Falsifiability

We examine the fundamental concept of Popper’s falsifiability within an economic model in which a tester hires a potential expert to produce a theory. Payments are made contingent on the performance of the theory vis-a-vis future realizations of the data. We show that if experts are strategic, then falsifiability has no power to distinguish legitimate scientific theories from worthless theories. We also show that even if experts are strategic there are alternative criteria that can distinguish legitimate from worthless theories.Testing Strategic Experts

Giffen's Paradox and Falsifiability

This paper considers the methodological problem which the Giffen paradox poses for the economist intent on establishing the empirical status of microeconomic theory. We then turn to more general considerations of the falsifiability of economic theory based on discussions by Adolf Grünbaum. These considerations lead us to reject Louis De Alessi's proposal for rectifying the problem of the Giffen paradox. Finally, we turn to the problem of ceteris paribus as it bears on De Alessi's argument, and observe that he has not resolved this problem.Giffen Paradox, Falsifiability, Microeconomic Theory

Science and pseudoscience - Falsifiability

The delimitation between science and pseudoscience is part of the more general task of determining which beliefs are epistemologically justified. Standards for demarcation may vary by domain, but several basic principles are universally accepted. Karl Popper proposed falsifiability as an important criterion in distinguishing between science and pseudoscience. He argues that verification and confirmation can play no role in formulating a satisfactory criterion of demarcation. Instead, it proposes that scientific theories be distinguished from non-scientific theories by testable claims that future observations might reveal to be false. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.29821.6192

Effective Field Theories and the Role of Consistency in Theory Choice

Promoting a theory with a finite number of terms into an effective field theory with an infinite number of terms worsens simplicity, predictability, falsifiability, and other attributes often favored in theory choice. However, the importance of these attributes pales in comparison with consistency, both observational and mathematical consistency, which propels the effective theory to be superior to its simpler truncated version of finite terms, whether that theory be renormalizable (e.g., Standard Model of particle physics) or nonrenormalizable (e.g., gravity). Some implications for the Large Hadron Collider and beyond are discussed, including comments on how directly acknowledging the preeminence of consistency can affect future theory work.Comment: 17 pages, Lecture delivered at physics and philosophy conference "The Epistemology of the Large Hadron Collider", Wuppertal University, January 201

Belief in a Good and Loving God: a Case Study in the Varieties of a Religious Belief

There has been much recent debate over the meaning of the claim that God is good and loving. Although the participants in this debate strongly disagree over the correct analysis of the claim, there is nonetheless agreement across all parties that there is a single correct analysis. This paper aims to overthrow this consensus, by showing that sentences such as ‘There is a good and loving God’ are often used to express a variety of beliefs with quite different logico-grammatical characteristics. Belief in a good and loving God might range from being an evidentially grounded and empirically falsifiable ontological hypothesis, all the way to being a belief which is both ungrounded and unfalsifiable, and more akin to an attitude than to an hypothesis. The logical variety exhibited by the belief in a good and loving God often gives rise, in turn, to people holding that belief in a way that is indeterminate, mixed, or fluid between those different varieties. That is, someone’s belief in a good and loving God may hover indeterminately between more than one logical variety of the belief; or it may mix together some of the logical characteristics of different varieties of the belief; or it may change from having one logical character to another and perhaps back again. These properties are often masked by the fact that the belief is always expressed by the same sentence regardless of any indeterminacy, mixedness, or fluidity. Though these properties are rarely discussed by analytic philosophers of religion, logico-grammatical variety, indeterminacy, mixedness, and fluidity are pervasive in religious beliefs and utterances, and account for much of those beliefs and utterances' real-life complexity. This paper will make a start at an examination of these important properties by using the belief in a good and loving God as a representative case study