CONTRACTING FOR NONPOINT-SOURCE POLLUTION ABATEMENT

This study presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural nonpoint-source pollution. The analysis is based on a principal-agent framework with two parties: farmers and a regulating authority. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. Unlike previous analyses of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest nonindividual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority, where farmers can trade pollution abatement efforts. Findings show that the information requirement of a regulatory agency can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made nonindividual.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Role of fish in enhancing ricefield ecology and in integrated pest management: summary report

Summary report of the Third Asian Regional Rice-Fish Farming Research and Development Workshop, Indonesia, 1993. Includes sessions on ricefield ecology and fish; integrated pest management (IPM); research methodology; and IPM adoption.Rice-fish aquaculture, Culture effects, Pest control, Integrated farming

Zanimljivosti

Prvi statistički podaci o popisu pučanstva od god. 1954. u Francuskoj pokazuju da svake goidine 150.000 poljoprivrednih proizvođača ostavlja svoja zvanja. Od god. 1942. smanjio se broj poljoprivrednih domaćinstava za 600.000

The purpose of rating quality of evidence differs in an overview, as compared to guidelines or recommendations

No abstract available

O mužnji i mlijeku u SAD

Prilikom svojih pohoda mljekarskim farmama Unije imali smo prilike promatrati čitav postupak, tamošnjih farmera oko mužnje, a s tim u vezi i oko dobivanja mlijeka. Svagdje smo se mogli uvjeriti da oni farmeri koji postižu rekordne količine namuzenog mlijeka, obraćaju osobitu pažnju baš samoj mužnji