New York City\u27s formation leading up to this case. This Note then analyzes the issue of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Section 11 of the New York Constitution. This Note then discusses the Home Rule Doctrine of the New York State Constitution. This Note concludes that, based upon federal and state case law, Staten Island can legally secede from New York City as long as the State Legislature supports the secession

The Legality of Staten Island\u27s Attempt to Secede from New York City

This Note argues that, according to judicial interpretations of state and federal constitutions, Staten Island should be allowed to secede from New York City, regardless of the City\u27s position. This Note begins by analyzing the background history of Staten Island\u27s secession and New York City\u27s formation leading up to this case. This Note then analyzes the issue of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Section 11 of the New York Constitution. This Note then discusses the Home Rule Doctrine of the New York State Constitution. This Note concludes that, based upon federal and state case law, Staten Island can legally secede from New York City as long as the State Legislature supports the secession

Can You Hear Me Now? : Expectations of Privacy, False Friends, and the Perils of Speaking Under the Supreme Court\u27s Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence

Part I of this article offers a brief history of the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the Court\u27s articulation and application of what has come to be known as the exclusionary rule, which forbids some (but not all) government use of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Part II focuses on the false-friend cases, elaborating the Court\u27s reasoning and showing why, although the most famous cases involve varying kinds of activity from electronic recording to eavesdropping to simple reporting of the false friend\u27s observation, the Court\u27s method has united these cases under a single analytical rubric. Part III discusses the unavoidable implication of the Court\u27s approach, and Part IV examines whether there is a principled way out of the dilemma that the Court\u27s reasoning has created. It concludes that there is, but the solution requires recognizing two unstated assumptions that undergird the Court\u27s jurisprudence in this area, assumptions that, when exposed to light, are highly questionable. The Court needs to reconsider how expectations of privacy really work. It has tended to view expectation of privacy as an all-or-nothing proposition, so that for Fourth Amendment purposes, lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to one person connotes that there cannot be a reasonable expectation with respect to anyone else. The Article suggests that this approach does not reflect the way that either those who wrote and ratified the Fourth Amendment or the majority of Americans today think about privacy. The Supreme Court should recognize, therefore, that when the government employs false friends to gather evidence for use in a criminal case, it does no more than to undertake a search with other eyes and ears and a seizure with other hands. It is a government intrusion all the same. Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment\u27s warrant requirement, which demands probable cause and the acquiescence of a neutral magistrate in the proposed search, should apply in full force

Take the Money and Run: Detainment Incident to a Search Warrant in Bailey v. United States

This commentary previews an upcoming Supreme Court case, Bailey v. United States, in which the Court will examine the scope of permissible non-arrest seizures in the context of a detainment incident to a search warrant. The case offers the Court an opportunity to clarify its holding in Michigan v. Summers--that occupants of premises being searched pursuant to a valid warrant may be detained during the search--by determining whether such a detainment is permissible when the occupants have left the premises