Exercising Abilities

According to one prominent view of exercising abilities (e.g., Millar 2009), a subject, S, counts as exercising an ability to ϕ if and only if S successfully ϕs. Such an ‘exercise-success’ thesis looks initially very plausible for abilities, perhaps even obviously or analytically true. In this paper, however, I will be defending the position that one can in fact exercise an ability to do one thing by doing some entirely distinct thing, and in doing so I’ll highlight various reasons (epistemological, metaphysical and linguistic) that favor the alternative approach I develop over views that hold that the exercise of an ability is a success notion in the sense Millar maintains

Classical invariantism and the puzzle of fallibilism

This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs (namely, about the outcome of fair lotteries) that are based on even stronger inductive grounds, while, intuitively, they do not qualify as knowledge. This paper discusses what is often regarded as the most promising classical invariantist solution to the puzzle, namely, that beliefs about the outcomes of fair lotteries do not qualify as knowledge because they are too lucky to do so (or, relatedly, because they do not satisfy a safety condition on knowledge), while other beliefs based on potentially weaker inductive grounds are not too lucky (or, relatedly, because they are safe). A case is presented that shows that this solution to the puzzle is actually not viable. It is argued that there is no obvious alternative solution in sight and that therefore the puzzle still awaits a classical invariantist solution

Wittgenstein on Knowledge (1949-1951)

In this paper, I want to characterize Wittgenstein"s epistemology, namely his contextualism, presented in his notes published under the title On Certainty. This characterization will be made in terms of a comparison with four control points in order to put into light the peculiarities of Wittgenstein"s epistemological position. The markers I will use for that purpose will give an indication of the level of conceptual commitment toward four important epistemological theses: holism, internalism, fallibilism, and egalitarianism. These markers have been chosen in function of the power of discrimination they provide regarding the two main trends in the past 40 years (or so) of debate in contemporary epistemology, i.e., foundationalism and coherentism. Using these conceptual markers, one can easily distinguish between strict foundationalism, which shows a low level of each markers, and strict coherentism, which shows a high level of each markers

Fallibilism and Multiple Paths to Knowledge (Extended Version)

This chapter argues that epistemologists should replace a “standard alternatives” picture of knowledge, assumed by many fallibilist theories of knowledge, with a new “multipath” picture of knowledge. The chapter first identifies a problem for the standard picture: fallibilists working with this picture cannot maintain even the most uncontroversial epistemic closure principles without making extreme assumptions about the ability of humans to know empirical truths without empirical investigation. The chapter then shows how the multipath picture, motivated by independent arguments, saves fallibilism from this problem. The multipath picture is based on taking seriously the idea that there can be multiple paths to knowing some propositions about the world. An overlooked consequence of fallibilism is that these multiple paths to knowledge may involve ruling out different sets of alternatives, which should be represented in a fallibilist picture of knowledge. The chapter concludes by considering inductive knowledge and strong epistemic closure from this multipath perspective

Why Objective Truth Is the Ally of Social and Epistemic Justice: Reply to Jenco

In “Are Certain Knowledge Frameworks More Congenial to the Aims of Cross-Cultural Philosophy? A Qualified Yes,” Leigh Jenco responds to an article in which I had argued for a similar conclusion. I had contended roughly that the positing of objective truth combined with a fallibilist epistemology best explains why a philosopher from one culture could learn something substantial from another culture. In her response, Jenco contends that this knowledge framework does not account adequately for the intuition that various philosophical traditions have an equal standing and that traditions other than one’s own are not to be considered inferior. In addition, according to Jenco, an appeal to objective truth on the part of one epistemic culture is unavoidably oppressive, or overly risks being so, with regard to another one. In this brief reply, I argue that an appeal to objective truth in the realms of epistemology and morality in fact makes the most sense of Jenco’s concerns about inegalitarianism and oppression

What is "true" in internal realism?

This paper is a critical examination of Putnam's theory of truth as it evolves from metaphysical to internal realism. First, I analyze the model-theoretic argument that led Putnam to abandon the metaphysical concept of truth as correspondence and to adopt and epistemic view of truth. Though a powerful critique of the metaphysical realist conception of truth, this argument does not establish conclusively that the concept of truth has any epistemic content. Secondly, I discuss Putnam's idealization theory of truth, arguing that the identification of truth with "acceptability under ideal conditions" is at odds with the claim that truth is context-transcendent, since the notion of justification is intrinsically context-dependent and no amount of idealization can reedeem its contextual character. Finally, I suggest that the realist intuitions that Putnam's internal realism tries to capture call for no more than a deflationary view of truth. Acceptance of this view requires abandoning not only the idea that truth is an epistemic property, but also the idea that truth is a substantive property that all true statements share and, therefore, a proper object of philosophical theorizing.Aquest article és un examen critic de la teoria de la veritat de Putnam en la seva evolució des d'un realisme metafisic a un realisme intern. En primer lloc, presento una anàlisi de l'argument de la teoria de models que va dur a Putnam a abandonar el concepte metafísic de veritat corn a correspondència i a adoptar un concepte epistèmic de veritat. Aquest argument, encara que constitueix una potent crítica de la concepció de la veritat del realisme metafísic, no estableix conclusivament que la veritar tingui algun contingut epistèmic. En segon lloc, discuteixo la teoria idealitzada de la veritat de Putnam, tot argumentant que la identificació de la veritat amb "acceptabilitat en condicions ideals" no s'adiu amb la tesi que la veritat no és contextual sinó transcendent, per tal com la noció de justificació és intrínsecament contextual i no hi ha idealització que la pugui redimir d'aquest caracter. Finalment, suggereixo que les intuicions realistes que el realisme intern de Putnam intenta captar no requereixen més que una perspectiva deflacionista sobre la veritat. Adoptar aquesta perspectiva implica abandonar no sols la idea que la veritat és una propietat epistèmica, sinó també la idea que la veritat és una propietat substantiva que totes les afirmacions verdaderes comparteixen i que, per tant, és objecte d'una teoria filosòfica

Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism

Hope, in its propositional construction "I hope that p," is compatible with a stated chance for the speaker that not-p. On fallibilist construals of knowledge, knowledge is compatible with a chance of being wrong, such that one can know that p even though there is an epistemic chance for one that not-p. But self-ascriptions of propositional hope that p seem to be incompatible, in some sense, with self-ascriptions of knowing whether p. Data from conjoining hope self-ascription with outright assertions, with first- and third-person knowledge ascriptions, and with factive predicates suggest a problem: when combined with a plausible principle on the rationality of hope, they suggest that fallibilism is false. By contrast, the infallibilist about knowledge can straightforwardly explain why knowledge would be incompatible with hope, and can offer a simple and unified explanation of all the linguistic data introduced here. This suggests that fallibilists bear an explanatory burden which has been hitherto overlooked

Charles Peirce's limit concept of truth

This entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or ‘limit’ of inquiry. This account is distinct from – and arguably more objectivist than – views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its ‘internal realism’, not realist enough

Defending Standards Contextualism

It has become more common recently for epistemologists to advocate the pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, the claim that the appropriateness ofknowledge ascriptions is dependent on the relevant practical circumstances. Advocacy of practicalism in epistemology has come at the expense of contextualism, the view that knowledge ascriptions are independent of pragmatic factors and depend alternatively on distinctively epistemological, semantic factors with the result that knowledge ascriptions express different knowledge properties on different occasions of use. Overall, my goal here is to defend a particular version of contextualism drawn from work by Peter Ludlow, called ‘standards contextualism.’ My strategy will be to elaborate on this form of contextualism by defending it from various objections raised by the practicalists Jason Stanley, Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath. In showing how standards contextualism can effectively repel these criticisms I hope to establish that standards contextualism is a viable alternative to practicalism

Can knowledge be justified true belief?

Knowledge was traditionally held to be justified true belief. This paper examines the implications of maintaining this view if justication is interpreted algorithmically. It is argued that if we move sufficiently far from the small worlds to which Bayesian decision theory properly applies, we can steer between the rock of fallibilism and the whirlpool of skepticism only by explicitly building into our framing of the underlying decision problem the possibility that its attempt to describe the world is inadequate